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It is a pleasure to share the 9th Issue of the International Journal of African Development 
(IJAD) Vol. 5.1 for Spring 2018. This issue covers seven research papers that entail a wide range 
of topics of African development challenges and opportunities. The contributors explore topics 
such the danger of tribal identity politics based on case studies, energy transition challenges for 
sustainable development, the impact of motivation on employee performance in insurance 
companies, whether inclusive growth promote effective regional integration among African 
states, the value of indigenous knowledge for development debate, a comparative study of 
breaking the poverty trap across African states, and integrating the youth into politics and 
economics for the African Development Agenda 2063.  
The contributing authors explore African sustainable challenges with case studies from 
Ethiopia, Nigeria, Ghana, and including regional and continental issues for Africa. The origins of 
the contributions include universities and research institutions from countries such as Ethiopia, 
Nigeria, Germany, Turkey, Uganda, Lesotho, Namibia, and Japan.   
With this brief note, I invite our readers from African States and around the world to read 
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Policy Research. We would also value advice regarding receiving funding from International 
Grant Agencies. 
I wish you all happy reading of the important papers in this issue. 
Sincerely, 
Sisay Asefa, PhD, Professor of Economics 
Editor in Chief of the International Journal of African Development 
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The Tigray Identity and the Paradox in the Securitization  
of the Oromo and Amhara Identities in Ethiopia 
 
Anwar Hassen Tsega1, Marmara University, Istanbul, Turkey 
 
Abstract 
Tigray’s ethnic nationality is the minority identity in the ruling Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a coalition of four political parties under the 
leadership of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). For decades, the ruling party 
has governed by pitting the Oromo and Amhara against one another. Accordingly, the 
Oromo-Amhara solidarity is the greatest threat to the Ethiopian government. Within the 
framework of the Copenhagen school, we analyzed the securitization of the two majority 
identities. This essay is split into two sections. The first examines why and how the Oromo 
and Amhara identities have been securitized by the dominant force of TPLF within the 
governing EPRDF coalition. The second section examines the implications and 
consequences of this securitization. I argue that the securitization, while a natural choice 
in many respects, has perhaps been detrimental to the overall security of the Ethiopia's 
Tigray-dominated government that perceives the Oromo and Amhara as a serious threat to 
Ethiopia's leadership.  
 
The TPLF Political Party as the Securitizing Actor 
As an authoritarian government and noncompetitively elected party state, the TPLF led 
government is deeply concerned with issues of legitimacy, and assert that it has the right to rule 
all those within its borders. Although the TPLF established the EPRDF in order to gain a national 
base and legitimacy in Ethiopia, it never lost its minority identification, and this has always been 
a source of insecurity (Tadesse, & Young, 2003). The EPRDF is therefore left with a dilemma – 
being an umbrella of ethno-national fronts of which the TPLF forms 6% of the ethnic portion, but 
it is the dominant political force of the country. On such a dubious platform of legitimacy and as 
the leaders of a ‘minority,’ the TPLF “either does not have, or has failed to create, a domestic 
political and social consensus of sufficient strength to eliminate the large-scale use of force” 
(Buzan, 1983, p. 94). If they are to remain in power, the TPLF clearly needs to build on this 
position because of the importance of “national identity and social cohesion in terms of the degree 
to which the population identifies with the nation-state and to accept its legitimate role in their 
lives” (Jackson, 2007, p. 203)  The EPRDF therefore has to both appear inclusive while 
simultaneously promoting “the ANDM [Amhara National Democratic Movement], OPDO 
[Oromo People Democratic Organization]  and the SEPDM [Southern Ethiopian People's 
Democratic Movement] to the vanguard of the people of the People’s Republic” (Ashine, 2012) 
as this is where its main volume of support comes from. However, the EPRDF’s ethnic policy has 
empowered some groups but has not been accompanied by dialogue and reconciliation. Real power 
in Ethiopia is in the hands of the TPLF. The other parties in the governing collisions are puppets, 
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and TPLF is their puppet master (International Crisis Group, 2009). The TPLF, therefore, is the 
securitizing actor, as it “securitize(s) issues by declaring something, a referent object, existentially 
threatened” (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, P. 36) 
 
The Tigrayans as the Referent Object of Security 
Referent objects are “things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a 
legitimate claim to survival” (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, P. 36). In this case, the referent 
object is the Tigrayan’s ethnic identity, as referent objects “can be collective identities” (Emmers, 
2007, p. 172). These minorities fought to liberate their ethnic elites from the oppressive military 
regimes. However, due to domestic tensions at all corners of the country, the Tigrayans along with 
some representatives from the majority Oromo and Amhara populations formed allies to be called 
the EPRDF. 
 
The Reasons for Securitizing the Oromo and Amhara Identities 
Why has the TPLF political party as the securitizing actor chosen the Tigrayan identity as 
its referent object?  Essentially, securitizing the Oromo and Amhara identities is a means to an 
end, that end being ethnic dominance and regime security. 
 
Extraordinary measures of securitizing the Oromo and Amhara identities:  
The Ethnic Classification Project from the Transitional Government to the Federal 
Democratic Republic (1991-1994).  
One method used by the TPLF led by the ruling political coalition has been that of naming 
and classifying ethnic groups. Meles Zenawi (the former PM) engineered a one-party rule for the 
TPLF and his Tigrayan inner circle with the complicity of other ethnic elites that were co-opted 
into the ruling alliance, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The 
Front promised freedom, democracy and ethnic devolution but became highly centralized and 
tightly controlled the economy and suppressed political, social, ethnic and religious liberties. 
Ethiopia’s political system and society have grown increasingly unstable largely because the TPLF 
has become increasingly repressive, while failing to implement the policy of ethnic federalism it 
devised over twenty-five years ago to accommodate the land’s varied ethnic identities. The result 
has been greater political centralization associated with ethnicization of grievances. The TPLF has 
remained the center of political decision-making in the EPRDF and kept the principles and 
discourses of its guerrilla years. This includes Leninist “democratic centralism,” in which the 
executive and central committees make all major political decisions, and then transmit orders to 
junior officials and administrators. “Revolutionary democracy” that advocates capitalism and free 
market is promoted, but at the same time the state and party has retained iron control through five-
year development plans. Meles’s absolute pivotal role developed during the armed struggle to 
overthrow the Derg – the military regime of Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam that ruled from 1974 
to 1991 – when he was a core member of the TPLF, an ethno-Marxist guerrilla movement founded 
in the northern Tigray region (International Crisis Group, 2012).  
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Exoticization of the Oromo and Amhara Identities as a means of securitization.  
One of the more obtuse ways of securitizing the Oromo and Amhara identities is by 
dominating the internal other. This is because “the objectified portrayal of majorities as exoticized 
is essential to the construction of the Tigray’s minority, the very formulation of the Ethiopia 
‘nation’ itself” (Yalew, 2014). Regarding naming, this intense othering is designed to quantify the 
majorities as commodities rather than equal footed citizens. It seems “the state has turned its gaze 
upon the internal other, engaging in a formalized, commodified, oriental orientalism that may be 
focused on the minorities but represents a long tradition of fascination with the outsider in 
Ethiopian society” (Saed, 1978 in Yalew, 2014). Securitizing the Oromo and Amhara identities in 
this unique manner and emasculating the other is essential to the EPRDF. “Belonging to a distinct 
culture tells us ‘who we are,’ and it is this process of self-identification which is key to nations” 
(Roe, 2007, p. 218). This non-violent and arguably non-repressive means of objectification 
nevertheless constitutes a speech act, as “the exoticization of majorities essentializes the imagined 
identity of the Tigrayans and reaffirms Tigre feelings of superiority” (Yalew, 2014) is crucial to 
the existence of the regime.  
 As ethnic mobilization was the TPLF’s means to seize power, it now appears that the ethnic 
polarization was created as a result of threatening the state power structure and national cohesion. 
There is insecurity when sharing the national agenda, mistrust against the government and other 
ethnic groups, many times irrational (political and economic) competition, and a new dynamic of 
the ‘we vs. them’ conception (Berhe, 2008). The previous Prime Minister Meles was the 
unchallenged intellectual and ideological guide of the party and government, and as a result, had 
accumulated a disproportionate share of power in the Ethiopian state. He had successfully and 
effectively marginalized his TPLF opponents and concentrated power to his own hands and those 
of close colleagues (Tadesse, & Young, 2003). Moreover, the TPLF promoted hatred of the other 
two major ethnicities (The Oromo and Amhara). They gave names for Oromo “Tebab” and for 
Amara “Temketgna.” The name “Tebab” in Amharic language stands for ‘Narrow Oromo 
Nationalists’ as the Oromos believe in Oromoness, and “Temketgna” stands for ‘Arrogant Amhara 
Nationalists’ as the Amharas believe in Ethiopianess. Indeed, it is a deliberate ‘speech act’ used 
for the last 25 years to subjugate the other ethnic majorities and solidify the referent object (the 
Tigray identity) at the center. It helped the TPLF to increase its power by dividing the two largest 
ethnic groups.  
 
The Securitization Process 
 The most notable feature of the securitization process of the Oromo and Amhara identities 
is that it is circular. The securitizing actor (the TPLF) securitizes the Oromo and Amhara identities 
(which the EPRDF is also comprised of) from an internal threat (other Ethiopian citizens) by 
subverting and subsuming the internal other (Amharas and Oromos). While “transforming an issue 
into a security question only requires the audience’s acknowledgement that it is indeed a threat” 
(Emmers, 2007, p. 173), in this case, the audience is the referent object of which the securitizing 
actor is also a part. Therefore, admission of the existence of a threat is pre-determined as long as 
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the audience (Tigrayan Ethiopians) keep faith in the securitizing actor (the TPLF), which it is not 
going to do whilst the securitizing actor has securitized their identity. This therefore legitimizes 
“the claims of the state to have authority over citizens as citizens [which] provide a source of its 
ability to exert violence against them” (Krause, & Williams, 1997, p. 45). This logical process is 
difficult to follow, but it boils down to a self-fulfilling prophecy whereby, as the EPRDF 
articulates, the threat is an “existential threat to a referent object” (Emmers, 2007, p. 170) and 
hence propagates its own existence because “in practice, the idea of state security – the integrity 
and functioning of the institutions and idea of the state – and regime security – the security of the 
ruling elite from violent challenge – become indistinguishable” (Jackson, 2007, p. 205).  
 
The Implications and Consequences of Securitization 
Marginalizing the dominant Ethnic Nationalities - the Oromo and Amhara. 
 The fall-out from the securitization of the Oromo and Amhara identities was in many ways 
quite predictable. Favoring the minority ethnic group and trying to dominate other cultures is 
usually met with ill feeling and violent resistance. Ethiopia has been left with the lingering problem 
of large marginalized groups, which have implications for the threat towards territorial control, 
and ultimately, for sovereignty. The net result of this failed forcible integration is that the EPRDF 
faces continuing ethnic unrest amongst ‘majority’ people (particularly in Oromia and Amhara) 
exacerbated by an assertive Tigrayan nationalism that the EPRDF has itself encouraged (directly 
and indirectly) in a bid to bolster its legitimacy by highlighting its patriotic credentials.  It is a 
matter of time before two of the three members of the EPRDF, the Oromo Peoples’ Democratic 
Organization (OPDO) and the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM) desert them in 
their role as puppets. Both groups hold little real power, but simply have been personally rewarded 
for going along with the TPLF under the name of their ethnicity. The transparency of the close 
relationship between the Tigrayan identity and the Ethiopian state has made any pretensions of 
multinationalism increasingly difficult. One obvious such failure is amongst its major population 
because the OPDO/EPRDF’s ideological project in Oromia – to win recognition as the sole 
legitimate representative of Oromo’s interests and to make Oromos think of themselves as 
Ethiopians and citizens of the Ethiopia – has not been successful.  
 
Ethnic cleansing of Amhara and forced displacement of Indigenous people from their 
Ancestral lands. 
 Population transfer as a method of gaining regional preponderance and ensuring the 
stability of the minority ethnic group is a deliberate activity so as to benefit from the resources of 
regions other than the Tigrayans’ original settlement. The net result of this is that “increased 
Tigrayan migration to participate in the region’s Sesaaam production continues to exacerbate 
ethnic tensions” (Tsega, 2017) Tigrayans flooded the territory, especially from the 1980s on, when 
the TPLF-led government reform program created new opportunities for migration and profit. 
Although they probably make up no more than 10 percent of the population, the Tigrayans are 
concentrated in Wolqayt’s cities and dominate the modern sectors of the economy. The close ties 
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between economics and demographics are illustrated here, as well as the fact that “many Wolqayts 
claim they are being pushed to the economic margins and overwhelmed by Tigre’s immigration. 
In the next section, we will look at the economic implications of the securitization of the 
Tigrayans in these ethnic areas. Article 32 of the Ethiopian Constitution guarantees freedom of 
movement within the national territory. Ethiopia is also a signatory to several conventions, 
including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which clearly state that 
a citizen has the right to work and live in any part of his or her country. However, since 2012, 
ethnic Amharas have been subjected to forcible eviction from Guraferda Bench-Maji in the 
Southern Regional State as well as from the Beni Shangul region of Western Ethiopia. Targeting 
Amharas, one of the largest ethnic groups in Ethiopia, for illegal deportation is a barbaric act that 
will have dire consequences for fostering ethnic harmony in Ethiopia. Stoking hatred will only 
serve to destabilize the country (Endalk, 2013). 
 Moreover, there is an ongoing hostility in the Amhara region. The government’s annexing 
of the Wolqayt communities to the Tigray administrative region has raised a serious question from 
its indigenous Wolqayt people who claim to be Amhara. Others should not be surprised at the 
failure of communities to accept the imposition of identities that do not correspond with how they 
view themselves and their surroundings. Favoring the minority ethnic group ensures a strong base 
of support, but discontented majorities have the possibility of taking asymmetrical means to 
destabilize key elements of the EPRDF rule and the Ethiopian economy. As we established, 
Wolqayt and Addis Ababa, especially, are areas which are vital for the EPRDF to retain control 
for geopolitical imperatives. The securitization of the Oromo and Amhara identities comes with 
its own set of problems as “the formulations of Tigrayan nationalism generally limit the extent and 
ways that non Tigrayan Ethiopian voices are recognized, and the EPRDF has problems in dealing 
with ethnic or nationality difference other than as a function of economic development” (Tsega, 
2017) 
 
The Addis Ababa ‘Master Plan’ and the ‘Ethiopian Somali Special Forces’ as a means 
of displacing the Oromos from their Ancestral lands. 
 In April 2014, the government announced its readiness to implement what it called the 
"Addis Ababa Integrated Regional Development Plan" (the Master Plan for short), which proposed 
to annex most of the city's surrounding areas belonging to the National Regional State of Oromia. 
This provoked an immediate reaction from the public, but the government responded with brutal 
repression of the protests. Clashes are thought to have claimed 140 lives of students and farmers 
from the Oromia region. The announcement of the Master Plan led to another round of killing and 
arrests of the Oromo youth. Ethiopian jails were beefed up even more. Oromia was subjected to a 
continued state of terror. Ethiopia is fast becoming a concentration camp of Oromo people.  
 As many argue, Ethiopia’s tense ethnic federalism is being tested as it experiences the 
recent deadly clashes between ethnic Oromos and ethnic Somalis in the country’s dry and mainly 
pastoralist southeast. Local militia and police, including the controversial Somali Special Forces 
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known as the Liyu (for Amharic ‘special’) issued a proxy against the Oromo. There is no doubt 
that the Liyu force has full support of the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) government 
in Addis Ababa. The TPLF initially set up the Liyu police as a counter insurgency force against 
the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), a group fighting for self-determination for the 
Somali region. Importantly, these ethnic clashes arose during the time when there was ongoing 
protests in the Oromia and Amhara regions and while the two major ethnic groups showed their 
unity to resist the TPLF led ruling party. I argue that this was a deliberate political decision made 
by the TPLF, because without these new ethnic clashes at the Somali-Oromo border, the unrest 
would not have been erupted. Due to the silent response from the ruling government, one of the 
high-level OPDO officials, Abadula Gemeda (speaker of the House of People's Representatives), 
has resigned out of his own freewill.  
 
Conclusion 
 In this analysis, the securitization of the Oromo and Amhara identities contradict the 
existing literature where “elites favor certain groups in the allocation of state resources, oppress 
minorities viewed as hostile, create minority scapegoat groups during times of unrest and appoint 
members of the elite’s own ethnic group to positions of power” (Jackson, 2007, p. 206). However, 
there is a paradox in that a tiny minority in the ruling coalition has not only become a securitizing 
actor and referent object in the securitization process but also demands and monopolizes 
federalism for the last 25 years. In the Ethiopian context, the TPLF was inherently and structurally 
deficient in establishing a genuine accommodative federal political framework in the country. 
Hence, it has been embarking on sustaining a political travesty via EPRDF (Ethiopian Peoples’ 
Revolutionary Democratic Force) that would assure its hegemonic project by using ethnic rights 
as a discourse to attract and subdue the disoriented ethnic elites. As the Copenhagen school 
forecasted, securitization is not a positive tool of statecraft. “Security is what we make of it” 
(Booth, 1997, p. 93), and “what constitutes an existential threat is regarded as a subjective matter” 
(Emmers, 2007, p. 172), but in dealing with these subjective threats, we often ignore other threats 
and simultaneously create new ones.   
To ensure the Tigray identity at the expense of others, “the state confronts powerful social 
forces with substantial coercive force, which in turn provokes violent resistance” (Jackson, 2007, 
p. 202). But securitizing an issue can make you vulnerable to the consequences of the exceptional 
actions you undertake, and something that has been bitterly experienced by those in Rwanda, 
where the traditional use of State violence in the exercise of power has created deep roots in 
history. It is this violence that facilitated Tutsi political domination over Hutu masses (Batware, 
2012). The government intensively works in a divide rule system so as to polarize the two major 
ethnic groups unless and otherwise its ruling period might be at an end.  
For decades, the ruling party has governed by pitting the Oromo and Amhara against one 
another. Now, the two groups are joining forces against the government; therefore, the Oromo-
Amhara solidarity has become the greatest threat to the Ethiopian government. However, as much 
as the dominant elite TPLF utilized ethnicity to come this far and defend the present power 
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structure, the marginalized elites may use similar tools to resist domination by fomenting ethnic 
conflicts in which civil liberties and human rights, the essential elements of building civil society, 
will be the casualties. As Berhe (2008) strongly argued, ethnic mobilization can only play a 
positive role if it is based on establishing and institutionalizing civil liberties and human rights 
upon which diversities are accommodated and differences are mediated democratically. To the 
aforementioned, Bete Amhara is a typical and successful resistance movement in the Amhara 
region - witness the rise of Amhara Nationalism. The Copenhagen school advocates 
desecuritization and repoliticization as more sustainable methods of dealing with security issues 
in the political sphere.  
I believe this securitization essay has shown the decidedly limited benefit of the Oromo’s 
and Amhara’s identity’s securitization. This is due to the fact that securitization is succeeded only 
by acceptance from the audience so as to move the issue above the sphere of normal politics 
(Wæver, 1995). However, by observing the overall hostilities in the country, one can understand 
that Ethiopia's Tigray-dominated government may not be able to sustain its hold on power for 
much longer if the current nationwide uprising in Ethiopia against a minority tyranny continues 
without changing its views. Though it is not going to be attempted here, what can be suggested is 
that desecuritization of the Oromo and Amhara identities through power sharing can be used as a 
means of curing the current unrest and future political stability. 
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Abstract 
This paper describes a novel approach to helping municipal authorities address the 
sustainable energy challenges associated with rapidly growing urban populations in Sub-
Saharan Africa.  Population in Africa is expected to double between 2010 and 2040, and 
substantial urban growth is expected in small and medium-sized cities where local 
government capacity constraints are most serious. A long-term partnership between 
municipal authorities, NGOs, and academics can build capacity, and a prescribed strategy 
can lead to progress on the ground. In order to contribute to future action, the paper argues 
for a greater role of local government in sustainable energy transitions, and presents some 
of the lessons learned from work in municipality-based energy work undertaken in South 
Africa over a 17-year period.  It provides evidence of change, but more importantly, 
considers the process by which that change occurred and the intentional strategy of policy 
influence. Several South African cities engaged in this process with the assistance of the 
non-profit organization Sustainable Energy Africa have been able to move to greater 
renewable energy and energy efficiency implementation, and have strengthened their 
energy capacity and governance frameworks. The paper reviews the changing energy 
characteristics of South African cities, and describes the key processes that create a policy 
environment conducive to moving away from business as usual and responding to 
sustainable energy imperatives around clean energy and energy poverty. The use of energy 
modeling to support municipal energy strategy development is also described as an 
important informant for decision-makers regarding the consequences of decisions taken, 
or not taken, today. As such, it provides the groundwork for transferring the 
methodological process to other countries, while the latter part of the paper draws on recent 
experiences in Uganda and Ghana in replicating the work. 
 
The Energy Challenges of African Urbanization 
Population in Africa is expected to double between 2010 and 2040. The urban population 
proportion across sub-Saharan Africa is 38% (UN, 2014), but is growing steadily at 1.4% per year. 
Most urban development in Sub-Saharan Africa is occurring in a non-planned and non-transparent 
manner (African Research Institute, 2013), and well over half of urban dwellers live in slum 
conditions, which presents serious governance challenges. One of the noteworthy features of the 
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population growth in Sub-Saharan Africa is that it is expected to take place mostly in small and 
medium sized cities, rather than capitals (UN-Habitat, 2010). Yet this is where local government 
capacity is weakest, and there is little to suggest that urban governance capacity will improve 
significantly under ‘business as usual’ conditions, as reflected in a recent assessment of capacity 
in African local government: “few countries have developed strategies to cope with the challenges 
posed by rapid urbanization” (Cities Alliance & UCLGA, 2013, p. 10).  
Energy is just one facet of sustainable urbanization, but a completely cross-cutting one, 
closely linked with welfare, economic health and environmental sustainability. However, as noted 
in the recent African Energy Outlook (IEA, 2014b), in spite of being resource-rich, access to 
modern energy in Sub-Saharan Africa remains low, the use of unsafe and unhealthy fuels is 
widespread, energy infrastructure is poorly developed, and the electricity supply is unreliable. 
While efforts to improve access to electricity are increasing, it is not keeping pace with population 
growth so the absolute number of people without a connection is rising. The often unreliable power 
systems have led to a proliferation of expensive back-up generators, and the ubiquitous reliance 
on solid biomass is putting forestry stocks under increasing pressure. The energy challenges in the 
region are therefore substantial, and there are roles for all levels of government in shaping a more 
sustainable future. 
Over the past decades the understanding of a ‘sustainable energy transition’ has started to 
broaden from a focus on cleaner energy to include the democratization of energy. This involves a 
greater decentralization of energy systems, increased bottom-up decision-making, and a demand-
driven planning focus, in contrast to the nationally centralized, supply-side planning common 
around the world before the 1990s (Goldthau, 2014; Reddy, 2002). A greater involvement of 
municipalities is a component of this trajectory, as reflected in the MDGs (Modi et al., 2006), 
where local government’s role is specifically noted, and the Sustainable Energy for All (SE4All, 
2014) initiative, where ‘bottom up’ solutions are considered important, amongst others is 
presented. The UN-Habitat notes, “Each region, nation, city and locality is different and 
sustainable innovations must be tailored to specificities that vary between localities and over time” 
(UN-Habitat, 2014, p. 7).  This again suggests a stronger role for municipal government in energy 
transitions.   
 
The Role of Municipalities in Sustainable Energy Transitions 
Although not yet acknowledged by many national governments, municipalities need to be 
stronger players in supporting the sustainable energy transition. Their core role around urban 
planning, transport planning, electricity distribution, and building plan approvals, amongst others, 
are important factors in energy transitions. Buildings consume 32% of the world’s energy (IEA, 
2014a), and each inefficient building that is erected today commits its occupiers to upwards of 50 
years of unnecessary energy consumption and associated high costs and emissions levels. 
Uncontrolled sprawling urban form results in cities that are likely to consume 30% or more 
transport fuels than denser cities (FFC, 2011). Municipalities are also significant consumers of 
energy in their operations, and operate landfill and wastewater treatment systems that can present 
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opportunities for clean energy generation. In addition, they can play a facilitative role for localized 
energy programs, such as the promotion of small-scale renewable energy systems (e.g. rooftop PV 
or biogas systems) and efficient cook stove initiatives (Kaza and Curtis, 2014). They are in close 
contact with their citizenry, including the growing urban poor population, and so are well placed 
to plan and respond more appropriately than national governments or other ‘external’ agents. 
 
Sustainable Energy Transitions in Cities: The Case of South Africa 
The 18 urban areas covered by the recent State of Energy in South African Cities Report 
(SEA, 2015) are home to half of South Africa’s population, but occupy under 5% of the country’s 
land area. They account for over a third (37%) of the national energy consumption and nearly half 
(46%) of national electricity consumption. They also consume half (52%) of the country’s petrol 
and diesel. The city energy picture is thus crucial in moving the country along a sustainable energy 
trajectory.  Yet, as with most local governments in developing countries, they are capacity 
constrained and struggle to provide the necessary services to their citizens, let alone give attention 
to issues which have longer-term consequences such as sustainable energy transitions. This is a 
dangerous situation, with the potential for a spiraling decline in welfare as the consequences of 
unsustainable practices steadily become the crises of the day. 
Given the growing recognition of the role of local government in a sustainable future 
(ADB, 2011; Cities Alliance and UCLGA, 2013; & UN-Habitat, 2014;), support for this level of 
government has started to increase over the past years, with organizations such as the International 
Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) and the South African Local Government 
Association (SALGA) having a growing sustainable energy focus. The following sections describe 
a municipal support program run by the non-profit organization Sustainable Energy Africa since 
1998 – the longest-standing of such support initiatives in South Africa. When this work started, 
cities were generally not regarded as players in the energy sector, and were not considered in most 
national energy policy or strategy discussions.  Today, this has changed. Due in no small part to 
such support programs, cities are now regarded as central agents to a sustainable energy future for 
the country. For example, local governments now are instrumental in key national policies such as 
the National Climate Response White Paper and the National Energy Efficiency Action Plan, and 
have a recognized role in national electricity planning documents. 
 
Agents of Change: An Applied Methodology for Facilitating Energy Transition at the 
Local Government Level. 
The capacity shortfall of local government to tackle the challenges posed by sustainable 
energy imperatives are significant, and are likely to remain so into the long-term under current 
conditions, as noted earlier. Given this situation, there is a clear need for external capacity support, 
and recently international organizations have begun to respond to this need, as discussed above. 
However, efforts to support municipalities with sustainable energy initiatives are too often 
ineffective. A fundamental reason for this is because many such initiatives, often conceptualized 
by outsiders, lack a detailed grasp of the complex internal operations and dynamics of 
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municipalities and do not appreciate the severe constraints they operate under. Often, approaches 
to this issue are derived from experiences in northern cities, where capacity – human and financial 
- is far less of a challenge, mandates and priorities are significantly different, and there is 
substantially less political interference and manipulation than at the local level (Bawakyillenuo et 
al., 2015). 
Sustainable Energy Africa has worked as a support organization for municipal authorities 
in South Africa over a 17-year period to promote sustainable energy. Over this time, they have 
developed a structured method of working with local government to support sustainable energy 
transitions. This methodology can be applicable to any organization in the role of change agent to 
this government sector, and is now being used in other African countries as indicated in the 
SAMSET (2013) project. The methodology is described in detail elsewhere (Bawakyillenuo et al., 
2015), but in summary, there are two key elements involved: one is the presence of an intermediary 
organization and the other is the structured workstream.  
 
Role of the Intermediary.  
Key to the approach is the involvement of a local intermediary organization, which can fulfill a 
number of functions: 
 Links several municipalities together in a partnership arrangement; 
 Facilitates the development of a Sustainable Energy Strategy by municipal authorities; 
 Coordinates local government inputs to relevant national activities; 
 Identifies barriers and constraints to the successful implementation of projects; 
 Provides a certain amount of expertise and research capability, but more importantly, has 
the contacts to be able to source specialist expertise as needed; 
 Acts as a knowledge intermediary, making technical information accessible to partners; 
 Promotes learning and capacity building of municipal partners, for example by running 
suitable workshops and courses. 
The intermediary should be an established, respected institution that deals with 
urbanization and/or energy and has a grounding in applied research. Candidates include 
universities, NGOs, and professional associations. However, the complexion of the intermediary 
organization is important; for example, local government associations tend to be too political, and 
some university locations may be too academic. 
   
Structured Workstream.  
A structured program of the following activities is designed to identify priority issues, 
develop a strategy to address these, and act on the strategy: 
1. Developing a State of Energy Report on each municipality – examine the energy supply 
and demand (domestic, commercial, industrial, transport, and government), including 
energy access and poverty, and environmental implications of energy use. 
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3. Modeling energy’s future using a simple energy modelling package, or even a 
spreadsheet. Considering energy use in the future based on, for example, population and 
economic growth trends can help decision makers identify forthcoming problems, and plan 
accordingly (discussed more later). 
4. Developing a Sustainable Energy Strategy evolving from the previous activities that 
identifies areas to be pursued, and assigns responsibilities and timeframes.  
5. Implementation support so the intermediary organization supports the process by 
facilitating, sourcing technical support, and communicating technical information to 
partners. This is arguably the most critical area of work of the program. 
The structured workstream described above, and the work of the intermediary organization in 
particular, all serve to strengthen the capacity of municipal partners. Formal capacity building 
activities have also been found to be effective: 
 Networking events - municipalities share lessons from implementation of particular 
projects. 
 Week long ‘Masters Level’ courses – relevant not only to municipalities but also to 
academics, consultants, NGOs, and development workers. 
Networking not only facilitates lessons sharing, but builds relationships between municipalities 
and enables the development of common positions resulting in a stronger voice to national 
government. 
 
The Changing (or not) Energy Characteristics of South African Cities 
Given the multiple factors that are inevitably at play in an ever-changing energy sector, 
what has the impact of such a dedicated local government support program been? The recent State 
of Energy in South African Cities 2015 report provides an overview of the changes that are taking 
place across the top cities in the country. Together with a range of other research reports, the 
emerging picture is one of significant local government energy governance shifts, substantial 
implementation in some sectors, and little movement, even deterioration, in others.  
 
The Energy Picture.  
South African cities are characterized by high transport fuel energy consumption, partly 
associated with sprawling cities with poor public transport.  Electricity is the second largest energy 
source (Figure 1) supplying the residential, commercial, and much of the industrial energy needs. 
Depending on the industrial sector characteristics of a city, there may be significant coal or heavy 
furnace oil consumption in the energy profile. Electricity is accountable for the majority of global 
warming emissions due to the carbon-intensive nature of national electricity generation, which is 
mainly coal-based. Largely because of such electricity consumption but also because of their high 










































Figure 1: Typical metro energy use and carbon emissions (SEA 2015) 
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Key Urban Energy Trends.  
Overall, energy use in South African cities 
has increased over the past decade, as expected in a 
developing country with a growing population and 
economy. This is substantially driven by transport 
fuel increases, since absolute electricity 
consumption has declined since 2007 (Figure 2 and 
3) due to steep electricity price increases and to some 
extent the global recession.  The economy in many 
urban areas is becoming less energy intensive, partly 
because some cities are showing a small shift away 
from manufacturing and industrial sectors towards 
the less energy-intensive financial and services 
sectors, but the decoupling is also thought to be a 
response to electricity price increases. This reduction in energy intensity is a positive trend, as the 
national economy has been notoriously energy intensive due to historically low electricity prices. 
Significant progress has been made with 
electricity efficiency since 2007, both in the private 
sector as well as in municipal operations. Although 
this trend has been accelerated by the electricity price 
increases, the focus on efficiency strategies and action 
plans, awareness raising campaigns, private sector 
energy efficiency forums and pilot projects that 
preceded the price hikes is likely to have enabled a 
more effective response to the situation. Within 
municipalities, efficiency improvements in traffic 
lights, street lights and buildings has been significant, 
supported by a National Treasury Energy Efficiency 
and Demand-Side Management (EEDSM) grant, and this has precipitated the institutionalizing of 
electricity efficiency in local government operations in several cities. Another significant 
development in the field of energy efficiency is the finalization of national building regulations 
that specify minimum efficiency standards for all new buildings (SABS, 2011), although they are 
not yet being widely applied mainly due to capacity constraints amongst municipal staff. However, 
in spite of these positive steps, there still remain significant unexploited energy efficiency 
opportunities, as reflected in the National Energy Efficiency Action Plan (DoE, 2013) as well as a 
recent assessment of efficiency opportunities in municipal operations (SACN, 2014). Amongst 
these is lack of ceilings in the majority of the approximately 3 million government subsidized low 
income households, resulting in poor indoor comfort levels and higher space heating energy 
expenditures in winter. 
Figure 3: Electricity consumption over time in South African 
metros, showing the decrease after 2007 (SEA 2015) 
Figure 2: Energy consumption over time in South African metros 
(SEA 2015) 
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The renewable energy profile of cities is improving (Figure 4) with several methane from 
landfill gas projects completed or underway and one significant wind generation project in place. 
In addition, sewage methane is being explored and rooftop solar PV embedded generation 
installation numbers are accelerating. Many municipalities have developed, or are in the process 
of developing, regulatory and procedural guidelines to accommodate this increased interest in 
embedded generation, as it is becoming ever more popular in light of consistently steep 
conventional power price increases and renewable energy technology price decreases. Total 
amounts of renewable generation, however, are still very small in relation to city purchases from 
















Access to electricity in South African cities is generally close to the national targets of 97% 
access by 2025, with 10 of the top 18 cities having connection rates of 90% or above, and only one 
being below 80% electrified (SEA, 2015). Several cities have programs to electrify informal 
settlements, often using innovative approaches and appropriate technologies to move into this 
previously marginalized sector (Gaunt et al., 2012). 
Overall, carbon emissions from cities are decreasing per capita in terms of GVA despite 
increases nationally (Figure 5). This has to do with the shifting nature of industries in urban areas, 
but also the recent decrease in total electricity use. To a lesser extent renewable and other 
sustainable energy interventions have contributed to this trend (SEA, 2015). 
Figure 4: Municipal (led or assisted) renewable energy capacity (SEA 2015) 
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Figure 5: Metro carbon emissions trends compared with national (SEA 2015) 
 
In the urban transport sector, there has been limited progress however. In spite of the 
Gautrain rapid rail project and Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) projects being implemented in several 
cities, the characteristic of urban transport is moving increasingly towards greater private vehicle 
dominance, worse congestion, greater real household expenditure on mobility, and longer 
commute times (DoT, 2013, DoT, 2014). Sustainable transport efforts are only likely to gain 
traction within a supportive spatial planning framework, however, and unfortunately, the 
development of South African cities has largely reinforced the apartheid spatial form of sprawling, 
low-density urban spaces, with the poor often in far-flung settlements, resulting in inefficient and 
expensive transport systems and reduced access to urban amenities by many households (CGTA, 
2014). While a few urban areas have progressive spatial development frameworks or regulations, 
urban form changes slowly, so even in these instances, it is not yet conducive to significant shifts 
towards sustainable transport. 
The State of South African Cities Report (SEA, 2015) indicates that urban energy-related 
governance has made substantial progress over the past decade, with seventeen metros and 
secondary cities developing sustainable energy strategies by 2011 from the first one in 2002 (SEA, 
2013), and dedicated sustainable energy management capacity increasing exponentially. (In 2015, 
there were over 35 dedicated staff dealing with sustainable energy matters in four leading metros, 
which is an increase from zero in 2000.) In addition, the availability and collection of local-level 
data to enable planning and track progress has improved markedly since 2000, prompted by 
multiple data collection exercises (SEA, 2006; SEA, 2011; & SEA 2015). An overarching local 
government sustainable energy strategy has been developed by the South African Local 
Government Association (SALGA, 2014), and the engagement of many municipalities with 
substantial renewable energy and energy efficiency projects indicates a departure from business as 
usual practice. However, without external support, the fact remains that most municipalities 
struggle to attend to sustainability projects that have longer-term benefits because of the pressing 
demands of day-to-day service delivery. 
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Evidence of Impact from the Support Program 
Urban change is driven by multiple factors, including energy prices, technology 
developments and prices, global warming pressures, national and local policy shifts, local political 
interference, resource discoveries, and economic performance and structural changes. In addition, 
in the past years, there have been several players active within the local government energy sector, 
partly linked to the increasing recognition of their crucial role in a sustainable energy transition 
and a resulting inflow of funding in this direction. It is therefore not easy to isolate the impact of 
any one support program such as the initiative described earlier, albeit a longstanding and 
extensive program. An independent review was undertaken in 2014 to this end which drew on 
interviews with stakeholders as well as a review of tangible projects linked to the program. In brief, 
the support given by the program was described as having a clear role in the following:  
 initiating the development of nation-wide city energy data,  
 facilitating energy efficiency programs in different sectors in several municipalities,  
 promoting renewable energy (often rooftop solar PV) in several major cities,  
 bringing local government perspectives to a range of key national policies and strategies,  
 bringing energy and climate change issues into spatial planning for the first time, and  
 institutionalizing sustainable energy and climate change issues within municipalities 
(CDRA, 2015). 
In six metros, the institutionalizing of sustainable energy has progressed significantly with 
energy strategies being developed and staff compliments expanded significantly. Tangible change 
has been evident, because of a range of factors, of which the above support is seen by stakeholders 
as being amongst the significant ones. The support program facilitated a sharing of experience 
with successful projects through research support, inter-municipal exchanges, site visits and 
making technical expertise available. Implementation of the following has accelerated as a result: 
 Installation of renewable energy capacity including electricity from landfill gas and waste 
water gas, rooftop solar PV, biowaste and wind electricity; 
 Energy efficiency measures including street lighting, traffic lighting, and buildings 
efficiency. 
Municipalities are generally conservative by nature and follow more readily than lead, so 
effort invested in supporting the first municipalities generally has a multiplier effect, especially 
when successes are shared via facilitated learning exchange events. 
 
Making a Support Program Work in Practice 
The experience from the last 17 years of working with municipalities has given insight into 
a number of important principles for local government support programs. The approach needs to 
be flexible enough to accommodate the following key operating principles: 
 Because municipalities are by nature conservative, it is most effective to work primarily 
with proactive partner municipalities, from which lessons can radiate to others. Selected 
partner municipalities should be fast growing, have senior-level buy-in to the program, and 
above all, they should be enthusiastic to participate.   
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 ‘Outsiders’ cannot easily grasp the detailed inner dynamics of municipalities, which are 
very often bureaucratically complicated as well as being subject to idiosyncrasies 
associated with politics and power. It is, therefore, essential that the sustainable energy 
strategy is led by the municipalities with the intermediary organization fulfilling facilitation 
and support roles.  
 It is important to make sure that the programs focused on are compatible with political 
interests and strategic priorities; it may be appropriate to focus on specific sectors where 
there is the most interest and alignment with municipal goals. 
 Success depends on goodwill within the municipalities, so the program should support the 
interests of key staff, even if this may not address highest priority energy issues, especially 
at the early stages of working with municipalities. Once the benefits of the program are 
appreciated, focus can shift more towards energy priorities. 
 It is worth linking with the ‘champions’ within a municipality who are keen to see change.  
Because change requires effort, little happens without people who have a specific 
motivation and vision in this area. 
It is important to emphasize that this is a long-term approach. In the absence of any clear 
revenue streams, the support program will require external funding. Few local governments in 
South Africa or Africa are likely to have the capacity, even in the long-term, to give adequate 
attention to future sustainability concerns in the face of the more immediate service backlogs and 
other urgent pressures. Supporting the capacity of local government can be funded by national 
governments but comes with a risk of bringing national political interests to bear, which may not 
be in the best interest of local government. Funding from development support donors is thus more 
appropriate. 
 
Energy Futures Modeling to Support Municipal Prioritization and Planning 
Although just one of 
a suite of support activities, 
energy futures modeling has 
played a significant role in 
the support of South African 
cities. As part of their energy 
strategy development 
process, full-system energy 
modeling has been 
undertaken in five cities - 
Thekwini, Ekurhuleni, Cape 
Town, Buffalo City and 
Polokwane. A province-
level model has been 
developed for Gauteng, and 
Figure 6: Modeled energy consumption forecasts under Business-as-usual (Ekurhuleni) 
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partial models have been developed in several other cities. Modeling the future has been found to 
be an important motivator for change. If decision-makers can see the future impact of decisions 
taken, or not taken, today, they are more likely to be proactive in this regard. 
The accuracy of such modeling exercises is reliant on adequate data.  While local-level 
data is improving, it is still far from comprehensive or reliable (SEA, 2015). However, a decade 
of experience with modeling (Winkler et al., 2005) shows that, even with substantially less-than-
complete data sets, it is a worthwhile exercise, because for strategy development purposes in a 
municipality, a high degree of accuracy is not important. It is enough to demonstrate the broad 
implications of current trajectories and different intervention choices. The futures modeling is 
based on a ‘business-as-usual’ scenario, which is generally taken to be an expected future should 
current trends continue (See Figure 6 as an example.). Different municipalities will customize 
alternative, more sustainable scenarios based on existing policy frameworks and emerging priority 
issues. For example, if decision-makers can see the cost of a future ‘business as usual’ energy 
profile (e.g. Figure 7) and the potential cost savings of a different trajectory (e.g. Figure 9), they 
are more motivated to change the trajectory. In addition, the modeling can show which 
interventions are most critical to effect such change (Figure 8). Municipal officials are thus 
equipped with facts and figures to help argue the case for change and negotiate the inevitable 























Figure 7: With energy cost increases and high growth, the city may face an expensive 
energy future (Cape Town) 
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Figure 8: Energy saving impacts of different sustainable energy efficiency interventions (Buffalo City) 
Figure 9: Modeled cost savings from efficiency and renewable interventions (eThekwini) 
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The modeling can also explore what is required to move a city’s carbon profile to one in 
keeping with national or global mitigation ambitions. In South Africa’s case this is the peak-
plateau-decline trajectory defined in the National Climate Change Response White Paper (DEA, 
2011). Through such an exercise, it is common to find that, even with a very ambitious set of 
efficiency and renewable energy interventions, the carbon trajectory can only temporarily accord 
with these ambitions (Figure 10), and in the decades to come, will start to depart from acceptable 
levels unless more fundamental and hitherto undefined shifts in the energy sector emerge. The 
difficulty of achieving a stable, declining carbon trajectory in the long-term is a concern the world 


















Although energy futures modeling is an important part of strategy development and the 
local government support process, it must be seen as just one component of a general support 
framework, and should be adequately embedded in such a process if it is to be of use. Elements of 
the support program design mentioned earlier, including capacity building, participatory strategy 
development and a strong implementation support component, are essential if change is to take 
place. 
 
Supporting Sub-Saharan African Cities with Sustainable Energy 
Urbanization rates in Africa are amongst the highest in the world, and, as with South Africa, 
the municipal capacity to undertake even minimum levels of urban planning and basic service 
delivery is severely inadequate. This is acknowledged by institutions such as the African 
Development Bank (ADB, 2011), UN-Habitat (2014) and Cities Alliance (Cities Alliance & 
UCLGA, 2013); all of whom have noted the need for bolstering local government mandates, 
capacity and resources. This includes the municipal role in sustainable energy transitions given the 
Figure 10: Even with significant sustainable energy implementation, emissions rise 
above acceptable levels after about 2035 (Cape Town) 
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central role energy plays in welfare improvements and economic health, as well as its 
environmental impact. In many African countries, the capacity challenges are even greater than 
those faced by South African municipalities. 
In general, although few outside of South Africa are electricity distributors, local 
governments across Sub-Saharan Africa have strong roles in spatial and transport planning and 
building plan approval.  They also often manage solid and liquid waste streams, with associated 
renewable energy opportunities.  All of these have important direct links with sustainable energy. 
Drawing on the experience in South Africa, the SAMSET project (SAMSET, 2013) has 
been working with selected Sub-Saharan African municipalities at a detailed level since 2013. The 
project is a partnership with universities and development organizations in Africa and the UK, and 
six municipalities in Uganda, Ghana and South Africa. The project has identified intermediary 
support organizations in each African country – one at the Institute of Statistical Social and 
Economic Research at the University of Ghana, and one in the Faculty of the Built Environment 
at the Uganda Martyrs University, in addition to Sustainable Energy Africa in South Africa. The 
project is building the capacity of these organizations through their engagement with the structured 
workstream described earlier, and they are in turn supporting local partner municipalities with 
energy issues of relevance.   
A central component of the project is to research and improve the knowledge exchange 
process (Marvin & Silver, 2014), both amongst the project partners as feedback to improve activity 
effectiveness, as well as more generally between local government and support organization 
players – those aiming to be change agents to this sphere of government. Given the current frequent 
misalignment of development support initiatives and local government needs discussed earlier, the 
knowledge exchange framework being developed is seen as a core contribution to such 
development support in Africa. 
The municipal support work of SAMSET is in its early stages still and therefore impacts 
and lessons are not yet apparent. To date, ‘state of energy’ surveys have been undertaken to 
establish the problems and opportunities within municipalities, relationships with municipalities 
have been formalized, capacity building events have been held, and coordination with key 
stakeholders pursued. Energy futures modeling is in advanced stages and strategy development 
work has started. The inter-municipal knowledge exchange events that have taken place to date 
have revealed numerous transferrable learnings between the countries. This collaboration will 
guide the full process of systemic change with the municipalities over the coming years, and the 
longer-term plan is to roll out the approach and for the current intermediary support organizations 
in each country, to capacitate further intermediary organizations in other African countries. 
 
Conclusion 
Given the rate of urbanization in Sub-Saharan Africa and the lack of capacity in most 
governments to respond to the expanding service delivery needs, the region may be facing a crisis 
of global proportion. In Africa, there is a call for at least a partial localization of solutions. In 
addition, there is a growing recognition of the potentially important role of municipalities in 
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addressing the many challenges facing urban areas, including those associated with sustainable 
energy transitions. This, coupled with the severe capacity shortages in municipalities, point to an 
important focus for development support. The program described herein has had a positive impact 
on the trajectory of South African urban areas and can make a contribution in bolstering municipal 
abilities throughout Sub-Saharan Africa to respond to these challenges. It seems appropriate that 
such approaches are given greater attention by development support institutions globally. 
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The Impact of Motivation on Employee Performance in 
Selected Insurance Companies in Nigeria 
 
Oluwayomi Ayoade Ekundayo, Joseph Ayo Babalola University, Nigeria 
 
Abstract 
Motivation refers to a complexity of forces that inspires a person at work to intensify his 
desire and willingness to use his potentialities to perform in order to achieve organizational 
goals or objectives. This study investigates the relationship between motivation and the 
level of employee performance as applied to some selected insurance companies in Lagos. 
The study has three main objectives: to evaluate the effects of motivation on employee 
performance in some selected insurance companies, to assess motivational factors that can 
influence employee performance, and to recommend possible policies and innovations for 
better performance of the employees and increased profitability. Structured Questionnaire 
was used as the instrument for the research work. This instrument was tested for reliability 
and validity of its content. The results of the tests were certified by experts. The study used 
stratified random sampling and simple random sampling techniques in selecting the 
respondents. A sample of 100 respondents which included management, senior and junior 
staff members, of the selected insurance company was used for the primary data. Simple 
percentages, distribution tables and pie chart statistical tools were used to analyse the 
primary data while Chi-Square (X2) was applied to test the only hypothesis formulated for 
the study at 0.05 level of significance. The findings revealed that motivation was the major 
factor that affected employee performance. Furthermore, the study showed a direct strong 
and positive relationship between motivation of employees and their performance. This 
study hereby recommends that the management teams in organizations should always carry 
out a thorough study on the various motivational tools that can appeal and motivate their 
employees. Such motivational tools can include: involvement of employees in decision 
making, rotation of employees, provision of fringe benefits, payment of bonuses to 
workers, and promotion of deserved staff to higher positions of authority. 
 
Keywords: motivation, employee performance, intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. 
 
Introduction 
Motivation can be defined as the complexity of forces that inspires a person at work to 
intensify his desires and willingness to use his potential to perform in order to achieve 
organizational objectives. According to Mile (2004), motivation is a condition which influences 
the arousal, direction and maintenance of behavior. Human needs must be satisfied, and this can 
cause the arousal of motivational forces. Koontz et al. (1990) opined that motivation of employees 
is an important inner control tool and should be satisfied in order to attain advantages such as 
increased employee commitment, increased productivity and efficiency. Motivation emphasizes 
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result-oriented management through the setting of smart goals and effective communication 
systems in an organization. 
According to Koontz et al. (1990), employee performance refers to the efficiency and 
effectiveness of employees in achieving organizational goals and objectives. They further stated 
that employee performance could be evaluated by considering the level of absenteeism, quality of 
reports, and the time of reporting for and leaving duty. 
 
Statement of Problem 
Towers, (2003) emphasized in his book titled, Working Today: Understanding What Drives 
Employee Engagement, quoted by Adelanwa (2013), that employee motivation was the biggest 
driver of organizational performance. He further stated that an organization that was able to 
motivate its employees and maintain it would be able to leverage their zeal and drive in order to 
ensure staff performance. 
This study is therefore aimed at evaluating the impact of motivation on the employees and 
the level of their performance. 
 
Research Questions 
1. Is there any relationship between motivation and employee performance? 
2. Is it necessary to motivate employees before they can perform? 
3. Should motivation of employees be limited to salary and allowances? 
 
Objectives of the Study 
This research study will evaluate the motivational factors that can influence employee 
performance, assess effects of motivation on employee performance, and recommend possible 
motivational policies and innovations for increasing the level of performance of the employees. 
The independent variable in this study is performance while the dependent variable is motivation. 
Motivation will be discussed using the following variables: salaries and wages, ICT training, fringe 
benefits (e.g. house rent allowance, leave bonus, transportation allowance, luncheon vouchers), 
staff training, provision for staff self-development benefits, length of service award to deserved 
staff, along with others. 
 
Research Hypothesis 
1. There is no strong relationship between employee performance and motivation. 
2. It is not necessary to motivate employees before they perform. 
3. Motivation of employees should not be limited to salaries and allowances. 
 
Scope of Study 
The study focuses on the impact of motivation on employee performance and the 
relationship between motivation and employee performance. 
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Significance of the Study 
The research will be of great importance to various organizations and groups of employers 
of labor in assisting them in knowing different forms of motivation for better performance. 
 
Literature Review 
There are competitive environments among the various businesses and organizations. 
Therefore, all employers of labor try to manage their overhead costs in order to retain their key 
employees through motivation. The relationship between motivation and employee performance 
is that employees tend to perform much better when they are positively and consistently motivated. 
However, the employees perform less when they are poorly motivated. Therefore, motivation is 
directly proportional to the performance of employees. Kreitner (1989) and Higgins (1994) in their 
respective comments asserted that motivation is the psychological process that gives behavior, 
purpose, direction and an internal drive to satisfy an unsatisfied need. Adelanwa (2013) referenced 
Deci, Ryan and Roberts by saying, 
Traditionally, motivation has been defined by the two dimensions that comprise it, namely: 
energy and direction. The energy dimension of motivation is the driving force behind 
someone’s efforts and persistence during engagement in a particular activity. Direction of 
motivation determines the area or field of interest in which that effort is projected. Both 
energy and direction are necessary elements of a complete motivational act. Energy without 
a direction has no purpose, and direction without energy results in a state of no motivation. 
(p. 56) 
Different scholars have agreed and disagreed on the ways employees should be motivated. 
Some of them assert that in order to motivate an individual, a financial reward is necessary by the 
motivator whereas others believe that money is not a true motivator hence both financial and non- 
financial incentives are required. According to Cole (1998), financial incentives are rewards that 
employees receive in consideration of their contribution towards the organization. Lindner (1998) 
noted that monetary methods of motivation have little value, even though many firms still use 
money as a major incentive. She adds that wages are normally paid per hours worked and workers 
receive money at the end of the week, and overtime is paid for any additional hours worked, 
whereas salaries are based on a year’s work and are paid at the end of each month. Chien-Chung 
(2003) said, “Piece rate is the paying of a worker per item produced in a certain period of time.” 
He asserted that this incentive increased speed of work and therefore, productivity. This was in 
agreement with the earlier revelations made by Taylor (1911) who noted that the employees 
considered piece rate as a practice of motivation. Doellgast (2006) believed that fringe benefits are 
often known as ‘’perks’’ and are items which an employee receives in addition to their normal 
wage and salary. These include: company cars, health insurance, free meals, education, and so on. 
He asserts that these encourage loyalty to the company, and as such, employees may stay longer 
with the company. Another believer of this school of thought includes Likert (2004). 
An additional school of thought believes that non-financial incentives are the most 
important motivators of human behavior in terms of the needs of human beings. These researchers 
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believe that non-financial incentives such as training opportunities, job rotation and 
communication styles are excellent motivators. The believers of this school of thought include 
Herzberg (2000) and Fowler (2001). However, Clifton (2000) disagreed with the view that job 
rotation does not actually lead to the motivation of employees. This practice only helps the 
employees not get bored with their work but does not maintain a certain level of motivation in 
employees. 
A third school of thought believes that employee performance can be increased through the 
provision of non-financial incentives such as goal clarity, knowledge of structures and feedback. 
Believers in this school of thought are Knights and Willmott (2007), Peterson and Luthans (2006), 
Rynes, Gerhart, Minette, and Edwards (2004) along with Taylor (1911). 
Another school of thought believes that performance might not occur if the environmental 
conditions are so unsuitable as to present insurmountable barriers to performance (Rynes et al., 
2004). These environmental conditions, they believe, include technology, training and experience, 
abilities, and work-home balance. Technology, according to Samuel (2010), is a primary tool that 
can be used to boost employee performance. Improvement in technology accompanied by training 
of the employees can significantly increase their level of performance because it reduces the stress 
that comes with doing the job manually. Scott (2000) defined ability as the capacity to learn and 
perform the tasks required. He revealed that a good mixture of ability, training and experience is 
the root cause of the best performance. He asserted that the best performing employees have at 
least, two of the three factors. In addition, Berman (2001) wrote that as much as an employer might 
not want to be affected by the personal life of his employees, personal problems can sometimes 
affect employee performance. Managers need to be more sensitive to employee personal problems 
and be prepared to discuss the issues with the employees when necessary. If an employee requires 
time off to deal with a personal problem, Berman continued, then granting that time off would help 
to show all other employees that the company values its employees. In all, motivation that leads 
to productivity can be complicated. 
 
Challenges of Motivation 
Some of the challenges facing the application of motivation in organizations include 
corporate culture, communication style, organization direction, decision making, and feedback 
mechanism (Deci, 1975). 
 
Theoretical Framework 
This research study is based on the following motivational theories: 
 
Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs Theory (1943) 
Abraham Maslow in 1943 published a theory on what motivates human beings in his paper 
titled, “A Theory of Human Motivation.” In it, Maslow said that human beings had five levels of 
needs that they always sought to meet. The more the needs are basic for life, the more motivated a 
person is to fulfil them. However, they would experience more stress if they failed or were unable 
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to fulfil them. The five levels of need are: physiological needs, safety needs, belongingness needs, 
ego-status needs and self-actualization needs. 
 
Expectancy Theory of Motivation 
This theory tries to explain and predict motivated behavior. It attempts to answer the 
question: What determines a person’s readiness for motivated behavior? The theory draws on 
thoughts from rational science, which includes human behavior as being controlled by a desire for 
maximum use of a given behavior. The following formula can be used to explain the theory 
(Atkinson, 1964). 
Motivation = Expectancy x Instrumentality x Valence (E x I x V) where: 
E = Expectancy, or “the relevant employee’s expectations that his performance leads to the desired 
result, i.e. that the performance will be successful (Laegaard & Bindslev, 2006, p. 46).” 
I = Instrumentality, or “the personal assessment of the probability of different rewards as a 
consequence of successful task performance. Some rewards will in all probability occur while 
others have significantly smaller or very poor probability (Laegaard & Bindslev).” 
V = Valence, or “the value attached to these rewards by the employee concerned. Examples of 
rewards are promotion, higher pay (increase in salary), time off, over-time pay, credit, and so on. 
The factor V is the personal value of possible rewards and is often called Valence (Laegaard & 
Bindslev).” 
 
Management by Objectives (MBO) 
This theory relies on the idea that “most human behavior depends on unconscious choices 
related to objectives and intentions” (Laegaard & Bindsley, 2006, p. 48). All actions have a 
direction and a desired result. Techniques for objective setting include the practical use of several 
motivational theories, or of which the Expectancy Theory is a primary influence. The belief is that 
the objectives and the process of objectives setting have positive influence on motivation that can 
lead to better performance. Objectives, or goals, must be SMART. That is S = Specific, M = 
Measurable, A = Ambitious and Attractive, R = Realistic, T =Time related (Laegaard & Bindslev). 
 
McClelland’s Motivational Theory (1971) 
David McClelland’s Theory begins with the management group, and he “focuses on three 
meaningful needs which he believes are culturally acquired and therefore, possible to change 
through training. He does not deal with progression and regression between needs but with the 
needs/motives that have significant influence on productivity and efficiency in work life. 
McClelland’s needs, which are often called APA needs, include: 
1. Achievement Needs: This is the need to achieve high performance and to master difficult 
and complex tasks. 
2. Power Needs: This is a need to take responsibility, take charge, gain influence, and the 
willingness to make a difference. McClelland distinguished between social power needs, 
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i.e. the need to perform well for others and/or the entire company, and personal power 
needs, i.e. the need to create personal gain. 
3. Affiliation Need: This is the need for social interaction and need to create and maintain 
friendships. McClelland believed that all people have different composition of the three 




A descriptive research design was used in carrying out this study. The purposeful sampling 
technique was used to collect data from the management staff, underwriting department staff, 
claims department staff, marketing department staff and accounting department staff of the 
selected insurance organizations through the use of a structured questionnaire. One hundred copies 
of the questionnaire were administered and collected. Distribution and frequency tables and 
percentages were used for data presentation. A four Likert scale ranging from Strongly agree - SA 
(4), Agree - A (3), Disagree - D (2), and Strongly disagree - SD (1) was used to measure the 
adequacy of the data. Only one of the hypotheses was tested using the Chi-square [X2] statistical 
tool. 
Data Presentation, Analysis and Results 
Table 1 
Length of Service 
Length of service Frequency Percentage Valid % Cumulative Percentage 
1-5 years 16 16 16 16 
6-10 years 34 34 34 50 
11-15 years 28 28 28 78 
16 years 22 22 22 100 
Total 100 100 100  
 
Table 2 
Wages and salaries as a factor of motivation 
Motivation Levels Frequency Percentage Valid Percentage Cumulative Percentage 
Strongly Agree 10 10 10 10 
Agree 18 18 18 28 
Disagree 45 45 45 73 
Strongly Disagree 27 27 27 100 
Total 100 100 100  
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Table 3 
Fringe Benefits as Factor of Motivation 
Fringe Benefits Frequency Percentage Valid Percentage Cumulative Percentage 
Strongly Agree 64 64 64 64 
Agree 32 32 32 96 
Disagree 4 4 4 100 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 0 100 
Total 100 100 100  
 
Table 4 
In-Service Training of Workers as Factor of Motivation 
Employee Training Frequency Valid Percentage Cumulative Percentage 
Strongly Agree 76 76 76 
Agree 20 20 96 
Disagree 4 4 100 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 100 
Total 100 100  
 
Table 5 
Participation in Decision Making as Factor of Motivation 
Decision Making Frequency Valid Percentage Cumulative Percentage 
Strongly Agree 4 4 4 
Agree 8 8 12 
Disagree 30 30 42 
Strongly Disagree 58 58 100 
Total 100 100  
 
Table 6 
Promotion as Factor of Motivation 
Employee Promotion Frequency Valid Percentage Cumulative Percentage 
Strongly Agree 20 20 20 
Agree 14 14 34 
Disagree 46 46 80 
Strongly Disagree 20 20 100 
Total 100 100  
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Table 7 
Goal Clarity and Staff Performance as Factor of Motivation 
 
Goal Clarity Frequency Valid Percentage Cumulative Percentage 
Strongly Agree 24 24 24 
Agree 56 56 80 
Disagree 12 12 92 
Strongly Disagree 8 8 100 
Total 100 100  
Note. Respondents were requested to indicate if goal clarity of an organization can help to 
improve employee performance. 
 
Table 8 
Working Conditions as a factor for improved Performance 
Working Conditions Frequency Valid Percentage Cumulative Percentage 
Strongly Agree 48 48 48 
Agree 38 38 86 
Disagree 8 8 94 
Strongly Disagree 6 6 100 
Total 100 100  
Note. The respondents were asked to indicate if the working conditions can lead to improved 
performance of the employees. 
 
Table 9 
Use of ICT as a factor for improved performance 
Use of ICT Frequency Valid Percentage Cumulative Percentage 
Strongly Agree 44 44 44 
Agree 40 40 84 
Disagree 10 10 94 
Strongly Disagree 6 6 100 
Total 100 100  
Note. Respondents were asked if the use of ICT can lead to improved performance of the 
employees. 
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Relationship Between Motivation and Employee Performance 
Questions 1 to 6 of this section we analysed using Likert’s Scale. 
 
Table 10 
Code and value of responses 
Option Code Point 
Strongly Agree SA 4 
Agree A 3 
Disagree D 2 
Strongly Disagree SD 1 
 
Total value == Total respondents x Point of categories 
Mean Average Value (MAV) = Total value 
Total response 
Table 11 
Mean average value (MAV) of items 1-6 
No. Questions SA A D SD Total Value MAV 
1 With the help of management, my 
performance has improved 
25 40 10 25 265 2.65 
2 My performance reduced when it took my 
employers long time to rotate the employees 
20 46 4 30 256 2.56 
3 I always perform my best when I know that I 
am accepted at work 
38 34 16 12 298 2.98 
 
4 
With the current motivational practices at my 
working place, the performance of the 













5 Employees often endeavour to meet the set 
goals/objectives which attract bonus payments 
44 46 8 2 332 3.32 
6 There is strong relationship between 
employee performance and motivation 
60 36 2 2 354 3.54 
 
Testing of Hypotheses 
The test was conducted with 95% confidence level and 0.05% level of significance, (n-1) 
(c-1) degree of freedom. 
The Chi-square (X2 ) formula is X2 = (Fo-Fe) 
Fe 
 
Where Fo = observed frequencies 
Fe = expected frequencies 
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i.e. expected frequency = Total Row x Total Columns 
Grand total 
i.e. TR x TC. 
GT 
 
H1: There is no strong relationship between employee performance and motivation. 
From the table above, items 3, 4, 5 and 6 are used as data for this hypothesis. 
 
Table 12 
Responses to items 3-6 for relationship of performance and motivation. 
Questions SA A D SD Total 
3 38 34 16 12 100 
4 26 16 28 30 100 
5 44 46 8 2 100 
6 60 36 2 2 100 
Total 168 132 54 46 400 
 
Table 13 
Chi-square calculation for observed frequency vs expected frequency. 
Fo Fe Fo – Fe [Fo-Fe]2 [Fo-Fe]2 
Fe 
38 42 -4 16 0.381 
34 33 1 1 0.030 
16 13.5 2.5 6.25 0.463 
12 11.5 0.5 0.25 0.022 
26 42 -16 256 6.095 
16 33 -17 289 8.758 
28 13.5 14.5 210.25 15.574 
30 11.5 18.5 342.25 29.761 
44 42 2 4 0.095 
46 33 13 169 5.121 
8 13.5 -5.5 30.25 2.241 
2 11.5 -9.5 90.25 7.848 
60 42 18 324 7.714 
36 33 3 9 0.273 
2 13.5 -11.5 132.25 9.796 
2 11.5 -9.5 90.25 7.848 
  TOTAL = 102.401 
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Decision Rule 
The rejection or acceptance of a null hypothesis is based on some level of significance as 
a criterion. The null hypothesis is rejected if X2 calculation is greater than X2 tab and accepted for 
H1. The degree of freedom at .05 level of significance is given by 
(R-1) (C-1) = (4-1) (4-1) – (3)(3) = 9. 
The calculated X2 = 102.401. The critical value at 0.05 level of significance and 9 degrees 
of freedom is 16.919. Since the X2 calculated is 102.401 and the critical or table value at the 0.05 
significance level and 9 degrees of freedom is 16.919, the null hypothesis is rejected, and the 
alternate hypothesis is accepted. Therefore, there is a strong relationship between employee 
performance and motivation. 
 
Summary of Findings 
This study demonstrates that the selected insurance company effectively and appropriately 
applied positive motivation to make its employees perform extremely well. It also discovered that 
there is a strong relationship between motivation and employee performance. The type of 
motivation determined the level of performance of the employee. When positive motivation was 
efficiently, skillfully and effectively applied, the level of employee performance increased and 
vice versa. 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
From the summary of findings, it can be inferred that the type of motivation will stimulate 
employees to perform very well and must be such that it will meet an employee’s desired needs 
and expectations. Furthermore, motivation must be such that it will enhance an employee’s 
promotion level and position, i.e. positive change. 
This study therefore recommends that the insurance companies should always organize 
self-development programs for their employees. They must organize training and retraining 
programs as well. An employee must be moved to different departments in the insurance 
companies so that every staff member will acquire an all-round experience and skills within the 
organization. Hard work must be recognized and rewarded. All these recommendations, if put into 
practice or use, will reduce laziness, idleness, frustration and high labor turnover. 
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Abstract 
Inclusive growth is an important channel through which African countries can foster higher 
regional integration especially through trade. This is because many African countries are 
characterized by exclusive growth, small and fragmented domestic markets that are 
landlocked and often prone to external shocks. Using an augmented gravity specification, 
this paper conducts an empirical investigation of the relationship between regional 
integration and inclusive growth in Africa. The adapted model is estimated using ordinary 
least squares, Pseudo Poisson maximum likelihood estimator and the Blundell-Bond 
system generalized method of moment estimator. The empirical results reveal that 
inclusive growth plays a vital role towards intra-regional trade in Africa. The findings also 
support the need to strengthen regional and national institutions as well as provision of 
infrastructure. The paper makes a case for consistent and integrated national and regional 
policies especially with respect to the pursuit of broad based growth. 
 
Keywords: regional integration, inclusive growth, gravity model, panel data, Africa. 
 
Introduction 
Despite Africa’s enormous market potentials for trade in different products, given its 
estimated population of over 1.11 billion as at 2013, the benefits from this positive trend is yet to 
be harnessed due to the exclusiveness of growth in the continent. African consumers are unable to 
enjoy the gains from regional markets primarily due to high poverty and income inequality 
occasioned by growth without the “trickle-down” effect. Comparatively, as observed in the 2012 
Seminar by the Philippines Institute for Development, high economic growth and lower population 
growth reduced poverty but some areas still lag behind as East Asia continues to experience 
inequality and persistent poverty. Intra-regional trade has occupied the centre stage of sub-regional 
development policy with a view to improve the standard of living. Regional integration is an 
important avenue for African countries to foster broad-based growth (African Development Bank, 
2014). In line with the classical trade theory, this would imply removal of trade restrictions. The 
link between trade and welfare can be traced to the growth channel (See, Dollar & Kraay, 2004). 
Observably, weak global growth occasioned by contemporaneous recessions prompts a shift from 
external to domestic and regional demand. Adequate income buffers that stabilize purchasing 
power should concomitantly match adverse shocks. In general, growth in most African countries 
has not been inclusive, as indicated by the relatively weak inclusive growth measures such as 
household per capita spending, job creation, and accessibility to basic infrastructure.  
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A striking feature of intra-regional trade in Africa is that the trend has been positive during 
the period of 2011-2015. Evidently, Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) have dominated in this regard recording about USD3.3 and 
USD1.9 trillion in terms of imports compared with the USD869 billion, USD1.01 and USD1.1 
trillion recorded accordingly by the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa 
(CEMAC), East African Community (EAC) and Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS). The benefit of these positive trends may be difficult to harness due to inclusive 
growth drag in Africa. For instance, household final consumption spending is quite low with 
CEMAC recording USD2.5 billion in the 1991-1995 period to USD11.21 in 2011-2015 compared 
with the EAC’s USD2.92 and USD19.99 billion during the same periods. Observably, AMU, 
SADC and ECOWAS dominate in this regard recording, accordingly, USD81.45, USD35.36 and 
USD27.83 during the period between 2011 and 2015. This obvious disconnect prompts this 
empirical pursuit.  
Although inclusive growth remains a critical component of regional integration especially 
through income and consumption, it has not been given adequate attention in explaining intra-
regional trade. Based on data from the World Bank’s world development indicators, Africa lags 
behind other continents in terms of inclusive growth measures such as employment, poverty, 
access to basic infrastructure and inequality. This has prompted the analysis of intra-African trade 
using augmented gravity specifications in order to analyze the responsiveness of bilateral trade 
flows to income, distance, trade policy, bilateral investment treaties, FTAs, and other control 
variables (Ajakaiye & Ncube, 2010; Akpan, 2014; Carrere, 2004; Ebaidalla & Yahia, 2014; Golit 
& Adamu, 2014; Hatzenberg, 2011; Kayizza-Mugerwa et al., 2014; Ndulu, 2006; and Shuaibu, 
2015). Evidently, these studies fail to account for inclusive growth, which is an important factor 
especially in the context of Africa since it affects regional demand and invariably, the volume of 
intra-regional trade. Further, very little attempt has been made to assess the interaction between 
inclusive growth and regional integration. This motivates this paper, in addition to the fact that the 
outcome of this research is expected to provide insight on regional and sub-regional trade and 
development policy formulation and implementation.   
On the methodological front, we observe the existence of a trade flow that has a bilateral 
value equal to zero that may pose a selection problem. To overcome this challenge, we use 
alternative estimation techniques such as the Pseudo Poisson Maximum-likelihood estimator 
(PPML) following Silva and Tenreyro’s (2006) approach. These models explain the volume of 
trade between countries through a Poisson distribution with a conditional mean that is 
exponentially related to our set of explanatory variables. In addition to the use of the fixed effect 
estimator, the panel causality test proposed by Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) that tests for Granger 
non-causality in heterogeneous panel data is used to check for possible reverse causation. To 
overcome selection bias associated with heterogeneity in gravity models, we account for 
unobserved time varying country-pair heterogeneity through the use of fixed effect in the spirit of 
Bergstrand, Larch and Yotov (2015). Moreover, Cheng and Wall (2004) opine that unless 
heterogeneity is accounted for correctly, gravity models can greatly overestimate the effects of 
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regional integration on the volume of trade.  
Another important contribution of our paper is based on the empirical finding of a strong 
persistence in aggregate trade data (Bun and Klaassen, 2002; De Benedictis & Vicarelli, 2005; and 
Fidrmuc, 2009). They observed that countries engaged in trade with each other at time t-1 also 
tend to trade at time t (intensive margin). We explore these dynamics by applying the dynamic 
panel model that uses the Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator (De Benedictis & Vicarelli, 
2005). Finally, we subject our model to a battery of robustness checks to ascertain the potency of 
our results to sub-samples (sub-regional groups) and alternative estimators. The findings provide 
insight towards regional integration policy formulation and implementation, especially within the 
context of inclusive growth that has continued to escape policy makers in Africa. The paper will 
be organized as follows. Section 2 provides evidence on regional integration in Africa. Sections 3 
and 4 discuss the methodology and empirical outcomes, respectively. Section 5 concludes the 
paper and highlights some implications for policy. 
 
Evidence on Regional Integration and Inclusive Growth in Africa 
Regional integration has occupied the centre stage of the global trade system, and this is 
particularly important for Africa as it lags behind other continents in terms of sustained inclusive 
growth and development. There are several regional integration arrangements in Africa out of 
which eight are regional economic communities: the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the 
Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the 
Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), and six are inter-governmental organizations: the Central African Monetary 
and Economic Community (CEMAC), the Economic Community of the Great Lakes States 
(CEPGL), the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), the Mano River Union (MRU), the Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU) and the West African and Monetary Union (UEMOA). Their 
main objective is the pursuit of economic, social, political, technological and legal cooperation. 
Such arrangements are deepened through the formation of customs and monetary unions, common 
markets and a regional judiciary. They also seek to promote and liberalize inter- and intra-regional 
trade through harmonized tariffs. 
A striking feature of intra-regional trade in Africa is that the trend has been positive during 
the review period across the sub-regional arrangements considered (See Table 1.). Evidently, 
AMU and SADC have dominated in this regard recording about USD3.3 and USD1.9 trillion in 
terms of imports compared with the USD869 billion, USD1.01 and USD1.1 trillion recorded 
accordingly by CEMAC, EAC and ECOWAS. This positive trend may be explained by the 
significant impact of regional trade agreements amongst member countries in the various sub-
regional bodies, especially with respect to the harmonized common external tariffs. Concurrently, 
intra-African exports have also exhibited a remarkable upward trend that mirrored the behavioral 
pattern of intra-African imports.   
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Table 1  
Intra-African Trade Performance 
  AMU CEMAC EAC ECOWAS SADC 
Period Total Intra-Africa Imports (USD Billion) 
1991-1995 346.83 72.20 134.17 143.44 278.80 
1996-2000 374.34 131.34 227.46 194.93 489.99 
2001-2005 597.51 188.67 354.82 344.83 652.66 
2006-2010 1439.18 487.99 718.44 750.03 1654.39 
2011-2015 1967.37 869.26 1008.02 1077.53 3284.91 
  Total Intra-Africa Exports (USD Billion) 
1991-1995 266.32 34.07 109.63 146.85 86.39 
1996-2000 284.54 36.53 185.60 214.81 269.94 
2001-2005 506.19 64.47 286.06 342.82 584.01 
2006-2010 1404.70 299.45 554.46 759.89 1327.31 
2011-2015 2272.04 498.24 810.39 1254.58 3074.75 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics online 
 
The inherent weaknesses of most African economies exacerbated the inclusive growth drag 
observed in Table 2. Household final consumption expenditure is quite low across the board with 
CEMAC recording USD2.5 billion in the 1991-1995 period and USD11.21 in 2011-2015. The 
EAC also recorded USD2.92 and USD19.99 billion during the same periods. Observably, AMU, 
SADC and ECOWAS dominate in this regard recording, accordingly, USD81.45, USD35.36 and 
USD27.83. These developments may be traced to the resource dependence and less conflict-prone 
countries in the sub-regions that recorded higher values. Although unemployment as a percentage 
of total labor force has declined across the sub-regional bodies during the review period, the most 
significant positive trends were recorded in AMU and ECOWAS while the EAC recorded the 
highest share with 9.12% and AMU, CEMAC and ECOWAS documented a 5% average compared 
with the relatively high value observed in the case of SADC. 
Good governance and institutions have been identified as important drivers of intra-
regional exports (Shuaibu, 2015). Notably, the relatively low level of intra-regional trade in Africa 
may be traced to the poor governance and weak institutions that have bedevilled the continent’s 
overall development and sustained trade amongst African countries. For instance, all the sub-
regions have recorded very weak regulatory quality, high corruption and political instability. 
Evidence from the World Bank World Development Indicators reveals that between 2013 and 
2014, the ECOWAS sub-region recorded a positive trend in terms of political stability and this 
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Table 2  
Inclusive Growth Indicators 
  AMU CEMAC EAC ECOWAS SADC 
Period Household final consumption expenditure (USD Billion) 
1991-1995 21.49 2.49 2.92 3.40 9.81 
1996-2000 29.02 2.42 4.86 4.30 13.08 
2001-2005 30.72 3.72 5.52 6.81 14.22 
2006-2010 51.12 7.71 11.75 15.18 25.46 
2011-2015 81.45 11.21 19.99 27.83 35.36 
  Unemployment, total (% of total labour force) 
1991-1995 12.40 800.17 18.69 16.62 742.59 
1996-2000 3.61 134.91 10.23 7.05 141.64 
2001-2005 1.63 19.65 6.46 6.27 41.15 
2006-2010 5.36 8.04 9.75 6.49 10.99 
2011-2015 5.45 5.65 9.12 5.16 8.13 
  Employment to population ratio, 15+, total (%) (national estimate) 
1991-1995 43.98 69.20 81.90 61.37 53.89 
1996-2000 43.30 60.87 73.68 59.05 51.73 
2001-2005 44.57 70.08 72.63 63.29 60.45 
2006-2010 42.07 50.50 76.48 63.33 55.18 
2011-2015 40.85 71.00 76.60 68.63 61.55 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators online 
 
The concept of inclusive growth also involves access of the greatest number to the requisite 
infrastructure. While teledensity and information and communication technology-related access 
have improved significantly in Africa (World Bank Group, 2018), improved access to sanitation 
facilities and improved water sources have been somewhat stagnant with minimal improvement 
during the review period. In addition to the high incidence of poverty and low income in the 
continent, this may also be explained by inadequate efforts by the government towards providing 




Given the plethora of analytical expositions, the main focus in the literature is a precise 
estimation of the gravity equation. One important theoretical contribution in the gravity literature 
is related to the structural form of the equation and the implication of misspecification or omitted 
variable bias. In particular, the way trade costs and firm heterogeneity are incorporated in the 
gravity equation as populated by the contributions of Anderson and van Wincoop (2001, 2003) 
and Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008). The heterogeneity in firm behavior is mainly due to 
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fixed and variable costs that are market specific and higher for international trade than for domestic 
markets. Consequently, only the most productive firms are able to cover these costs and find it 
profitable to export. The profitability of exports varies by country destination and is higher for 
countries’ higher demand, but lower costs of exporting.  
 
Link between inclusive growth and trade. 
The framework of this study draws from the trade-welfare transmission channel developed 
by McCulloch, Winters and Cirera (2001) which illustrates how trade policy changes affect 
households through increase in consumption, production and exports. We illustrate how trade 
liberalization can offer considerable opportunities to poor households but also increase their 
vulnerability in terms of its short- and medium-term adverse impacts. First, RTAs in form of freer 
trade can translate into larger market for consumers with increased product varieties. Regional 
integration can also lead to lower transaction costs (TC) and increased competition from foreign 
producers (DD), and therefore lower prices for consumers which in turn leads to an increase in 
household consumption (HC). An important feature of this channel is that it emphasizes the 
households’ abilities to change income sources and consumption patterns in response to changes 
in relative prices.  
𝑅𝑇𝐴 → 𝑇𝐶 ↓→ 𝐷𝐷 ↑→ 𝐻𝐶 
Second, RTAs can reduce trade costs for imported inputs used in the production process. 
This translates to lower production costs (PC) that can in turn increase firm competitiveness (SS) 
in local and international markets (EX). Increased competitiveness spurs business expansion, job 
creation and higher household income. Trade liberalization can also change the composition of 
goods produced by local firms. In a seminal paper, Aghion et al. (2005) argue that firms with 
different capabilities tend to respond differently to increased competition. More competition can 
result in re-allocation of resources from less productive to more productive export-oriented firms 
(Melitz & Ottaviano, 2008). It can also lead to higher within-firm productivity through efficiency 
gains as firms become exposed to more sophisticated intermediates and technology that increase 
technical efficiency and capacity to expand production.  
𝑅𝑇𝐴 → 𝑃𝐶 ↓→ 𝑆𝑆 ↑→ 𝐸𝑋 ↑ 
Finally, with increased competition due to RTAs, firms tend to focus more on products that 
have comparative advantage and export more of these products (Bernard, Redding & Schott, 
2007). This is particularly crucial for producers in developing countries that face significant 
technological constraints in terms of access to adequate imported inputs. Alternatively, increased 
household welfare leads to increased productivity and higher output which can lead to increased 
output of exports. Increased household welfare also implies increased propensity to import a 
variety of goods from abroad.   
 
Empirical Model 
The framework used in this study draws from the theoretical gravity model proposed by 
Bergstrand (1989) for the following reasons. First, it is widely accepted in the literature. Second, 
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it incorporates the modelling of multilateral trade resistance which accounts for omitted variable 
bias in the estimated gravity coefficients (Baldwin & Taglioni, 2006). 
 In its traditional form, the gravity model predicts that bilateral trade flows (exports or 
imports) between countries is determined by national incomes of the exporting and importing 
countries and the geographical distance between them. The income (GDP) of the exporting country 
indicates the supply capacity whereas the importing country’s GDP indicates the total demand. 
The geographic distance between the countries is used to measure transport costs.  The 




𝛼3     (1) 
Further extensions have justified the inclusion of additional control variables in the gravity 
model such as exchange rate risk variables including volatility and currency union (Bergstrand, 
1985; Frankel & Rose, 2005; & Rose, 2000), geographical factors such as common border, 
landlocked, island and remoteness (Feenstra, Romalis & Schott, 2002; Frankel and Rose, 2002; 
Silva and Tenreyro, 2006; & Soloaga and Winters, 2001;), membership of RTAs (Baier and 
Bergstrand, 2007, 2009; & Frankel & Rose, 2002). Including these additional factors in equation 
(1) and taking the natural logarithm yields a log linear gravity model given as:   
𝑙𝑛(𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑗,𝑡) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑙𝑛⁡(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡) ⁡+ 𝛼2𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡) + 𝛼3 𝑙𝑛(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗) + 𝛼4𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡) +
𝛼5𝑙𝑛 (𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑗𝑡)+𝛼6⁡𝑙𝑛(𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗)⁡ + 𝛼7𝑙𝑛(𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗) + 𝛼8𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼9𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼10𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗 +
𝛼11𝐼𝐶𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼12𝐼𝐶𝐺𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼14𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗 + 𝑖𝑗,𝑡                   (2) 
Where 𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑗,𝑡 is the value of exports between country i and country j at year t, 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 and 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 are respectively the national incomes for country i and j in year t and 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗 is the 
geographical distance between the major cities of countries i and country j. 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 and 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑗𝑡 are 
the population in country i and j in year t. GDP and population are the proxy for the supply and 
demand capacities of the two trading countries respectively. RTAij is a binary variable assuming 
the value 1 if i and j have a regional trade agreement (specifically, ECOWAS, SADC, EAC, 
CEMAC, AMU) and 0 otherwise, lockij is a binary variable which assumes the value of 1 if 
country i and country j are both landlocked countries, langij is a binary variable that takes the value 
1 if i and j share a common official language and 0. Otherwise, borderij is a binary variable 
assuming the value 1 if i and j share a common land border and 0 otherwise, colij is a binary 
variable that takes the value of 1 if country i and country j share the same colonial history, INFij 
is a measure of quality of infrastructure, INSTij  is a measure of the quality of institutions. 𝛼0 is a 
constant of proportionality. 
An important aspect and thus contribution of this study is to show that inclusive growth 
can foster regional integration through increased intra-regional trade flows between countries 
(Bernard, Redding & Schott, 2007). This is particularly important in the context of African 
countries where inclusive growth remains at the forefront of regional and national development 
pursuit. Therefore, we use household final consumption expenditure to account for the effect of 
inclusive growth for country i (𝐼𝐶𝐺𝑖) and for country j (𝐼𝐶𝐺𝑗).  Alternative measures of inclusive 
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growth used for robustness checks include percentage share of the population that have access to 
improved sanitation and water source. 
Finally, 𝑖𝑗,𝑡 is the two-way error component term 𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗,𝑡  where 𝛾𝑖  is the 
unobserved individual country-specific (exporter and importer) effects, and these are accounted 
for through exporter (𝛿𝑖) and importer (𝛿𝑗) fixed effects – the multilateral resistant term. 𝜃𝑡 is 
unobserved time effect, and 𝜇𝑖𝑗,𝑡 is the remaining part of the stochastic disturbance term. All of 
these fixed effects correct the biases from estimating panel data (Baldwin & Tagloni, 2006) 
Apriori, the key coefficients of interest 𝛼11⁡ and 𝛼12⁡ are expected to be positive as higher 
inclusive growth facilitates higher exports and stimulates higher imports.  𝛼1 and 𝛼4  are expected 
to be positive as a high level of income and population in the exporting country denote a high level 
of production ceteris paribus, which increases the exports of goods. The coefficients on⁡𝛼2 
and⁡𝛼5⁡are also expected to be positive as a high income level in importing countries stimulates 
higher imports. The distance coefficient 𝛼3 is however expected to be negative as it is a proxy of 
all trade cost. Finally, the coefficients on lang, col, land and RTA are all expected to be positive 
while the coefficient on border is expected to be negative.  
 
Estimation Strategy 
The estimation procedures carried out in this study are in two phases. The first stage entails 
conducting baseline regressions using ordinary least square (OLS) regression. In this type of 
regression, the individual-specific effect is a random variable that is correlated with the 
explanatory variables. Therefore, we allow individual errors in different time periods to be 
correlated (Hill, Griffiths & Lim, 2012). Secondly, the Pseudo Poisson Maximum Likelihood 
(PPML) estimator is utilized. This method is appropriate because in the presence of 
heteroscedasticity, the PPML estimator performs better since OLS is not efficient (Silva & 
Tenreyro, 2006). The logarithmic linearization of an empirical model in the presence of 
heteroscedasticity leads to inconsistent estimates because the expected value of the logarithm of a 
random variable depends on higher-order moments of its distribution (Silva & Tenreyro, 2006). 
There are two important methodological concerns associated with selection bias in gravity 
models. The first concern is related to the bias that arises from multilateral resistance. Anderson 
and van Wincoop (2003), who extended on Anderson (1979), showed that the flow of bilateral 
trade is influenced by trade impediments that exist at the bilateral level (bilateral resistance) and 
by the relative weight of these obstacles with respect to all other countries (the multilateral 
resistance). To account for this bias, we control for time varying and time-invariant unobserved 
country characteristics that are common to both countries. Rose and van Wincoop (2001) and Baier 
and Bergstrand (2007) applied similar approaches to account for multilateral resistance terms. 
The second source of methodological concern is related to selection bias associated with 
the presence of heterogeneous firms operating internationally. Contrary to what is implied by 
models of monopolistic competition à la Krugman (1979), not all existing firms operate on 
international markets. Contradicting results find that only a few firms serve foreign markets 
(Bernard, Redding & Schott, 2007; & Mayer & Ottaviano, 2008) and not all exporting firms export 
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to all foreign markets, as they are generally active in a subset of countries. The critical resulting 
implication of firm heterogeneity for modelling the gravity equation is that the matrix of bilateral 
trade flows is not full since many cells have a zero entry, more frequently at the aggregate level.  
The existence of trade flows that have a bilateral value equal to zero may signal a selection 
problem. If the zero entries are the result of the firm choice of not selling specific goods to specific 
markets (or its inability to do so), the standard OLS estimation of the gravity equation would be 
inappropriate as it would produce biased results (Helpman, Melitz & Rubenstein, 2008). This is 
primarily due to two reasons. First, it is not possible to raise a number to any power and end up 
with zero, the log of zero is undefined, and zero-trade flows cannot be treated with logarithmic 
specifications. Second, the zeroes are non-randomly distributed as they indicate the absence of 
trade, hence suggesting that barriers to trade are prohibitive to allow a particular trade relationship 
to take place at a given level of demand and supply.  
Therefore, we also use the PPML, where the dependent variable is expressed in levels 
instead of logarithms as suggested by Silva and Tenreyro (2006). Poisson models were originally 
applicable for count data, but as pointed out by Wooldridge (2002), they are also applicable when 
using non-negative continuous dependent variables. These models explain the volume of trade 
between countries through a Poisson distribution with a conditional mean that is exponentially 
related to the set of explanatory variables. Other studies in the literature use the Tobit model to 
deal with the zero valued trade flows (Andersen & Marcoiller, 2002; Rose, 2004). However, this 
method has some shortcoming as it involves artificial censoring of small trade values which is 
subject to measurement errors and biased results (Rose, 2000; & Silva & Tenreyro, 2011). We 
tested the results against different measures of inclusive growth.  
 
Data Description  
The variables used for estimation are taken from different sources. The dependent variable, 
i.e. the bilateral trade (export) flow between countries, is from the IMF, Direction of Trade 
Statistics covering 49 African countries between 1990 and 2015 counting about 45,923 data points. 
Exporters and importers’ nominal GDP, and GDP per capita income, population and real exchange 
rate are taken from World Development Indicators (WDI) database. Bilateral distance, area and 
other dummy variables (contiguity, official language, common colonizer, and whether the 
countries are landlocked or not) are derived from CEPII database. Detailed variable description 
and data source can be found in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 
Description of Variables used in Estimation 
 





Intra-African Exports (million 
USD) 
International Monetary 
Fund Direction Of Trade 
Statistics 
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(% of population 
with access) 
ICG1 
Improved sanitation facilities 
(% of population with access) 
World Bank World 
Development Indicators  
3 
Improved water 




Access to an improved water 
source refers to the 
percentage of the population 
using an improved drinking 
water source.  
World Bank World 







Household final consumption 
expenditure (formerly private 
consumption) is the market 
value of all goods and 
services purchased by 
households. 
World Bank World 
Development Indicators  
5 




GDP at purchaser's prices is 
the sum of gross value added 
by all resident producers in 
the economy plus any product 
taxes and minus any subsidies 
not included in the value of 
the products.  
World Bank World 
Development Indicators  
6 
Official exchange 




Official exchange rate refers 
to the exchange rate 
determined by national 
authorities or to the rate 
determined in the legally 
sanctioned exchange market.  
World Bank World 






Control of corruption 
measures the extent to which 
public power is exercised for 
private gain, including petty 
and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as 
“capture” of the state by elites 
and private interests.   
World Bank Institute. 
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Political stability and absence 
of violence measures the 
perceptions of the likelihood 
that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by 
unconstitutional or violent 
means, including domestic 
violence or terrorism. 





Regulatory quality measures 
the ability of the government 
to formulate and implement 
sound policies and regulations 
that permit and promote 
private sector development.   
World Bank Institute. 
10 Population, total POP 
Total population is based on 
the de facto definition of 
population, which counts all 
residents regardless of legal 
status or citizenship. 
United Nations 
Population Division. 
2009. World Population 








Mobile and fixed-line 
subscribers are total telephone 







And Database, And 
World Bank Estimates. 
12 Distance dist 
Geographical distance 
between country of origin and 
destination  
Mayer And Zignago 
(2006) Index 
13 Distance distcap 
Simple distance (most 
populated cities, km) 
Mayer And Zignago 
(2006) Index 
14 Weighted distance distw 
Weighted distance 
(population-wt, km) 
Mayer And Zignago 
(2006) Index 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
Empirical Results and Discussion 
The results of the basic regressions are presented in Table 4. Since the number of time 
series observations (years) are relatively smaller than the number of cross-sectional observations 
(countries), we do not need to worry about time series estimation procedures such as stationarity, 
spurious regression and cointegration of the variables. The basic OLS results are presented in the 
first three columns and the last three present the results for the PPML. The coefficients of inclusive 
growth are positive and significant, as expected, in all the regressions, suggesting that inclusive 
growth exerts a positive impact on export flows within Africa. As expected, economic size (GDP) 
positively influences exports and imports while population only influences exports. For all models, 
the coefficients on the income elasticities of exporters' and importers’ GDP are far below the 
theoretical value of 1. However, both GDP and population coefficients are not significant in the 
regressions where inclusive growth is measured by household final consumption expenditure. 





Weighted distance (pop-wt, 
km) CES 
Mayer And Zignago 
(2006) Index 
16 Landlocked landlocked 
If both countries are 
landlocked 
Head, K., T. Mayer And 
J. Ries, 2010 
17 Country code iso 
Country code for origin and 
destination country 
Head, K., T. Mayer And 
J. Ries, 2010 
18 Border dummy border  
Head, K., T. Mayer And 
J. Ries, 2010 
19 Common language comlang_off Common official language 
Head, K., T. Mayer And 




Colony Colonial relationship 
Head, K., T. Mayer And 
J. Ries, 2010 
21 Common coloniser Comcol Common colonizer post 1945 
Head, K., T. Mayer And 







If currently in colonial 
relationship 
Head, K., T. Mayer And 
J. Ries, 2010 
23  col45 
Colonial relationship post 
1945 
Head, K., T. Mayer And 
J. Ries, 2010 
24 Similar country smctry 
If countries were or are the 
same country 
Head, K., T. Mayer And 
J. Ries, 2010 
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between country-pairs due to increasing trade costs. The landlocked dummy is also significant and 
negative for both exporting and importing countries, implying that countries are also likely to trade 
less with other countries due to higher trade costs.  
The results also show that countries that share the same border and language are likely to 
trade more than countries that do not share the same border and speak different languages. The 
presence of telecommunication infrastructure and effective institutions that control corrupt 
practices especially along the borders of exporting and importing countries are likely to increase 
trade between country-pairs. In line with a priori, the regional trade agreements between country-
pairs have a positive effect on trade and the potency of the impact is higher for SADC and EAC 
relative to ECOWAS. However, no effect was observed for CEMAC and AMU sub-regions. These 
results are robust to the exclusion of zero trade flows as suggested in the literature.  
 
Table 4 
Regression results for regional integration and inclusive growth 
The dependent 
variable is 




OLS OLS OLS PPML PPML PPML 
ICG1 (exporter) 0.707***   0.056***   
 
(0.125)   (0.010)   
ICG1 (importer) 0.223*   0.017*   
 
(0.125)   (0.010)   
ICG2 (exporter)  1.638***   0.128***  
 
 (0.308)   (0.026)  
ICG2 (importer)  1.053***   0.083***  
 
 (0.259)   (0.021)  
ICG3 (exporter)   1.270***   0.092*** 
 
  (0.266)   (0.021) 
ICG3 (importer)   0.361*   0.027* 
 
  (0.253)   (0.020) 
GDP (exporter) 0.368*** 0.539*** -0.192 0.031*** 0.044*** -0.009 
 
(0.108) (0.092) (0.226) (0.008) (0.007) (0.018) 
GDP (importer) 0.564*** 0.542*** 0.397 0.045*** 0.043*** 0.032 
 
(0.100) (0.088) (0.217) (0.008) (0.007) (0.017) 
Population 
(exporter) 
0.572*** 0.446*** -0.040 0.043*** 0.033*** -0.003 
 (0.113) (0.107) (0.104) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Population 
(importer) 
0.097 0.143 -0.045 0.008 0.011 -0.004 
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Table 4 (continued) 
 (0.099) (0.093) (0.100) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
Distance -1.567*** -1.494*** -1.484*** -0.123*** -0.117*** -0.115*** 




0.926*** 0.816*** 0.900*** 0.076*** 0.068*** 0.074*** 
 (0.140) (0.141) (0.154) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
Border 0.874*** 1.037*** 0.887*** 0.057*** 0.070*** 0.058*** 
 (0.274) (0.273) (0.275) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Landlocked 
(exporter) 
-1.192*** -1.189*** -0.955*** -0.096*** -0.096*** -0.078*** 
 (0.167) (0.165) (0.181) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) 
Landlocked 
(importer) 
-0.818*** -0.810*** -0.771*** -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.060*** 
 (0.165) (0.169) (0.178) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
INSTQ1 
(exporter) 
0.744*** 0.683*** 0.703*** 0.059*** 0.054*** 0.055*** 
 (0.111) (0.110) (0.114) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
INSTQ1 
(importer) 
0.203* 0.243** 0.222* 0.016* 0.018** 0.018** 
 (0.105) (0.109) (0.115) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
INFRA4 
(exporter) 
0.008*** 0.007*** 0.005** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
INFRA4 
(importer) 
-0.005*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SADC 1.178*** 1.377*** 1.272*** 0.095*** 0.109*** 0.098*** 
 (0.282) (0.270) (0.294) (0.020) (0.019) (0.021) 
EAC 1.304** 1.534*** 1.799*** 0.109** 0.125*** 0.144*** 
 (0.625) (0.571) (0.611) (0.047) (0.043) (0.045) 
ECOWAS 0.738*** 0.445* 0.509* 0.065*** 0.041** 0.046** 
 (0.256) (0.261) (0.266) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) 
CEMAC 0.194 0.278 0.180 0.026 0.033 0.024 
 
(0.488) (0.490) (0.493) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
AMU -0.164 0.151 0.280 -0.046 -0.024 -0.009 
 
(0.423) (0.394) (0.407) (0.030) (0.031) (0.028) 
Constant -11.185*** -21.820*** -16.369*** 0.620*** -0.208 0.283* 
 (1.985) (2.452) (2.168) (0.155) (0.197) (0.165) 
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Table 4 (continued) 
year*exporter 
FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
year*importer 
FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13,803 13,596 12,281 13,803 13,596 12,281 
Adj. R-squared 0.45 0.45 0.44    
Source: Authors Calculation using STATA 13 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of export flows (in Million USD) and is computed at 
the country-pair and year level. Columns 1 present the key results where inclusive growth is 
measured by improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access). Columns 2 and 3 present 
the results where inclusive growth is measured by improved water source (% of population with 
access) and Household final consumption expenditure (current US$) respectively.  All regressions 
are estimated with year*importer and year*exporter fixed effects. Robust standard errors in 
parenthesis below the estimated coefficients are clustered at country-pair level. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Further Analysis: Dynamic Gravity Equation 
As a preliminary test to the system GMM estimation, common and individual coefficient 
panel causality tests were carried out to check for possible reverse causation. These tests make 
different assumptions about homogeneity of the coefficients across the cross sections. On one 
hand, the common coefficient test treats the panel as homogenous in the standard Granger causality 
sense and does not allow the data from one cross section to interact with lagged values of the data 
from the next cross section. However, this does not account for heterogeneities across countries. 
Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) propose an alternative assumption that allows all coefficients to 
vary across cross sections. We present evidence of reverse causation between regional integration 
(RI) and two measures of inclusive growth (ICG1 and ICG3) but observed a one-way causal 
association in the case between RI and ICG2. This finding is reinforced by the panel Granger 
causality test that assumes homogeneity in the cross sections. These estimation results are not 
presented in this paper but are available upon request.   
Thus, we explored dynamic interaction in the gravity model for two reasons. First, due to 
the behavior of export which is assumed to be autoregressive (Costantini & Melitz, 2008); and 
second due to strong persistence found in the aggregate trade data (Bun & Klaassen, 2002; De 
Benedicts & Vicarelli, 2005; & Fidrmuc, 2009). We explored these dynamics by applying the 
dynamic panel estimation model that uses the Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator (De 
Benedicts & Vicarelli, 2005). Finally, the validity of the instruments was tested using the 
Sargan/Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions, which considers the sample analogy of the 
moment conditions used in the estimation process.  
The results of the GMM estimator are presented in Table 5. The Sargan/Hansen tests of over 
identifying restrictions are satisfactory, as is the Arellano–Bond test for AR (2) errors. We find 
very significant evidence that intra-African trade flows are autoregressive, which is consistent with 
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Costantini and Melitz (2008). Most importantly, inclusive growth is found to be a significant 
determinant of intra-African trade flows. The GMM estimates in column 1, for example, suggest 
that a percentage point increase in improved sanitation facilities increases trade flows for the 
exporting country by 1.30 and 0.48 percentage points for the importing country. The results are 
stronger when inclusive growth is measured by improved water source, recording 2.13 and 1.39 
percentage points for the exporting and importing countries, respectively.  
 
Table 5  
Regression results for the dynamics of regional integration and inclusive growth 
The dependent variable is  (1) (2) (3) 
Intra-African Exports (million 
USD) GMM GMM GMM 
lag(Intra-African Exports) -0.136*** -0.143*** -0.067** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.035) 
ICG1 (exporter) 1.303***   
 (0.267)   
ICG1 (importer) 0.477**   
 
(0.228)   
ICG2 (exporter)  2.130***  
  (0.626)  
ICG2 (importer)  1.390**  
  
(0.571)  
ICG3 (exporter)   1.418*** 
   (0.527) 
ICG3 (importer)   0.136* 
   (0.540) 
Distance -1.528*** -1.424*** -1.126*** 
 (0.217) (0.228) (0.220) 
GDP (exporter) 0.647*** 0.570*** -0.243 
 (0.173) (0.192) (0.474) 
GDP (importer) 0.386* 0.321 0.585 
 (0.201) (0.214) (0.493) 
Population (exporter) 0.343* 0.490** -0.124 
 (0.178) (0.207) (0.193) 
Population (importer) 0.434** 0.522** 0.385* 
 (0.191) (0.219) (0.200) 
Official common language 0.658*** 0.683*** 0.739*** 
 (0.224) (0.229) (0.228) 
Border 0.859** 1.037** 0.926** 
 (0.417) (0.405) (0.401) 
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Table 5 (continued) 
Landlocked (exporter) -1.173*** -1.433*** -1.134*** 
 (0.280) (0.278) (0.286) 
Landlocked (importer) -0.930*** -1.010*** -0.975*** 
 (0.287) (0.289) (0.289) 
INSTQ1 (exporter) 0.344** 0.475*** 0.346** 
 (0.140) (0.142) (0.134) 
INSTQ1 (importer) 0.277* 0.349** 0.302** 
 (0.148) (0.147) (0.142) 
INFRA4 (exporter) -0.000 0.004 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
INFRA4 (importer) -0.002 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
SADC 2.180*** 2.609*** 2.428*** 
 (0.410) (0.394) (0.405) 
EAC 1.603* 1.757** 2.505*** 
 (0.882) (0.797) (0.752) 
CEMAC -0.546 -0.443 -0.044 
 (0.868) (0.879) (0.777) 
ECOWAS 1.505*** 0.757** 0.734** 
 (0.407) (0.383) (0.369) 
AMU -0.128 0.516 0.601 
 (0.461) (0.453) (0.440) 
Constant -16.190*** -25.890*** -18.515*** 
 (3.510) (4.198) (3.609) 
year*exporter FE Yes Yes Yes 
year*importer FE Yes Yes Yes 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) 
-1.41 (pr>z = 
0.116) 
-1.08 (pr>z = 
0.148) 
-1.22 (pr>z = 
0.221) 
Sargan Test  




6583 (pr>χ2 = 
0.000) 
Number of observations 7,011 7,043 6,329 
Number of groups 576 576 551 
Source: Authors Calculation using STATA 13 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of export flows (in Million USD) and is computed at 
the country-pair and year level. Columns 1 present the key results where inclusive growth is 
measured by improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access). Columns 2 and 3 present 
the results where inclusive growth is measured by improved water source (% of population with 
access) and Household final consumption expenditure (current US$) respectively.  All regressions 
are estimated with year*importer and year*exporter fixed effects. Robust standard errors in 
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parenthesis below the estimated coefficients are clustered at country-pair level. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Conclusion and Policy Implications 
The need to increase the volume trade amongst African countries cannot be downplayed 
given the enormous market potential of the region. However, Africa’s growth has at best been 
exclusive as the benefits of aggregate growth have not benefited the larger majority. This has been 
exacerbated by the high incidence of poverty and inequality recorded in African countries. 
Instructively, we argue that inclusive growth can play a very crucial role towards boosting intra-
African trade given the fact that it visibly improves welfare and household income, thereby 
expanding their spending space. In the absence of broad based growth that improves the purchasing 
power and welfare of households, the quest for higher intra-African imports and exports remains 
a mirage.   
Therefore, this paper sought to ascertain whether inclusive growth matters for increased 
intra-African trade. Predicated on a gravity specification that accounts for alternative measures of 
inclusive growth, the model was estimated using static and dynamic panel data analysis techniques. 
From the empirical analysis conducted in this paper, some key findings emerge. It was observed 
that the traditional gravity model variables (GDP, population, bilateral distance, common border, 
common official language, and landlockedness) are found to be important determinants of bilateral 
trade flow in Africa. Besides these factors, improved infrastructure and better institutional 
framework also influence multilateral trade flow within the continent. As measured by GDP of 
exporting and importing countries, production capacity and demand potential also positively affect 
trade between countries. Geographic distance and landlockedness are found to be detrimental to 
intra-regional trade. Another important finding is that landlocked countries incur higher per unit 
cost of export and import and therefore, such countries tend to trade less compared to those 
countries with access to international waters. Cultural ties between the trading partners was found 
to be trade creating. 
The empirical findings show mixed results related to the contribution of regional economic 
communities (RECs) on intra-regional trade in Africa. The result from the traditional gravity 
model shows that three of the RTAs (SADC, EAC and ECOWAS) have created trade among the 
members. On the other hand, CEMAC and AMU have not contributed to the promotion of trade 
between member countries. The quantitative evidence presented in this paper provides insights 
regarding the link between regional trade integration and inclusive growth. Specifically, the need 
to tackle important binding constraints such as poor infrastructure, weak institutions and the 
exclusiveness of growth with a view on boosting intra-African trade remains critical for the region. 
The importance of these issues has been underscored by the African Development Bank’s (AfDB) 
long term regional integration policy and strategy plan.  
Our findings do not make a case for the formulation and implementation of new policies; 
rather, it makes a case for implementing the existing regional trade and inclusive growth policies. 
This would particularly require strengthening institutional capacities and higher sub-regional 
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socio-economic cooperation. This means that at the sub-regional level, there is a need to ensure 
that inclusive regional integration policies are pursued by member countries. This is because the 
sub-regional bodies can serve as a potent medium for developing infrastructure, and increase 
financial integration as well as leverage trade, investment and value chains. This will no doubt 
reduce the cost of trade and increase trade facilitation through the removal of trade restriction. This 
can be done by strengthening and harmonizing regional trade arrangements such as the common 
external tariff as well as other multilateral protocols related to free movement of persons, goods 
and services. 
Another important policy implication from our findings is related to Africa’s weak 
infrastructure which negatively affected its competitiveness, productivity, and share of global and 
intra-regional trade. This makes a case for a regional approach towards infrastructure development 
especially in the ICT, power and water sectors, amongst others. On the other hand, regional 
infrastructure should be made accessible and affordable. For instance, regulated pricing and 
subsidy may be considered to help protect vulnerable groups and households from being excluded. 
At the same time, local content-based development should be considered. 
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Abstract 
This research employs Bourdieu’s theory of habitus to explain the disposition of the donor 
community to integrate indigenous knowledge systems and practices into development 
projects. The theory’s objectivist perspective specifies the mechanism that links structural 
conditioning to social practice and regularities. It holds that power is culturally and 
symbolically created, and it is constantly re-legitimized through the interplay of agency 
and structure. This facilitates an analysis of the development field as social space 
characterized by indigenous and donor power relations. It argues that the reinforcement of 
indigenous knowledge as the main channel for development will generate transferable local 
capacities and set new energies in motion in Africa that will greatly reduce the prevailing 
inequalities on the continent.  
 
Introduction 
This article employs Bourdieu’s theory of habitus to explain the disposition of the donor 
community to integrate indigenous knowledge systems and practices into development projects. 
The analysis is built on Bourdieu’s objectivist perspective which specifies the mechanism that 
links structural conditioning to social practice and regularities. It uses this insight to explore 
indigenous knowledge, being the idea of “local ownership” in development, as a “cultural and 
symbolic capital” in the development field where the interplay of indigenous and donor ideas 
produces outcomes. The aim is to analyze indigenous practices as a cultural capital for resisting 
wholesale imposition of knowledge. 
The argument is articulated in twofold: the first part situates the analysis in Bourdieu’s 
theory of practice, i.e. Bourdieu’s habitus, to analyze the development field as social space 
characterized by forces of power relations (indigenous and donor). Indigenous epistemic systems 
are increasingly regaining recognition as a critical strand of thoughts in opposition to the modernity 
perspective (Shiza & Abdi, 2014). In the second part, we advocate for a paradigm shift on 
development thinking and practice that reinforces the role of indigenous knowledge, not as a 
privilege but as a standardized means for development practice. We took the argument up from a 
general understanding as the need for local participation in development (Sillitoe, 1998) urging a 
necessity to bolster indigenous knowledge over donor ideas in the development practice. Our view 
is not far from Shiza and Abdi’s observation that anchoring African knowledge and development 
is a way of disrupting the global ethno-racial hierarchy to present African ideas of development 
on the global scale on equal terms to other paradigms. We argue that the use of indigenous 
knowledge as the main channel for development will generate transferable local capacities and set 
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new energies in motion in Africa that will curb the prevailing crisis of development on the 
continent. 
The concept of development itself remains a very controversial issue as it tends to mean 
different thing to different people. As we do not intend to go into the muddled debate on the 
meaning of development, for this paper, we will adopt a definition that views it as being a process 
that encompasses the needs and means by which to provide better lives for people in the poorest 
countries. This definition of development is not only restricted to economic prosperity, but also 
includes the provision of education, health, food and a sustainable environment which together 
constitute essential ingredients of human development. Taken from this perspective, we agree that 
Africa remains one of the poorest continents in the world as most of its people are still mired in 
poverty despite the significant decline in world poverty in recent years.  
The current dismal state of development coupled with the absence of social equity in 
present-day Africa makes the achievement of an intergenerational equity almost impossible. 
Works devoted to explaining why Africa has not been able to achieve the level of development 
deemed necessary for a sizeable portion of its population abound. Mainstream development 
studies, mostly in anthropological literature, attributed the adoption of indigenous knowledge (IK) 
in development projects to the failure of top-down, fabricated development frameworks that has 
dominated development strategies for decades. The dominant argument on the inclusion of 
indigenous knowledge (local ownership), particularly in anthropological literature, in development 
projects in non-Western societies is that its adoption will enable development agencies and NGOs 
to achieve desired universal human conditions. Similarly, the tremendous progress made by China 
and India in the past few decades has further reduced Africa to the continent with the highest 
number of people living below the poverty line with one dollar a day or less (Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2010). 
There is therefore a persistent antagonism amongst scholars and practitioners alike as to 
the best approach that can lead Africa out of its current development problems. While some 
scholars have suggested that the problems of the continent can best be resolved by promoting 
economic growth; others argue that institutional reforms are the panacea to Africa’s lasting 
problems. The only unanimity amongst most scholars is that their respective approaches are based 
on a Eurocentric perspective that further reinforces the notion of European exceptionalism. We 
address the different facets of the complex approaches to Africa’s near to endemic development 
challenges in the section on the development debate. This section reviews the status of the 
development debate with the aim of answering the question of how indigenous knowledge can be 
harnessed to speed up development in African communities. 
This paper is divided into three main sections. The next part recapitulates the development 
debate beginning from the growth theories of the 1940s to the present dominant neoliberal school 
of thought. The second part of the paper builds on the analysis of the theory of habitus that roots 
indigenous knowledge of development in an understanding of embodied capital of local people. 
The disposition of the donor community to integrating indigenous knowledge systems and 
practices into development projects is argued in the third section that focuses on situating 
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indigenous knowledge in development practice and evaluates the application of indigenous 
knowledge in healthcare using the example of Burkina Faso. 
 
The Development Debate 
 The debate over the desirability of modern forms of development has been the object of 
extensive study in development theory by both those that support it and those that oppose it 
(Rabbani, 2011). The debate between advocates and critics of development revolve around the key 
question of why countries of the global South and most specifically Africa have not been able to 
develop and lift themselves out of poverty in the same way as countries of the West and those of 
East Asia. A wide range of scholarly works have been published by experts from different 
disciplines to explain the development dilemma and several debates have probed the most suitable 
solutions to the unending development challenges (Ashcroft, 2011; Murithi, 1997; Savage, 2013).  
 Development economics research has for the most part been preoccupied with trying to 
explain the causal reasons why some countries are rich and others not, why some countries, peoples 
and communities develop while others stagnate, and the structural factors that distinguish countries 
that enjoy high levels of development and those that still face astonishing levels of backwardness. 
Most importantly, development theory has placed emphasis on what can be done to strengthen the 
experience of the rich countries to alleviate the suffering of the poor (Barrett, 2008). 
 This debate dates back as far as the 1940s when it was essentially dominated by fierce 
exchanges between the modernization and dependency schools of thought. The 1950s saw the birth 
of decolonization in many third world countries, and these freshly decolonized territories 
embarked on a frenetic process of catching up with the levels of development enjoyed by the 
countries of the West. Development at this stage was viewed from a growth perspective and 
development efforts focused on achieving growth of the Gross National Product (GNP). The main 
idea behind this Western model of development was to reproduce the same economic prosperity 
found in the West in the freshly decolonized countries. The driving force behind this approach to 
development was the belief that such GNP growth would generate higher per capita incomes that 
would trickle down from the top to the bottom of the society for the mutual benefit of all (Ewane, 
2004; Von Kimakowitz, 2012). 
The Harrod-Domar growth model provided the normative background for the reliance on 
GNP growth as a means of achieving development, which dominated development thinking 
throughout the 1950s. The model that was developed by Sir Roy Harrod in 1939 and Evsey Domar 
in 1946 is a growth model that states that the rate of economic growth in a country is dependent 
on the level of savings and the capital output ratio. It posits that a high level of saving in a country 
provides funds for firms to borrow and invest. Investment can increase the capital stock of an 
economy and generate economic growth through the increase in production of goods and services. 
The Harrod-Domar model argues that governments of developing countries need to encourage 
saving and support technological advancements to decrease the economy’s capital output ratio to 
attain economic growth (Solow, 1956). This model inspired other theorists to further conceptualize 
on growth as a means of achieving development in the poor countries. Theories such as the Big 
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Push, balanced growth, development growth poles and the stages of growth theory by W.W. 
Rostow were born out of this growth model. 
The Big Push theory developed by Rosenstein-Rodan in 1943 mainly argues that a 
comprehensive investment package, or big push, is necessary to generate economic growth. It 
holds the view that a huge amount of resources must be attributed to economic programs for such 
programs to produce the desired results. In other words, economies of scale will be achieved in 
underdeveloped countries if so many mutually supporting industries, which depend on each other, 
are created. The theory believes that even the simplest activity requires a network of other 
activities, and that individual firms cannot organize such a large network, so the state or some 
other giant agency must step in. However, the big push came to grief in the 1970s and 1980s as 
evidence accumulated that, in Africa at least, public investment and foreign aid had produced no 
perceptible change in productivity, not the least because so much of it was stolen. Recently, 
though, the idea has come back into vogue. At the UN, discussions always focus on its millennium 
development goals, and some scholars argue that if public investment and foreign aid are big 
enough, they will boost household incomes, spur savings and boost local investment. They should 
also “crowd in” external investment by improving infrastructure (The Economist, 2011). 
Nurkse’s theory of balanced growth published in 1953 was geared towards eliminating 
structural underdevelopment, especially as it sees limited market opportunities as being the 
impediment to development. The theory identifies the shortage of real capital as the main 
bottleneck in economic development, and it is both the starting point and end of a causal chain. It 
requests that governments must mobilize all potential sources of capital for investment to be made. 
Nurkse sees development as simply being an extension of the market and increase in production 
that includes agriculture. The theory assumes that there is the willingness and ability for rational 
investment decisions in a traditional society. His diagnosis of ‘underdevelopment’ and policy 
suggestions are strictly confined to economics. His opus has been attacked for neglecting non-
economic factors in development, such as failure to consider capital formation in education, skills 
and health (Bass, 2009). 
The development pole theory elaborated by Perroux in 1950 suggests that economic 
growth, interregional equilibrium and integration of underdeveloped regions could be achieved 
through a strategy of decentralized development. The underlying assumption here is that beneficial 
spread effects would be generated from the induced poles to their peripheral areas. Perroux argued 
that growth does not occur everywhere at the same time but in points or growth poles with variable 
intensities. It is therefore from the growth poles that development spreads along different channels 
and would have spillover effects for the whole country or region (Serra, 2003). 
The main argument of Rostow’s theory of stages of growth is that economic growth is 
based around a relatively short period of two or three decades ― when the economy and the society 
of which it is a part transform themselves in such ways that economic growth is, subsequently, 
more or less automatic (Rostow, 1956). The theory describes five stages through which all 
societies pass and analyzes the long-term processes of economic development from an economic 
history perspective. Rostow assumes that the traditional society has 75% of the population working 
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in food production, and political power is wielded by landowners or a central authority that is 
backed by the army and state bureaucracy. This theory came under criticism because of its inability 
to explain why some countries witness progress and others not. It is a highly ethnocentric theory 
that does not give room for alternative goals and processes of development. 
The growth theories that dominated the development debate throughout the 1940s and the 
1950s viewed human beings as simply beneficiaries of development rather than as active 
participants in the development process itself. They have been criticized for not considering the 
human beings as the goal of development. The growth theories were pervasive in their discourse, 
and some scholars have questioned the main epistemological foundations of development from an 
essentially growth perspective.  
The 1960’s saw a new dawn in the development debate as scholars became increasingly 
convinced that financial or capital injection alone was not sufficient to set the expected 
development in motion in the world’s poor countries. There was a revolution in development 
thinking, and most scholars found the need to accompany growth with change. This decade saw 
the emergence of modernization theorists who believed that poor countries needed solid political 
systems and that Eurocentric and America-centric forms of development could be replicated in the 
poor countries of the global south. 
Modernization theorists believe that endogenous factors such as the absence of 
communication and infrastructure, traditional agrarian structure, illiteracy, and low division of 
labor account for the high degree of backwardness in the poor countries. They treat the 
industrialized countries as a model for society and economy and argue that a change of these 
internal factors is an appropriate strategy for development. Poor societies therefore have to 
embrace the modernization of production as a means of knowledge transfer and capital aid to 
achieve industrialization. Development according to theorists of this school of thought is perceived 
as a rise in production and efficiency measured mainly by a comparison of GNP. 
In the late 1960s, the basic claims of the traditional neoclassical approach that the poorer 
countries were late in embarking on solid economic practices, and that as soon as they adopted the 
techniques of modern economics then poverty would begin to decline in these countries came 
under serious attack from dependency theorists mainly from Latin America. Dependency theory 
argued that poverty resulted from capitalist exploitation, and it was a consequence of the 
international political economy and the inflexible division of labor that favor the rich countries at 
the detriment of the poorer countries. Scholars such as Raul Prebisch argued that economic growth 
in the advanced industrialized countries did not necessarily lead to growth in the poorer countries 
but rather generated severe economic difficulties in them.   
 Such economic problems were attributed to the fact that poor countries exported primary 
commodities to the rich countries that then transformed them into finished products and sold them 
back to the poor countries. The finished products from the industrialized countries always cost 
more than the raw materials that they obtained from the poor countries. Poor countries only serve 
as suppliers of cheap minerals, agricultural commodities, and cheap labor as well as the 
repositories of surplus capital, obsolescent technologies, and manufactured goods.  Dependency 
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theorists recommended that poor countries should embark on importing substitutions so to avoid 
buying expensive products from the advanced industrial nations. The dependency is built on the 
assumption that political and economic power are heavily concentrated and centralized in the rich 
countries. 
 Poor countries were integrated into international political economy under harsh terms as 
they tried to replicate the West and accept the growth prescriptions of Western economists. This 
resulted largely from the colonial heritage which was further exacerbated by the fact that the elites 
in the poor countries benefited strongly from their role as suppliers of primary goods to developed 
countries. Wallerstein’s world system theory captures this core-periphery relationship succinctly 
whereby the industrialized countries constitute the core while the poorer countries were considered 
as the periphery. The core experienced rising levels of prosperity while the periphery served to 
satisfy the needs of the core (Von Kimakowitz, 2012). 
The debate in the 1980s was dominated by the neoliberal doctrine that was championed by 
the Bretton Woods institutions with the expressed support of the highly industrialized nations. The 
neoliberal development thinking was initially conceived to be applied in the rich countries of the 
West. The neoliberal theory suggests that the market is more efficient than the state and would 
produce better outcomes, and therefore, the state should not intervene. The neoliberal thinking was 
based on the belief that unemployment was the product of the absence of flexibility in the labor 
market and suggested that states should embark on legislative reforms and not try to create jobs 
through management and industrial policy in order to increase labor market flexibility. 
Accordingly, states needed to rely on monetary policy rather than using fiscal policy to resolve 
problems of unemployment and to promote growth. It further suggested that states should 
deregulate and liberalize markets so that investors can hope to achieve the highest profits (Von 
Kimakowitz, 2012). 
Neoliberalism was a political economy theory that was mainly driven by the belief that 
mankind can achieve better welfare by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms within an 
institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade 
(Harvey, 2005). In the 1980s, the poorest countries, especially those in Africa, faced deep-seated 
economic problems and started experiencing structural problems. Faced with these difficulties, 
African states started seeking financial support from the World Bank, IMF and the EU. Neoliberal 
policies then began to be imposed on the poor countries around the world, especially as the 
industrialized countries became the main capital owners at the IMF and World Bank. 
These policies are set by the Washington Consensus, which is a set of 10 free market 
economic ideas that emphasize the importance of macroeconomic stability and integration into the 
international economy and expansion of market forces within the domestic economy. In other 
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1. Low government borrowing to avoid large fiscal deficits relative to GDP; 
2. Redirection of public spending from subsidies (especially indiscriminate subsidies) toward 
a broad-based provision of key pro-growth, pro-poor services like primary education, 
primary health care and infrastructure investment; 
3. Tax reform, broadening the tax base and adopting moderate marginal tax rates; 
4. Interest rates that are market determined and positive (but moderate) in real terms; 
5. Competitive exchange rates; 
6. Trade liberalization of imports, with an emphasis on elimination of quantitative restrictions 
(licensing, etc.) with any trade protection to be provided by low and relatively uniform 
tariffs; 
7. Liberalization of inward foreign direct investment; 
8. Privatization of state enterprises; 
9. Deregulation or abolition of regulations that impede market entry or restrict competition, 
except for those justified for safety, environmental and consumer protection grounds, and 
prudential oversight of financial institutions; 
10. Legal security for property rights. 
 
The 10 points of the Washington Consensus were imposed as conditionality by the Bretton 
Wood institutions and other multilateral donors on the recipient poor countries. The Structural 
Adjustment Programs (SAPs) were designed with the aim of combating ever-rising inflation and 
achieving favorable balance of payments for the poorest economies especially African economies. 
The World Bank did not require poor countries to try to act directly on the balance of payments as 
this would be very difficult, but African countries were required to act directly on monetary and 
fiscal policies that they could control. It was hoped that through these conditions, reduced inflation 
would increase investment that was necessary for economic recovery in Africa. Governments were 
required to cut spending, liberalize domestic markets, reform their tax systems and reduce trade 
barriers (Ewane, 2004; Siebold, 1996).  
The IMF stabilization policies that focused on restoring the external sector balances failed 
to produce the expected effect in most countries that implemented them, and this approach to 
prosperity came under serious attacks from multilateral bodies such as the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECCLAC), United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD). Inflation remained high and poverty levels rose in most of Latin America and Africa. 
Many African countries never experienced measurable progress years after implementing the 
SAPs, rather most of them entered a period of decline and experienced unfavorable trade balances 
(Ogbonna, 2012). 
Since the early 1990s, the IMF and World Bank have been recommending good 
governance in all aspects of public life in the poor countries as a condition for aid. The main idea 
has been to enhance transparency in policy decisions and improve accountability on the use of 
public finances and procedures. Poor states have since been compelled to shape their national 
 
International Journal of African Development v.5 n.1 Spring 2018 71 
 
policies to create policy and institutional landscapes that will facilitate their integration into the 
global market.  
The current development debate adopts a human rights-based approach to development 
that seeks to empower both the beneficiaries of development while, at the same time, making them 
participants in the development process. The right to development (RTD) requires greater 
accountability from all actors in the development process: through legal, administrative, or 
political mechanisms, individuals, as right-holders, can make claims on the conduct of individual 
and collective agents, including states, which, as duty-holders, can be held responsible for not 
meeting their obligations. The RTD was first proclaimed by the defunct Organization of African 
Unity (OAU) and was included in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights in 1981. In 
1986, the UN Declaration on the Right to Development (DRTD) was adopted and was later 
reaffirmed in the 1993 Vienna and 2000 UN Millennium Declarations (Piron, 2002). 
The debate on the RTD was highly politicized between the poor and the rich countries. 
Most of the agreements reached in the various development fora have not always been replicated 
by the Commission on Human Rights. The Independent Expert on the Right to Development has 
made positive contributions to the debate by proposing a development compact that may lead to a 
politically acceptable solution. The ‘compact’ may need to be further defined in a manner 
consistent with current best practice or presented as a theoretical framework to guide real 
partnership agreements. The most controversial element of the RTD lies in the international 
implementation of the right. In the past, it was seen by some as giving rise to an obligation of 
developed states and international organizations to provide development assistance to developing 
states. However, such a human rights obligation of a legally binding nature cannot be grounded in 
international law. The current controversy surrounds the process of globalization, the equal 
participation of developing countries in that process, and its relation to human rights (Piron, 2002). 
The human rights-based approach to development overlaps with the question concerning 
local ownership of the process of development. Local ownership to development involves the use 
of indigenous knowledge of the people in the communities where development projects are taking 
place. This process emphasizes local ownership as a critical component for achieving development 
in the world’s poorest countries. It builds on the argument that a more localized development 
practice where people have a stake empowers the people and gives them a sense of belongingness 
rather than disconnecting them from the process of development (The World Bank, 2004).  
The debate as elaborated above has completely ignored African indigenous knowledge in 
the search for solutions to the continent’s seemingly intractable development challenges. However, 
more and more scholars are recognizing today that rural people have always maintained a certain 
formidable power that guides their indigenous institutions and knowledge systems thereby 
maintaining some level of reliance (Donelly-Roark, 2004). Therefore, the disposition of the donor 
community to regularize indigenous knowledge in the form of inclusion of local voices and 
priorities (Briggs and Sharp, 2004) into development projects emanates in the power relations 
between indigenous and donor participation in the development practice. In contrast to the past 
where indigenous knowledge was an obstacle to development, it is now seen as pivotal to achieving 
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development in Africa ((Briggs & Sharp, 2004). To expatiate the perspective of indigenous 
knowledge as a cultural capital that conditions development thinking, planning and delivery, we 
provide an analysis of the theory of habitus in the next section to provide a foundation for the 
subsequent section on situating indigenous knowledge in development practice. 
 
Bourdieu’s Concept of Habitus 
The concept of “habitus” was developed within Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice. In 
the Outline of a Theory of Practice, he draws our attention to the social conditions of scientific 
practice by developing a theory that, on the one hand, critiques the foundation of social science 
and on the other hand, accounts for a theory of practice that argues that there exists relatively 
autonomous structured fields, which have a structuring capacity and function in accordance with 
rigorous mechanism of cultural and social reproduction which is capable of imposing their 
necessity on agents (Bourdieu, 1977). 
The autonomous structured field is described as the doxa (or the field) in which agents 
tacitly accord by the mere fact of acting in accordance with social convention. These, in Bourdieu’s 
understanding, are the always existing obligatory boundaries of experiential context that are “a 
relational obligation endowed with a specific gravity which it imposes on all the objects and agents 
which enter it” (Bourdieu in Adams, 2006, p. 514). The acting in accord with social convention is 
the habitus (Bourdieu, 1977). The habitus, in this respect, emerges from explicit action of 
inculcation producing a system of rules such as grammars and rhetoric, and defines the right ways 
to put the rules into practices as repertoire of devices or techniques. Adams (2006) notes that the 
field instantiates us as subjects and reproduces social distinctions via the enactment of habitus. 
The concept of habitus was formulated by Bourdieu to overcome the pernicious dualism 
between objectivism and subjectivity, exemplified in France by Levi-Strauss and Sartre (King, 
2000; Lau, 2004; Asimaki & Koustourakis, 2014). For Bourdieu, the concept captures and 
encapsulates the dialectics of objectivism and subjectivism by inscribing subjective, bodily actions 
with objective social forces so that the most apparent subjective individual acts take on social 
meaning (King, 2000). The habitus is thus internalized history and a ‘structure’ ‘structured’ by 
conditions of the relevant social (class, group, institutional) milieu (Lau, 2004). The concept is 
built on Bourdieu’s objectivist perspective which specifies the mechanism that links structural 
conditioning to social practice and regularities (Lau, 2004). It thus comprises two sides: as 
structured structure and as structuring structure. 
In this regard, habitus emerges as a conceptual tool suitable for explaining actions within 
a social field where a dynamic interplay of struggles produces history (Chandler, 2013). Thus, 
agency and autonomy are incorporated in the concept of habitus through personal and collective 
accumulated history that imprints them as pre-reflective action-orientation (Adams, 2006). This 
generative capacity of habitus makes it function as both ‘the structure of the field’ and ‘structured 
by the field’ leading to enduring transferable patterns of the social world. In this usage, habitus is 
a collective practical sense of objective possibilities that force the shape of the field providing the 
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pattern through which thoughts and action are produced. Accordingly, Bourdieu submits that 
practices that are generated by habitus follow a practical logic of practice: 
 
The conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of existence produce 
habitus, system of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structure predisposed to 
functioning as structuring structures, that is as principles which generate and organize 
practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcome without 
presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary 
in order to attain them (Bourdieu, 1990b, p. 53). 
 
The concept of habitus thus stresses that human action can be “coherent without springing 
from an intention of coherence and deliberate decision; adjusted to the future without being the 
product of a project of a plan” (Elder-Vass, 2007, p. 326).  As the set of dispositions inculcate in 
each of us by the conditioning that follows from our social environment (Elder-Vass, 2007), it 
conceals in its function symbolic power and through its capacities ensures the reproduction of itself 
as a self-regulating system compelling a lasting relation of domination established in the system. 
According to Lau, habitus emerges horizontally from its structural conditions; it is what it 
is because these conditions are what they are, and not vice versa (Lau, 2004). The objective and 
prior cultural and structural features of a society, which were referred to by Bourdieu as the opus 
operatum, meaning the work which has been done, are beyond humans while the modus operanu 
are the practical strategies which an individual adopts (King, 2000). In this regard, Bourdieu sees 
society not only as consisting of interactions between individuals, but also as dialectics between 
practice and structure (King, 2000). He therefore appeals to the concept of habitus according to 
which society consists of objective structure and determines — and isolated—individuals (King, 
2000).  
The suggestion that the operation of habitus is subconscious has been criticized by several 
scholars (Elder-Vass, 2007). Bourdieu (1977) constrains the role of conscious thought in human 
action by arguing that habitus acts within the agents as the organizing principle of their actions 
and that this modus operandi informing every thought and action reveals itself only in the opus 
operatum. In the operation, habitus is seen as possessing emergent causal mechanism irreducible 
to structural and individual manipulation. Elder-Vass (2007) noted that the omission of conscious 
thought from the development of our dispositions is untenable as a general claim since “Many 
(though certainly not all) of our dispositions seem to be learned quite consciously via explicit 
verbal instructions, rather than being absorbed and embodied subconsciously” (p. 327). Therefore, 
Bourdieu neglects the role of conscious thought in both the development and the operation of 
habitus (Elder-Vass, 2007). The concept was thus heavily criticized for offering less substance for 
comprehending the complexity that comprises individuality of the agent (Chandler, 2013; Elder-
Vass, 2007).  
King criticizes the concept of habitus as being incompatible with Bourdieu’s practical 
theory and slips back exactly into the kind of objectivism Bourdieu refutes (2000). According to 
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King, “much of what Bourdieu describes under the name of ‘practical theory’ and which he 
believes justified the concept of the habitus is, in fact, quite radically incompatible with habitus 
(King, 2000) because: one, it fails to provide an explanation of social change, and two, it reduces 
social reproduction to the mechanical imposition of prior social structure onto individuals thereby 
returning to the very systemic image of social life which Bourdieu initially rejected in his critique 
of the structuralist account of gift exchange.  Therefore, critics of the concept have mainly argued 
that the notion of habitus does not resolve the subject-object dualism of social theory which 
Bourdieu intends to do, but, in fact, relapses against Bourdieu’s intention into the very objectivism 
which he rejects. Despite this, King noted that Bourdieu’s contribution to the agency-structure 
debate cannot be completely dismissed.  
The importance of Bourdieu’s contribution to social theory has driven other commentators 
to argue that Bourdieu has gone a long way toward overcoming the dualism of structure and agency 
by presenting a genuine advance in social theory (Crossley, 2001; King, 2000). Chandler (2013) 
argues that the dynamism, or the potency for change and individuality, of the agent, saturated by 
cultural capital, derives from being built of an economy of interest working strategically within 
the agent, which is very similar to Bourdieu’s ‘economy of practices’ comprising various fields of 
struggle. In this regard, the principle of our action is naturally practically emergent from 
experience. Lau dispensed Bourdieu’s myriad description of the concept specifying three inter-
linked components for it: belief-premises, perception-appreciation, and a descriptive and 
prescriptive practical sense of objective possibilities and of the forthcoming for its 
operationalization (Lau, 2004). 
In this article, we follow Bourdieu’s conceptualization of habitus as a practical sense 
emergent from experience. The embedment of ‘local ownership’ in the structure of global 
development thinking, planning and delivery is analyzed as emergent in the habitual practices of 
a development project. In other words, the disposition to indigenous knowledge in development 
practice is an internalized understanding and experiences of the both of “donor- and “receiving-
community” that have emerged from development practices. These practices evolve habitual 
through a complex renegotiation of relations between the “donor” and “receiving-community”, or 
to the agents, and leaves room for the transformation of both parties. 
 
Situating Indigenous Knowledge in Development Practice in Africa 
“Indigenous knowledge is an integral part of the culture and history of a local community. 
We need to learn from local communities to enrich the development process.”  
         James D. Wolfensohn, World Bank President (In Gope et al., 2017) 
 
This section firstly illustrates indigenous knowledge, being the idea of ‘local ownership’ 
in development, as a ‘cultural capital’ used for resisting wholesale imposition of development 
ideas. We argue that the elitist, top-down approach to development that relies on the application 
of modern science, technology and expert knowledge held outside Africa for the continent’s 
development is epistemologically flawed. African perspectives on development have been greatly 
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impacted by indigenous cultural traditions and the sense of place, and this makes it relevant for 
African development values to be invoked in the quest for finding a lasting solution to the 
continent’s development crisis. This argument is inspired by the theory of habitus with the hope 
of generating objective possibilities to overcome the development insufficiencies experienced in 
most parts of Africa through the application of indigenous knowledge. 
According to the World Bank (1998), there is no all-encompassing definition of indigenous 
knowledge systems. From a strictly Western perspective, the term indigenous is often associated 
with being primitive, wild and natural (Dei, 1999). Indigenous knowledge (IK) is the local 
knowledge – knowledge that is unique to a given culture or society (Zageye & Bambe, 2006). IK 
contrasts with the international knowledge system generated by universities, research institutions 
and private firms. It is the basis for local-level decision making in agriculture, health care, food 
preparation, education, natural-resource management, and a host of other activities in rural 
communities (Warren, 1991). Indigenous knowledge can equally be defined as being the 
information base for a society, which facilitates communication and decision-making. Indigenous 
information systems are dynamic and are continually influenced by internal creativity and 
experimentation as well as by contact with external systems (Flavier, 1995). 
 Kok (2005) posits that knowledge systems generally are systems through which people 
make sense of and attach meaning to the world in which they live. These views and perceptions 
originate within a specific community or culture and are handed down from generation to 
generation, resulting in personal experiences and wisdom being transferred to younger people. 
These knowledge systems reflect the dynamic way in which the residents of a community come to 
understand themselves in relation to their natural environment, and how they organize that 
knowledge of flora, fauna, cultural beliefs and history to enhance their lives (Bray & Els, 2007).  
According to Gorjestani (2004), indigenous knowledge is an essential element of the social 
capital of the poor and constitutes their main asset in their efforts to achieve control of their own 
lives. It forms the base of the knowledge system of any country and encompasses the skills, 
experiences and insights of people applied to maintain or improve their livelihoods (World Bank, 
2004). For these reasons, the potential contribution of indigenous knowledge to locally managed, 
sustainable and cost-effective survival strategies should be promoted in the development process.  
 Generally, the inclusion of indigenous knowledge in development practice is based on the 
claim that the Western knowledge dominated scientific path for underdevelopment in non-Western 
societies has failed to achieve its claim of capability to deliver these countries from their 
development problems. We, therefore, see the need for local participation to help break the 
impasse. However, the persistence of an indigenous knowledge system itself can also be a 
reflection of its capacity in holistically resisting modernity. Its forcibility as a part of a covert 
response to the destabilizing flux of modernity is noted by Fanon (1963). Therefore, its invocation 
in development practice forges a corporeal disposition that makes up development practices. The 
appeal to indigenous knowledge in this regard is seen through the capacity to renew itself as one 
of the forces for achieving development in Africa.  
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The World Bank (1998) identifies three levels of relevance of indigenous knowledge that 
may be within the process of sustainable development: the first level is the local community where 
the bearers of such knowledge live and produce; second is the various development agents such as 
governments, donors, local leaders and private sector initiatives. These agents recognize 
indigenous knowledge, value it and appreciate it in their interaction with the local communities. 
However, before incorporating it in their approaches, they need to understand it and critically 
validate it against the usefulness for their intended objectives; third, the global knowledge level 
ensures that indigenous knowledge forms part of global knowledge and in this context, it has a 
value and relevance in itself. Accordingly, indigenous knowledge can be conserved, transferred, 
or adopted and adapted elsewhere. 
The acceptance of African indigenous knowledge in development practice is an effort in 
the way of finding the most suitable approach to resolving Africa’s enduring development 
challenges. In this process the indigenous knowledge asserts its relevance in an institutional 
configuration that tends to suppress it. Local knowledge acts as a force that determines how 
development is conducted in specific localities. In this regard, the assumption that Western 
knowledge provides the only route, i.e. as superior to other knowledge, to development is 
confronted by indigenous knowledge’s determinative capacity. Die states that “indigenous 
knowledge, as local participation, is a resistance to historic and continuing dominance of Western 
practice of development” (2014, p. 16). Therefore, the force of indigenous knowledge creates a 
space for itself in the development field. 
In this regard, the indigenous epistemic system and the Western model are seen as endowed 
with the same principle of achieving a satisfactory end whereby they are organized in relation to 
each other in the field of development. About 60% of the African population, for instance, lives in 
rural areas where they depend largely on their indigenous worldviews to solve problems that affect 
their wellbeing and social development (Shiza & Abdi, 2014). The contending issues are, however, 
whether African indigenous knowledge is transformational or whether modernity (Western 
knowledge) will consume it over time in the search for solutions to development challenges.  
The choice of African indigenous knowledge derives from a strictly normative standpoint 
that inclusiveness of a decision-making process determined by the requirements of survival is 
conditional and self-defeating. The issue of development in Africa is one of survival, and therefore 
development policies must be conceived in a way that will not exclude the choices and knowledge 
of the Africans themselves. Dei (2014) maintains that a critique of the Western discursive approach 
to African development should be pursued as an anti-colonial and anti-racist intellectuality to 
reclaim and recover indigenous knowledge. 
 For some scholars the focus on indigenous knowledge has been in answering the question 
related to whether African countries should establish endogenous localized political systems and 
structures to form centralized and powerful governments that contribute to promoting economic 
prosperity, improved living conditions, transparent parliamentary systems and social stability 
based on the Western political ideology (Liu, 2013). Research has equally devoted attention to the 
question of whether it is necessary to establish a powerful government that can effectively channel 
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national resources in joint efforts to achieve the state's long-term development goals, or to establish 
a weak government that only pursues its own immediate interests or partial interests and thus, leads 
to continuous mutually exclusive cut-throat competition. 
We explore the role of indigenous knowledge in health care in Burkina Faso to elaborate 
its relevance as a valuable and inevitable resource in Africa’s development process while at the 
same time show how this resource can be exploited to help people on the continent take control of 
their own lives. This presents a counter-hegemonic perspective of indigenous knowledge whereby 
development can best be understood and achieved if the indigenous people are encouraged to drive 
their development process by focusing on reinforcing their indigenous epistemic systems. Our 
choice of the healthcare sector derives from the fact that the development discourse has for too 
long focused on achieving economic prosperity while paying little attention to social development. 
We argue that the inclusion of indigenous knowledge in social projects will greatly increase the 
possibility of such projects to impact positively on the lives of the poor masses in Africa. This is 
particularly true because most of Africa’s population live in the rural areas and most of them 
depend on indigenous knowledge to obtain a means of livelihood. 
 
Indigenous Knowledge and Healthcare 
Scientific innovation and technological advancement in medical research have led to a 
remarkable increase in life expectancy, eradication of some diseases and a significant drop in 
mortality around the world. These developments notwithstanding, a large portion of the world’s 
people still do not have access to essential drugs. In areas where modern medicine is not readily 
available, the people resort to the use of traditional medicine which is easy to find at affordable 
costs. Almost 80% of Africa’s people do not have access to regular medicine and resort to the use 
of traditional medicine for their medical needs. It was in recognition of this fact that the World 
Health Organization in 2000 adopted the resolution on “Promoting the Role of Traditional 
Medicine in the Health System: A Strategy for the African Region” (Xiaorui, 2004).  
Most of the plants used in traditional medicine have great biological and therapeutic 
potential and can be used in the treatment of common diseases such as coughs, diarrhea and fever. 
Considering this, the value added of traditional medicine development strategies should focus on 
promoting the growth of this local knowledge and enhancing consultation with indigenous 
practitioners to facilitate the treatment of some diseases (An, 2004). However, this knowledge is 
often exploited by big capital wielding pharmaceutical companies who patent the products. 
In Burkina Faso, the government has taken measures to exploit and develop indigenous 
medicine as a means of improving healthcare delivery in the country. The Ministry of Health has 
created a Department of Pharmaceutical Services and Traditional Pharmacopoeia in order to 
establish a policy for developing a traditional medicine pharmacopoeia throughout the country. 
The first decision by the department was to develop traditional pharmacopoeia at the regional level 
that met regularly to exchange experiences gained in the field. Traditional therapist and herbalist 
organizations have been established in major cities around the country and regulations have been 
put in place to supervise the practice of traditional medicine in Burkina Faso. The country that is 
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also heavily afflicted by the AIDS epidemic is using traditional pharmacopoeia as a substitute of 
the expensive antiretroviral drugs in the fight against the disease. The government is helping to 
develop traditional medicine as a necessary supplement to the existing medical care provided for 
all segments of society by the medical centres of the country (Dakuyo, 2004). 
The example of Burkina Faso is a clear indication that indigenous knowledge is essential 
to economic growth and must be an integral part of Africa’s development process. The use of 
traditional pharmacopoeia and the creation of support networks for traditional healers are 
contributing to the effectiveness and sustainability of the country’s healthcare system. These kinds 
of indigenous knowledge practices can be integrated in many other sectors in order to boost the 
continent’s prospects of achieving prosperity without having to rely on knowledge held elsewhere. 
The experience of Burkina Faso is testimony to the fact that indigenous knowledge represents a 
precious, invisible link between regions and cultures, its resources and the store of experiences 
nurtured by the specialists in the community (Ndenecho, 2011). The knowledge held by these 
traditional or native healers represent what Bourdieu (1994) refers to as cultural capital which can 
exist in three forms: incorporated form, objectified state and institutionalized form. 
However, reliance on indigenous knowledge in the health sector is not without challenges. 
One of the greatest challenges is that indigenous knowledge in Burkina Faso, like in most parts of 
the continent, is still greatly influenced by rituals and customary practices, some of which are 
gradually disappearing. More so, the high rates of illiteracy in some countries on the continent 
could result in most work based on indigenous knowledge not being accessed by the local 
populations, and thus leading to the researchers knowing more than the local populations. Burkina 
Faso, as well as many other African countries, is facing rapid biodiversity loss, and this might 
result in practices and knowledge related to fauna or flora being lost. To effectively address such 
threats to indigenous knowledge, African states would need to enact stringent measures that aim 
to protect natural habitats and ecosystems in order to guarantee continuous access to scientific 
knowledge. 
The preference of the dominant modern Western systems of learning and scientific 
investigation is rapidly destroying these indigenous knowledge systems, especially in the 
healthcare sector in Africa (Gareth, 2000).  It is imperative to incorporate African traditional 
medicine (social capital) into the formal healthcare systems of African countries. This can be 
achieved through ethnopharmacology, which can help identify indigenous medicinal plants that 
are safe and effective. However, this would require that Western donors or pharmaceutical 
companies respect the intellectual property rights of the traditional healers. In line with the theory 
of habitus, modern medical technology can serve to describe, analyze, validate and classify the 
native beliefs and processes of the traditional knowledge systems. Gareth (2000) argues that such 
validation using new techniques would help to confirm the difficult process of observation, 
analysis, and evaluation that determines every individual’s culture. The validation may also 
represent the basic point of reference in the process of exchange between the donors’ modern 
medicine and the local African traditional doctor (Neba, 2011). 
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Conclusion 
The indigenous knowledge underpinning of resistance to dominating Western knowledge 
has been argued through its persistence in development practice. Its persistence evolved habitually 
through a complex renegotiation of power relations between the donor- and receiving-community, 
which leaves room for the transformation of development space. In the struggle to resolve the 
enduring puzzle of development in Africa, the role of indigenous knowledge is thus affirmed as 
important. We argue that the importance of indigenous knowledge in development practice is in 
its capacity to generate transferable local skills and set energies in motion to reduce the prevailing 
inequalities on the continent. Therefore, the article advocates for a paradigm shift in development 
thinking and practice that reinforces the use of indigenous knowledge as a first line of action in 
the process of development. 
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Abstract 
An increasing number of African countries have recently registered improved rates of 
economic growth. Translating economic growth into poverty reduction, however, requires 
putting into place policies and institutions that promote a sustainable and shared economic 
growth process. The degree of success in poverty reduction depends largely on balancing 
the process of economic growth and the judicious pattern of income distribution so that an 
increasing share of the population benefits from the growth process and engages in more 
productive endeavors. Building the necessary policy and institutional framework to 
promote sustainable and shared economic growth is central in breaking the poverty trap 
and in initiating sustainable economic development. This article develops a political 
economy argument and demonstrates how successful poverty reduction are closely linked 
with pursuing economic policies that engage in increasing a segment of economic agents 




 African countries have exhibited relative improvement in their economic growth in the new 
millennium. Sub-Sahara African economies have registered on average a 2.29 percent annual 
growth rate in real per capita income from the year 2000 to 2015. Given the average growth rate 
of their population at a rate of about 2.699 per annum during this period, the overall economic 
performance has been relatively robust. This is an important improvement compared to the long 
stagnation that economies in the region exhibited from the mid-1970s to the end of the 1990s. 
During this period, the economies in the region on average grew less than the growth of their 
population leading to a reduction in their real per capita income for an extended period of time 
with considerable cost to Africans and their hope of breaking the poverty trap.  
 Robust economic growth, however, is not new to African countries. Africa registered rapid 
economic growth during the 1960s but that initial push for sustainable growth and improvement 
in standard of living became no longer possible once economic policy mismanagement set in and 
the commodity price boom was busted (Van de Walle, 2001). In reality, the post-1960 average per 
capita economic growth rate of Africa was about 0.79 percent whereas the population growth was 
stable and held fast at an average rate of 2.69 percent per annum (World Bank, 2017). 
 The overall economic growth performance of the region in the post-independence period 
has been so moderate that it is not yet clear if the recent relative improvement is a new trend or a 
temporary recovery from the long recession of the economies in the region. Have African 
economies learned the appropriate lesson from their past experiences as well as lessons from other 
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developing countries outside the continent to sustain their economic growth and more importantly 
to convert that growth into a steady reduction in poverty across the continent? These are some of 
the central issues that call for a critical and in-depth analysis of the current economic performance 
of Africa, and the efforts to break the vicious circle of chronic poverty and destitution across the 
continent. 
 The source of such economic growth, sustainability as well as differences across countries, 
are features that need further elaboration and systematic analysis of what factors should be 
emphasized in an effort to translate economic growth into sustainable development and poverty 
reduction. In light of the experiences of such economies in economic stagnation, demographic 
pressures, and worsening poverty situation, the recent performances are indeed remarkable in their 
magnitude as well as spread across countries. Whereas overall average economic growth 
performance has exhibited significant improvement, translating economic growth into steady 
improvement in the standard of living is the most challenging and often unachieved objective in a 
number of countries. Whereas the countries in the region registered better economic growth, this 
record should be contextualized in that the growth rate occurred from a distressingly low level of 
income. Despite the recent growth rate, the average real per capita income in sub-Sahara African 
countries is estimated at just $1,652 in 2015 as compared to $1,072 in 1960 measured in terms of 
the 2010 constant international dollar (World Bank, 2017). Overall, the observation of real income 
per capita over a longer span of time across African countries does not leave much room for 
optimism yet. As Figure 1 below graphically depicts, the most consistent and stable growth rate in 
the continent has been population growth and the economies struggle to stay barely above the 
forces of demography. 
 Economic recovery and growth provides economies new opportunities to restructure their 
economies and identify pathways that could lead to sustainable economic performance. If the 
recent economic recovery can be capitalized upon and national economies earnestly address 
structural bottlenecks and institutional and policy rigidities in sustaining the growth performance 
of their economic agents, they could create new momentum that could ensure sustainable 
economic growth and poverty reduction. The central policy issue is that given the current economic 
growth performance of most of the African countries, do they have the policy and institutional 
capacity to translate their economic growth into a sustained reduction in poverty? If not, what can 
be done about it? Breaking the low-level-equilibrium poverty trap requires both initiating and 
sustaining robust economic growth, raising the average income well beyond the subsistence level, 
and translating such dynamism into steady job creation, structural transformation, and reduction 
as well as eventual elimination of chronic poverty.  
 The overall improvement in the economic growth performance is a wider phenomenon and 
observed in diverse settings and situations across the developing world. African countries, as well 
as the wider family of developing countries, have improved their economic growth performance. 
Translating the improved overall economic growth performance into a steady reduction of chronic 
poverty across African countries requires putting in place institutions and policies that provide 
equitable opportunities to all the population and enabling economic agents to accumulate essential 
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human and investment capital. This leads to sustained improvement in their productivity and sets 
the stage for further reduction or even elimination of chronic poverty. For the first time in its 
history, Africa now has more non-poor than poor populations with an emerging middle class that 
has significant potential power to transform the continental economy (Moges, 2014). This has 
tremendous implications for the prospects of African economies and the life of Africans in the 
coming decades.    
Poverty reduction is the outcome of both growth and income distribution processes and 
these elements are closely linked with the pattern of economic growth. It is therefore critically 
important to understand the process and forces that give rise to a persistent decline in poverty 
across countries and draw policy lessons that would help to promote the capacity of national 
economies to further address the remaining poverty and inequality challenges. A number of African 
countries have exhibited a unique pattern where both the share and the number of poor people first 
increased and only recently have both started to follow a downward trend. A closer examination 
of the poverty indicators across African countries strongly suggests that the performance of 
countries in terms of addressing chronic poverty is not amenable to generalization, and there are 
both success as well as failure stories. Whereas the number of countries that have managed to 
reduce the poverty rate has been increasing, there are dominant cases with high concentrations of 
poverty and population that exert significant influence on the overall poverty situation in the 
continent. Despite the improved situation and performance of African countries, for the countries 
under our consideration and for which comparable data is available, the total number of poor 
people has increased by about 64 million since the turn of the millennium.  
These features suggest that the process of poverty reduction exhibits unique 
characteristics, and that subsequent efforts to eliminate poverty should take into account these 
forces so as to enable the majority of the population to escape the poverty trap and achieve 
sustainable improvement in their standard of living. The inspiration of this article emerges from 
the unique and historic possibility that chronic poverty as we know it could be eliminated within 
a foreseeable future provided that African countries, which are the weakest spots in this effort, 
could draw practical lessons from other developing countries and coordinate their efforts to break 
away from the poverty trap.  
 The purpose of this article is to analyze the recent trends in the extent of poverty reduction 
across African countries, highlight the pattern and features of the poverty reduction process, and 
draw policy lessons for further poverty reduction efforts. To accomplish this purpose, we have 
made use of a unique set of new and revised poverty and inequality data across African countries 
for which consistent and reliable data could be found. The study focuses on the period since the 
year 2000 during which poverty reduction policies took center stage in a new political-economy 
and global policy environment. We identified the effort and achievement of developing countries 
in terms of promoting economic growth, breaking away from economic stagnation, responding in 
terms of the pattern of income distribution, and interacting to both growth and distributional forces 
in shaping the outcome in the incidence of poverty across countries.  
 Success in poverty reduction is contextually defined in terms of sustained reduction in the 
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share of the population of the countries under consideration that live on less than USD $1.90 per 
day chronic poverty line. An economy is considered successful in dealing with chronic poverty if 
it has managed to reduce their poverty index consistently below the 5 percent threshold and has 
set the stage for sustained poverty alleviation.  
 The paper contributes both to the theory of poverty analysis and the practical issues of 
development policy in the context of African countries and addresses the nexus between economic 
growth, income distribution issues, and poverty. A systemic analysis of the challenges and 
achievements in terms of poverty reduction provides a new insight into effective approaches, 
policy choices, and prospects in promoting sustainable and equitable economic growth that have 
a significant effect on the standard of living of the population and in terms of reducing the scope 
and depth of chronic poverty.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section develops conceptual 
arguments and deals with issues of poverty and the poverty reduction policy framework. Section 
three explores the argument in a broader analytical framework that attempts to link poverty 
reduction with growth performance with income distribution. Section four provides the evidence 
regarding the achievement in poverty reduction and its underlying forces. The paper concludes by 
drawing relevant policy lessons for countries where chronic poverty is still a formidable challenge. 
 
Poverty: Conceptual Context and Measurement Challenges 
 Poverty is a multi-dimensional concept and as such requires a comprehensive policy 
approach to deal with it. Chronic poverty refers to the inability of households to provide sufficient 
subsistence and to lead a decent economic and social life. It is a pronounced and extensive 
deprivation in well-being of individuals, families, and communities.    
 From the conceptual perspective and current common perception, poverty and by 
implication, the policy of poverty alleviation have ambiguous and imprecise meanings (Chen and 
Ravallion, 2010; Deaton, 2005; Kanbur, 2005; Moges, 2013b, 2013c; Ravallion, et al. 2009; World 
Bank, 2005). Whereas researchers have widened the conceptual framework and context of poverty 
from consumption expenditure, capability, and freedom perspectives, the difficulty and 
inaccessibility of precise measurement of such concepts have led to the alternative focus on a 
narrow but more pragmatic identification of poverty indicators for public policy response 
purposes. This approach has limitations in understanding the full extent of the challenges 
individuals and families in the situation of the poverty trap face. This situation is not only related 
to material deprivation but overall lack of capability to change their situation. Breaking the impasse 
requires empowerment of the poor to address their situation coupled with effective intervention by 
the government sector or even external forces that have vested and rational interest in breaking the 
trap and making the escape permanent.   
 A poverty reduction policy involves measuring accurately the income of households 
relative to a reference poverty yardstick, counting the number of poor people, putting this figure 
in relation to the entire population, and characterizing the nature, underlying causes, and dynamics 
of their poverty. Each step is a difficult task and require considerable resources. Moreover, the 
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lack of precision makes the concept vulnerable to political yard sticking in which actual poverty 
problems are not directly addressed or addressed obliquely (Deaton, 2005; Kanbur, 2005; Easterly, 
2009; Jones, 2004). The headcount poverty index, for instance, could be reduced without 
necessarily reducing the absolute number of people in chronic poverty. This is particularly relevant 
in countries where population growth is fast, life expectancy is short and more children are born 
into poverty than those born in non-poor families. Moreover, who is poor and who is not largely 
depends on the poverty threshold the country adopts and when this yardstick is not realistic enough, 
the resultant poverty indicators would be misleading. Even when the benchmark yardstick is 
realistic enough, the poor are not homogenous. There is diversity within the ranks of the poor, and 
a concept of poverty would be partial if it fails to capture these essential features and develop ways 
to address them accordingly.   
 The conceptual context of chronic poverty is relevant especially in the poorest regions of 
the world as the situation might also involve generalized poverty where economies are simply not 
able to produce sufficient goods and services for the subsistence necessities of their population. It 
is important to note that the concept of poverty reduction might involve inter-temporal fallacy in 
that the poverty reduction strategy might become the victim of its own success. If one assumes 
that public policies reflect the will of the majority, at least in a democratic political setting, decline 
in the poverty index reduces the incentive for public policies to emphasize on further reduction 
measures especially when such measures are financed by contributions from the non-poor 
segments of the population or involve redistributive fiscal policy measures (Moges, 2013a). It is 
also realistic to acknowledge that not everybody has a vested interest in the elimination of poverty. 
As much as most of us want to overcome the humiliation that foreign aid and alms bring in the 
name of helping the poor, it is necessary to recognize the fierce resistance the powerful aid industry 
poses for radical changes in how countries implement anti-poverty measures.  
It therefore becomes important to develop poverty elimination strategies that appeal both 
to the poor and the non-poor in society, empower the poor to make choices that affect their life, 
recognize the potential resistance that could emerge from vested interest groups, and mobilize 
support from a wide base while emphasizing the idea that eliminating chronic poverty is to the 
vested economic, social and political interest of the whole population of a nation. It is only under 
such comprehensive and broad based support that African countries can mobilize the necessary 
political, social, and economic resources to break the poverty trap once and for all.  
The issues of poverty reduction could also be analyzed from the perspective of the process 
of economic growth and distribution of economic opportunities across economic agents and 
households. The level of poverty, as well as growth of mean income relative to the poverty line, is 
an important factor in reducing poverty. An economy might find itself in a situation of generalized 
poverty where aggregate output is not big enough to provide a decent living standard for all. In 
such a situation, average income falls short of the poverty line. This phenomenon emerges where 
economic agents and resources are underutilized, unemployed, underemployed or economic agents 
that do not have sufficient incentive, capital or technology to work for a number of institutional, 
policy, political, social and economic reasons. The first order of priority in such a situation is to 
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unburden economic agents from such constraints and develop strategies to eliminate structural 
bottlenecks for the realization of the economic potential of the country under consideration. This 
in turn requires a thorough examination of the economic, social, political and behavioral factors 
and the institutions that give rise to such under-capacity utilization of natural and human resources 
in the economy.  
Even when an economy improves its productive capacity and its average income is higher 
than the absolute poverty line, output may not or cannot be equally distributed across households. 
This is true partly because inequality and its root causes extend beyond economic forces. 
Observation of cross-country patterns of income distribution suggests that even the most 
egalitarian societies have an index of inequality in the range of 0.20 to 0.25, whereas the most 
unequal economies register about 0.60 to 0.66 (Milanovic, 2005). The pattern of wealth 
distribution across households, despite the limitation of the quality of such data, is turned out to 
be even more extremely unequal (Davies et al., 2010). However, not all inequality in a system 
reflects injustice. When the rewards that economic agents receive are adjusted relative to their 
effort, dexterity, and creativity so they are fairly balanced, it maintains the incentives for higher 
efficiency and robust growth in national income.  
 Economic growth is indeed the most powerful instrument to reduce poverty provided that 
it creates employment opportunities to the poor, increases the demand for factors that the poor 
own, and creates the condition in which the poor develop the capability to accumulate productive 
assets that prepare them for a productive and better life (Dollar & Kraay, 2002; Kraay & Raddatz, 
2007; Moges, 2013b). Economic growth has twin effects both of which have important effects on 
poverty indicators. From an analytical perspective, economic growth could imply an increase in 
the average income of all households without necessarily changing their relative income. There is 
also a distributional effect in which the growth process is accompanied by changes in the relative 
income with ambiguous effects on the poverty indicators (Bourguignon, 2003; Dollar & Kraay, 
2002). Nonetheless, the growth process might exhibit anti-poor elements when economic agents 
are not positioned to equally participate in and benefit from the growth process due to constraints 
of human capital, access to financial services, a weak business and investment climate, weak 
institutions, and restrictive economic policies (Alesina & Rodrik, 1994; Persson & Tabellini, 
1994).  
Is economic growth distribution neutral? There are strong tendencies that cast doubt on the 
distributional neutrality of growth. The growth of income of a national economy does not benefit 
all economic agents equally for a host of reasons including differences in resource endowments; 
inputs in market imperfections, government policies, institutions, and social relationships. 
Economic growth benefits mostly those who have the capability to initiate growth, and it 
eventually reaches those economic agents who get employment opportunities and those who 
produce factor inputs in the production processes. This process is gradual and its flow does not 
necessarily involve a significant portion of the population. It is possible that economic growth 
could be driven by a sector that has very weak linkage with the rest of the economy and with 
inconsequential effect on employment generation. Such a growth process can give rise to 
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deterioration in the distribution of income and worsen the inequality situation leaving the majority 
of the population behind.  
 Poverty reduction could be achieved by the growth in the income of the poor or 
improvement in the distribution of income. These two features of the growth process and its 
implication on poverty indicators are an important analytical approach to decompose the relative 
importance of the growth and distribution components in the process of poverty reduction 
(Bourguignon, 2003). The relative importance of these forces influences the extent to which 
growth can be translated into poverty reduction on a sustainable basis. The dynamics of economic 
growth and its impact on the poverty situation in a country hence largely depends on the political 
economic forces that shape the nature and dynamics of the economic and socio-political forces 
within the country. 
 
Analytical Framework for Poverty Analysis 
 The level and change in the indicators of poverty of a country are closely linked to the 
degree to which economic agents utilize all of their economic resources in the system for the 
production of goods and services at a given state of technology. Productive efficiency and 
technological progress are engines of economic growth. Given the production process, the 
distribution of output across households involve political economic, market, demographic, and 
institutional forces. As such, the process of production and distribution of economic resources 
ultimately influence the prevalence and persistence of poverty in the system. From such a 
perspective, the stage of economic development as measured by per capita or per household 
income, the growth rate of the average income, pattern of income distribution, and population 
growth are the main forces that shape the level and changes in the indicators of poverty. 
 The measurement of poverty and its dynamics over time depends on computing the 
aggregate output of the nation and its growth rate, the distribution of income across households, 
the size and growth rate of the population, and a realistic poverty yardstick. These factors in 
isolation as well as in combination influence the level and dynamics of poverty of a nation over 
time and across households.   
 
Poverty Indices 
 The measurement of poverty as defined above could take various approaches and practical 
twists. The most commonly used approaches involve establishing a distribution function of the 
aggregate output of an economy, arranging the distribution of income or purchasing power with 
respect to the distribution of the population and with the help of a separately determined poverty 
line to divide the population into poor and non-poor classes. This process is conceptually simple 
but could be misleading unless it is used precisely and interpreted from the perspectives of 
distribution, dynamics, and responsiveness to policy initiatives.  
 Accurate measurement of poverty starts with a reliable measurement and ordering of 
income at the household level and national level as well as computing accurately the size and 
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growth of the population in a country. These features could be captured in a conceptual framework 
that reflects various perspectives of poverty.    
 Consider that the income or consumption expenditure level of a total of n-households in a 
nation is arranged in an ascending order and take the following notation:   
          𝐲 = (𝒚𝟏, 𝒚𝟐,  ⋯ , 𝒚𝒅, ⋯ , 𝒚𝒎, ⋯ , 𝒚𝒏)                    (𝟏) 
The aggregate value of income of households approximates the size of the national output 
that is available for consumption which closely approximates the disposable income in the national 
income computation plus public services and goods that household members receive from the 
government. Hence the aggregate size of output is critically important.  
 If the average income of a nation falls short of the threshold poverty line, by necessity, the 
majority of its population would be suffering from chronic and endemic poverty. This is a situation 
where the poverty threshold income level is higher than the average income of the entire economy, 
yd >ym. This is an exceptional situation of generalized poverty. It captures the central challenge of 
a failed system that could not generate enough goods and services to provide the necessities of 
economic life. As we will discuss this issue later on, a number of African countries currently find 
themselves in generalized poverty that describes a low-level-equilibrium-poverty trap. This is an 
equilibrium trap conditioned by institutional, political, demographic, environmental, and 
technological forces that reinforce each other for stability. Breaking such a stable equilibrium 
requires radical reforms that break the rigidities, constraints, and limitations on economic agents 
from making decisions and responding to incentives so as to engage in productive endeavors and 
earning in the process a decent standard of living.    
It is only when the total output that the economy generates is large enough that sufficient 
resources can be available for addressing poverty objectives. Income per household hence 
measures what could be available, on average, for members of households and is measured by 
dividing national income by the total number of households, n. Income per capita, which depends 
on the average family household size, is equivalent to the aggregate output divided by the size of 
the national population. Note that the aggregate output is produced by a productively employed 
segment of the population and its productivity whereas this total output should support the 
consumption expenditure of the entire population. Therefore, the aggregate size of output and the 
total size of the population are two fundamental determinants of how many goods and services 
could be available on average for individuals to consume and invest for further production. 
The average income is an important indicator in a sense that it shows the value of goods 
and services that a typical household and its members can command if income and consumption 
capabilities were fairly and equally distributed. However, income is rarely distributed equally 
across households or economic agents. Households and their members have inherent inequality in 
age, productive capacity, incentive to work, education, health, dexterity, and the like that are 
reflected partly on their capacity to earn income. The dispersion of household income relative to 
the average income captures the distribution of income. However, the extent of inequality is a 
matter of public concern, especially when differences in income do not reflect differences in 
productive attributes of households and their members. It is also possible that inequality might 
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have functional influences on the growth rate of income of households and hence the inter-
temporal dynamics of income and poverty indicators.  
The simplest and quite obvious indicator of inequality is the gap in income between the 
richest households and the poorest. In our ordered ranking of households by their income level, 
this is depicted by (𝒚𝒏 − 𝒚𝟏). The relative concentration of households towards the highest, the 
middle, or the lowest on the income ladder generates the most obvious form of income and 
consumption expenditure gap in a country. This gap and its behavior over time would have 
important bearings on the relative poverty index.  
There is a stylized tendency of economic resource distribution which suggests that 
households tend to concentrate nearer to the lowest income, somewhere below the average income 
level, giving the overall distribution of income a skewed structure. The level of income that most 
of the households generate and consume - the modal income - is a typical barometer of interest in 
economic analysis for it reflects the most representative feature of a household and its members. 
In this context, it is also relevant to take into consideration the magnitude of (yd – y1) which shows 
how much income of the poorest households fall below the poverty line. The smaller the gap the 
better, whereas a larger gap suggests more daunting challenges in addressing the problem 
especially if those falling below the poverty line constitute a higher share of the population.   
The next issue of interest is related to the distribution of income of households relative to 
the average income of households. If we consider ym in equation (1) above as the average income 
of households, the deviation of individual household income relative to the average indicates how 
income and expenditure capabilities are distributed across households.  
Measuring income distribution and inequality is a notoriously difficult and inaccurate 
business. In practice, nations gather vital information on the distribution of income by conducting 
national household surveys on income or expenditures but for a long list of reasons such sample 
surveys fail to provide accurate indicators of the pattern of income distribution. Moreover, the 
surveys are conducted infrequently, and their outcomes largely deviate from national income 
accounting based estimates of aggregate output and income. It is therefore customary to rely on 
expenditure surveys to derive indicators of income distribution and inequality and rely more on 
national income accounts to gauge the level of national economic activity and growth rate. 
Based on the level and distribution of aggregate output of a nation across the population, 
indicators of consumption deprivation are computed by applying a poverty threshold line. A class 
of poverty measures, following the general framework of the Watt index, were commonly used in 
poverty analysis (Foster et. al., 1984, Morduch, 1998). This class of poverty index summarizes the 
level of poverty and its extent for a given distribution of income and the poverty line and the 
corresponding average exit time to eliminate poverty from the system. It can be summarized as 
follows: 









                       (𝟐) 
Where Pα (𝒊 = 𝟎, 𝟏, 𝟐) is the poverty index and is the function of income (y) of poor households 
and the poverty line (z). As indicated earlier, there are n households arranged in increasing order 
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from the lowest to the highest income per household, and household d has an income exactly equal 
to or below the poverty line.  
P0 is the indicator of the headcount poverty index (HPI), which measures the total number 
of people in households with an income below the poverty line expressed as a share of the total 
population in all households, N. Households and their members whose income falls short of the 
poverty line would constitute the poor.   
This is useful and yet it is highly dependent on the choice of the poverty line yardstick 
that is used to designate households as poor or non-poor. The poverty line is drawn using a set of 
commodities that are dominantly used and affordable by poor households. However, one has to be 
aware of the problems of picking an arbitrary threshold for it may not realistically reflect the 
choices that are available for poor households to allocate their limited resources (Chen et al., 2010; 
Ravallion et al., 2009). Poverty involves lack of choice and vulnerability to different shocks that 
are outside the control of the members of the household. This is particularly the case in chronic 
poverty even if relative poverty also invokes a considerable lack of freedom of choice. The way 
the poverty threshold is chosen and determined affects the classification of households in the two 
broad categories of the poor and the non-poor. This could take quite an arbitrary bend if those near 
or above the threshold are still deprived of the basic necessities of life and choices that would make 
their status of non-poor almost trivial (Deaton, 2005).  
There are two related measurement approaches of poverty that measure how poor 
households fall short of the poverty line - the poverty gap index (P1) - as a percentage of the poverty 
threshold level. This approach is sensitive to the distribution of income among the poor households 
for it measures the average deviation of income of poor households from the poverty line threshold. 
This suggests that anything that helps the poorest households relative to the rest would improve 
the overall extent of poverty. This might involve income transfers, welfare programs, or income 
boosting approaches that would benefit the poorest segments of the society. And yet it does not 
directly address the extent to which households with an income level higher than the poverty 
threshold would be vulnerable. This is quite an important concern particularly when the non-poor 
are concentrated just above the poverty line but not far enough to be comfortable about their current 
and future economic status. 
Consider a family of four whose current consumption expenditure is such that they are 
considered a non-poor household, and yet they barely make it. If a child is born, the family size 
expands by 25 percent while income most likely remains somewhat the same at least in the short 
run. In such a case, the family may soon be in poverty unless it compensates its purchasing power 
with a corresponding rise in their real income.  
These two concepts of poverty index, headcount poverty index and the poverty gap, are 
the most commonly used, popular, and relatively simple approaches to describe the absolute 
poverty of a nation.  
The third concept is the measure of the severity of poverty which is the square of the 
poverty gap that attaches more weight for those households that fall far below the poverty line than 
those near the threshold line: 
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However, its practical application in poverty analysis and policy has been marginal. In this study, 
we focus on the first concept and its implications in the analysis of poverty.  
Growth in the average income of the poor and the aggregate economy without a 
corresponding deterioration in the pattern of income distribution generate the most promising path 
out of poverty. However, there are complex sets of issues that might hamper members of poor 
households from benefiting and contributing to the growth of income, productivity and 
employment in the economy. The capacity of an economy to address the challenges of poverty, 
hence, depends on how much it can mobilize and invest in the productive capacity of its population 
and generate employment opportunities to most of the economically active population and 
especially for those from the poorest segment of the population. The elimination of poverty 
apparently translates into pushing the average income of the poorest segments of households, y1 
to yd, beyond the poverty line, z. The process of shared economic growth would have the best 
chances of eliminating poverty on a sustainable manner, and yet in most cases, some form of social 
safety net would be necessary to ensure that all families enjoy the basic necessities of life.  
Nonetheless, there are possibilities in which national economies find themselves where the 
poverty threshold line, defined within an acceptable level of bare necessities of life, might be 
higher than the average income of households (𝑧 > 𝑦𝑚). This is a typical situation of generalized 
poverty where chronic poverty is widespread and almost every family is in a poverty trap. This 
situation calls for an entirely different approach in addressing the challenges of poverty and overall 
economic underdevelopment. Even in such a dire situation, there would be a minority of 
households that are rich and yet their relative prosperity would have limited impact on the overall 
poverty situation of the national economy. Apparently, income redistribution policies would have 
very limited influence on the dynamics of poverty in this situation since the overall population has 
an egalitarian distribution of deprivation and poverty for its citizens. The challenge for policy here 
is a radical and comprehensive reform that would change the very nature of how households and 
their family members engage in productive economic activities and benefit from their endeavors. 
It would take radical institutional, political, and social reforms that break away from the 
bottlenecks and bad institutions that have deprived the population from earning a decent economic 
life and participate productively in the economic activities of their country. 
 
Poverty Exit Time 
The accurate conceptualization and measurement of poverty is the first step in dealing 
with poverty reduction efforts. The pace and extent of poverty reduction is dependent on a 
combination of factors that involve overall economic growth of the national economy, the growth 
rate of the average income of poor households, the distribution of income across households, the 
growth rate of family size across the income distribution pattern, and the extent to which vertical 
mobility is feasible for individuals from poor families to join the ranks of the non-poor.  
93 
International Journal of African Development v.5 n.1  Spring 2018 
The concept of poverty exit time is used to describe what it takes in terms of the growth 
rate of income for poor households to eliminate their income shortfall from the poverty line. Given 
the poverty gap, growth rate of income for the poor would translate into closing the income gap 
and joining the ranks of the non-poor. A concept of an average exit time that makes use of a 
modified version of the Watts measure, sensitive both to distribution of income and decomposable 
across subgroups of the population, is used for our analysis (Murdoch, 1998). The Watts index has 







                        (3) 
where there are i individuals in the population indexed from 1 to N in increasing order of income 
and d captures the number of people with income yi below the poverty line z.  
To develop a measure that captures the expected time for a poor household to exit poverty 
if its income grows at an average rate of g per annum is depicted as the relationship between the 
current income of the household, yi , and the target of the poverty threshold level, z. This could be 
depicted as follows: 
𝒛 = 𝒚𝒊𝒆
(𝒕𝒈
𝒊 𝒈)                                            (4) 
Taking the logarithm on both sides of the equation and solving for tig results in: 
𝒕𝒈
𝒊 =  
𝐥𝐧(𝐳) − 𝐥𝐧(𝐲𝐢)
𝐠
                            (5) 
Given that there are d households with an income at or below the poverty line and (n-d) 
households with an income at least equal to the poverty line, the average exit time for households, 
Tg, is hence the average time for the entire population to eliminate poverty. It is given by: 







                                (6) 
Note the fact that out of these households, n-d households have zero exit time because 
they have already achieved the target level of the threshold income. Some households may be 
barely above the threshold, and yet, they and their family members would be included in the class 









             (7) 
This is closely related to a class of Watts index above in that: 
𝑻𝒈 =  
𝑾
𝒈 
                                       (8) 
The essential feature of this formulation is that provided that the income of the poor is 
assumed to grow at an average rate of g per annum, the short fall of income of the poor from the 
poverty line could be eliminated within a span of time that is equal to the total amount of the gap 
divided by the growth rate of income of the poor. Therefore, if there are policies that promote the 
growth of income of the poor, then the poverty in a nation could be reduced or eliminated within 
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a specific period of time. This perspective, of course, assumes that income among the poor could 
grow equally or that the poor have equal opportunities to improve their income. With this 
qualification, the exit time provides an important point of focus for poverty policy. 
 Regarding a closely related issue particularly in terms of mobilizing the necessary 
resources to address the problems of chronic poverty, it is important to estimate what would be the 
cost of such an objective relative to national income. Since we can estimate the average income 
shortfall of households below the poverty line, by aggregating the shortfall of the relative burden 
to the size of the national economy, we get: 
 
𝑷𝒃𝒖𝒓𝒅𝒆𝒏 =




                        (9) 
 This estimate provides the cost burden to the national economy to eliminate poverty from 
the system, and it also serves as a yardstick by which households whose average income falls 
below the poverty line could be directly supported. The cost of such support could be unaffordable 
in economies where the majority of the households are poor, and the economy is rather weak. 
However, countries with an HPI within a range of 5-10 percent of their population should be able 
to mobilize the necessary funds domestically to absorb the financial burden of poverty alleviation 
measures. 
 
Analysis of Poverty Reduction in African Countries 
 The measurement of poverty and its dynamics over time depend on computing the 
aggregate output of the nation and its growth rate, the distribution of income across households, 
the size and growth rate of the population, and a realistic poverty yardstick. These factors in 
isolation as well as in combination influence the level and dynamics of poverty of a nation over 
time and across households. 
 Poverty has been deep and widespread across the developing countries of the world. This 
is the manifestation of both the low level of income and productivity of national economies as well 
as the inequitable access to productive opportunities and hence income. Low productivity and lack 
of access to educational and employment opportunities in more productive sectors have reduced 
the opportunities to realize the potentials of millions of poor people from earning decent living 
standards and escaping from the poverty trap. This has also deprived economies from benefitting 
from the potential productive contribution of poor people in improving the overall welfare of the 
total population. 
Table 1 summarizes the regional poverty indicators across African regions and over time. 
It exhibits features that provide both the challenges and prospects of addressing poverty in the 
context of African countries. First, there is a continental trend which indicates that both the 
absolute number of poor and their share in the total population first rose and then started declining. 
The headcount index of poverty first increased from 56.75% in 1990 to about 57.1% in 2002 and 
then declined over the years to reach 40.99% in 2013. Second, chronic poverty is concentrated in 
some countries and regions within the African continent. Increasingly, East and West African 
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countries are where both economic and demographic forces are pushing up a higher concentration 
of poverty indicators. Third, despite the overall tendency, there are significant variations in terms 
of the scope and rate of poverty reduction across countries. 
 
Table 1  
Poverty Indicators in Sub-Sahara Africa 













Developing Countries 42.01 1840.1 30.04 1588.12 12.55 766.01 
Sub-Sahara Africa 54.28 276.08 55.58 391.28 40.99 388.72 
 East Africa 62.94 130.6 58.53 160.4 40.90 159.1 
 West Africa 56.34 101.4 59.28 147.0 43.19 145.6 
 Central Africa 56.46 39.5 67.38 68.7 54.46 75.3 
 Southern Africa 32.81 13.8 36.05 19.1 17.88 10.9 
Source: World Bank, 2017. Poverty Database and World Development Indicators.  
Note: HPI measures the share of the population with less than $1.90 per day poverty line in terms 
of adjusted 2011 PPP. Author’s computation on the basis of data source. 
 
Fourth, the poverty reduction performance of countries has been highly influenced by 
demographic forces. Whereas the overall tendency of the demographic transition is manifest in 
several African countries, there are countries that face considerable demographic pressure. The 
demographic challenge expressed in terms of high and stable growth rate of the population has 
made the task of addressing poverty more daunting. Fifth, whereas the number of poor people has 
declined across the continent in recent years, there are more Africans in poverty now than in 1990. 
In total, there are still nearly 389 million Africans living in chronic poverty, which is about 113 
million more poor people than in 1990. Sixth, whereas the successes in reducing the number of the 
poor and their share in the population is widespread across the continent, those countries that have 
failed to make a significant reduction in poverty are dominant in terms of population and economic 
size which increases their influence on the overall assessment of the poverty situation in the 
continent.   
  Understanding variation in terms of the poverty reduction process and drawing policy 
lessons for those countries and regions that still face considerable challenges in addressing the 
problems of chronic poverty requires examining the forces behind variations in performance. 
Figure 1 depicts the average growth performance of Sub-Sahara African countries since 1960. It 
is notable that not only has economic growth been modest, it also has been very erratic and 
unsteady over time. Growth in real per capita income is also constrained significantly by the steady 
and rapid population growth rate of the region. As the figure graphically depicts, it is the struggle 
between the growth efforts of the economies and the power of the demographic forces that have 
shaped how economies have managed to generate sustainable or weak economic growth over time. 
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It is indeed a big deal to cope with the growth of the population, and yet steady improvement in 
the standard of living necessitates the growth of economic activity faster and more steadily than 
population.  
 
Figure 1. Sub Saharan Africa – Average real GDP and population growth rate. 
Source: World Bank, 2018 
 
  
Figure 2. Africa: Economic Growth-Poverty Nexus 
 
Figure 2 relates graphically the relative performance of 35 African countries for which 
comparable data could be secured both on poverty, growth rate in real income, and demographic 




































































































































































-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Africa: Economic Growth-Poverty Nexus
97 
International Journal of African Development v.5 n.1  Spring 2018 
forces in operation that affect the degree of poverty reduction in the sample countries. Whereas 
economic growth remains the main force that enable countries to address the problems of chronic 
poverty on a sustainable basis, economic growth does not necessarily translate to poverty 
reduction. Economic growth is only a potential power that could be used for effective and sustained 
reduction in poverty.  
 It is evident that countries with robust economic growth have registered significant 
reduction in poverty. Countries with a fast growth rate in real per capita income on average 
managed to reduce the share of their population living in chronic poverty. On the other side, 
countries with contracting economies could not reduce poverty even in a seemingly egalitarian 
situation. It is also clear that countries in our sample are concentrated in the low-growth-low-
poverty reduction loop. This suggests that without robust economic growth, economies find it very 
difficult to make a sustainable dent in chronic poverty.  
 A number of countries registered positive growth in average income and yet failed to 
translate that into tangible poverty reduction. This phenomenon tends to prevail in countries where 
growth is not shared broadly, and income distribution deteriorates. These features suggest that 
economic growth is necessary and critical for poverty reduction but without enabling a pattern of 
income distribution economic growth does not necessarily translate into steady poverty reduction.  
 Table 2 below summarizes the descriptive statistics of the data on variables under 
consideration in our sample of 35 African countries. The data reported here is only a conservative 
estimate of the problems of poverty and other attributes of life in Africa. Countries for which data 
is not available are usually with deeper poverty problems and failed economic growth. Whereas 
the 35 countries in the sample provide some picture of the situation in the sub-continent, the 
missing data is partly a symptom of deeper economic, political, and social problems. 
 
Table 2  
Sub-Sahara Africa- Descriptive Statistics on Poverty Indicators 
Variable                                  Obs.    Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
Change in HPI                         35    -.6779     1.1791        -3.1783      1.8575 
Population growth                   35    2.5555    0.6698        0.9126        3.8022 
GDPc growth                          35    2.1256     1.8701        -2.7092      5.9836 
ChangeinIncomeshare             35    -.4402     2.2846        -6.49          3.21 
GDPc2000                               35    854.47    1148.78      136.6          4854.5 
HPI2000                                  35    53.51      20.62          19.64          91.21 
Population 2000                      35    16.692    23.791         .137164     122.87 
Bottom40%share2000             35    26.298    2.955          17.53          30.88 
Poor Population2000               35    9.696      15.507        .04047       78.026 
Poor Population2012               35    11.52      18.323        .06315       94.896 
Change in # Poor                     35    1.825      4.558          -6.545       16.86 
Source: World Bank. 2016. World Development Indicators and Poverty Database.  
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 It is evident from the performance of the countries in the sample that overall poverty has 
declined by a modest rate, but intra-continental variations have been such that there is a net 
increase of about 113 million chronically poor people in the region since the year 2000. This is 
particularly true in countries where per capita income was extremely low to begin with, economic 
growth was modest, and population growth was fast. In the year 2000, for instance, only 10 out of 
the 35 countries in our sample had an income per capita higher than the poverty threshold level 
which suggests that technically, these countries were in generalized poverty. By the year 2012, the 
situation improved modestly so that 16 out of the 35 countries registered a level of per capita 
income beyond the threshold level of chronic poverty. In effect, more than half of the countries in 
the sample are still in generalized poverty, and under such a situation, sustainable poverty reduction 
would be practically impossible unless radical reforms are undertaken that break away from 
structural and systemic bottlenecks for economic activity and productivity of factors of production.    
 
Table 3  
SS Africa- Regression Result on Poverty Index 2000-2013 
Variables     Coefficient Std. Error P-value [95%Conf.  Interval] 
GDPc growth rate  -0.1579 0.0864 0.077 -0.334  0.0183 
Average change in Bottom 40% 
Income share 
-0.2169 0.0716 0.005 -0.363 -0.0709 
Population growth rate  0.2938 0.2036 0.159 -0.121  0.709 
HPI 2000 -0.02286 0.008911 0.015 -0.041 -0.0047 
Dependent Variable: Average annual change in HPI 
Observations: 35 
Adj. R-Squared= 0.4919 
 
Incorporating the different attributing factors in shaping the outcome in poverty indicators 
in the sample countries, Figure 3 portrays concisely the various channels by which progress in 
poverty reduction, as measured by change in the HPI, is influenced or related to the variables that 
are discussed in the conceptual framework section. Whereas economic growth is an important 
force that countries can use to address the problems of chronic poverty, the nature and 
inclusiveness of the growth process is found to be an important element in translating economic 
growth into robust poverty reduction.  
 This aspect of the growth process is closely linked with the pattern of income distribution 
and the extent to which the share of income goes to the relatively poor segment of the population. 
Even if there are various indicators of inequality and a pattern of income distribution, for the 
purpose of this research, we make use of the share of national income that goes to the bottom 40 
percent of the income quintile. Economies that manage to improve a share of the bottom segment 
of the income distribution and hence enabling more and more of the population to benefit from the 
growth process have made significant strides in poverty alleviation efforts.  
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Figure 3. Spectrum of Influences in Poverty Reduction Process 
 
 It is clear from the cross-country observation that a number of countries failed to translate 
economic growth into poverty reduction because of a deteriorating pattern of income distribution 
that effectively excluded the poor from improved income. Such economies have also failed to 
reduce the poverty index on a consistent manner even though they had the opportunity and capacity 
to address the problems of poverty through their improved economic growth performance. 
Countries seem to find that changing the pattern of income distribution is very difficult to 
accomplish without undertaking fundamental changes in their political economy and institutional 
environment. This constraint, in turn, has influenced the extent to which countries can translate 
economic growth into a corresponding poverty alleviation outcome.   
 
Growth, Inequality, and Poverty Nexus 
 The situation and change in poverty indicators are highly influenced by the growth rate of 
national income and the pattern of income distribution which effectively determine who benefits 
from the growth process. Whereas economic growth is a necessary condition for sustainable 
reduction in poverty and improvement in standard of living, it is not a sufficient condition for such 
an outcome. It takes more than economic growth to bring about sustainable growth of job 
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assurance that the next generation of the labor force is getting the necessary training and 
preparation to move to a higher career ladder in the production process. This would create 
economic growth that is shared, comprehensive, and sustainable in that an increasing share of the 
labor force and the population would become both the source and beneficiaries of the improved 
economic growth process.  
 It should be noted, however, that the process of economic growth does not follow sector 
neutral, economic agent neutral, or policy neutral pathways. The process of economic growth 
involves creative innovation of entrepreneurs and the policy and institutional environment in 
which economic decisions are made. This usually leads to sequential changes in economic 
activities, first in limiting industries or sectors and then eventually in reaching the entire economy. 
Entrepreneurs allocate their limited investment resources in areas that promise the most in terms 
of risk-adjusted real return which involves a selective approach towards areas of investment to be 
provided with priorities. Those sectors and activities receive the initial investment allocation and 
employ the factors of production in the flow of sequential economic activities. In this framework, 
growth in employment and income accrues to those ready and able to benefit from the initial 
investment process and translate their employment into higher output and income. Economic 
growth hence is characterized by such discontinuous processes that reshape the scope and intensity 
of utilization of economic resources in the system.  
 If national economic growth is driven by industrial sector growth, it is natural that 
investment resources and employment opportunities expand in the industrial sector attracting more 
resources from the rest of the economy and eventually reallocating these factors towards the sector. 
Those who are actively employ and engage in the industrial sector would be the first beneficiaries 
of the process with subsequent effects on the rest of the economic sectors. In the meantime, income 
and employment opportunities grow relatively faster in the industrial sector which leads perhaps 
to changes in the pattern of income distribution in favor of the industrial sector and workers, 
followed by those economic sectors that have direct and strong links with the industrial activities. 
In this way, the growth process disrupts the prevailing pattern of economic activities as well as the 
distribution of employment and income across economic sectors. The challenges and efficiency in 
economic policy making in the context of developing countries revolve around identifying the 
potentials of the economy and redirecting collective efforts towards such endeavors, and in the 
process, benefiting those involved in the growth of the new opportunities. Countries that have 
managed to generate sustained, steady, and inclusive economic growth were able to register drastic 
reduction in chronic poverty and set the stage for further development of their national economies. 
The experiences of such successful developing countries clearly indicate that addressing the 
challenges of poverty requires combining both the growth and income distribution approaches 
along with continuous effort to balance the two forces.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 The contours of success in poverty alleviation across African countries are closely related 
to economic growth performance, the initial level of income, the level and changes in the 
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distribution of income, and the extent to which the political-economy of these countries facilitates 
the opportunities for sustainable and shared economic growth. While African countries have 
registered modest progress in their fight against poverty, the challenge remains daunting, and those 
who escape chronic poverty are still vulnerable to fall back into the poverty trap. Generalized 
poverty is prevalent in a number of African countries where aggregate output of these economies 
is simply not large enough to provide the necessities of life for their population. In such a situation, 
the first order of priority is to enable the economy to break away from the structural bottlenecks in 
which it finds itself due to hostile policy, institutional, demographic, and environmental pressures.  
  The improvements in recent years both in growth rate and poverty indicators are mainly 
driven by better economic growth whereas further progress highly depends on addressing 
inequality concerns and improving the political-economy environment of the countries. Success 
in poverty reduction in African countries has been very uneven and the overall picture conceals 
critical challenges in a large number of countries that have limited capacity to initiate and sustain 
economic growth. Inequality remains a serious challenge in a number of countries and reform 
measures to address the problem have been moderate. With a few exceptions, there is an apparent 
deterioration in the pattern of income distribution. The evidence suggests that improving the 
pattern of income distribution in favor of the poor has significant impact on reducing the depth 
and scope of poverty and sustaining economic growth.  
 The objective of eliminating chronic poverty within the framework of global sustainable 
development faces its weakest point in the context of African countries and requires addressing 
the remaining hurdles in these countries to sustain and create growth inclusive of the poor. Access 
to education and health services to the poor generates long lasting human capital capabilities 
among the poor that would enable them to earn decent standards of living. Addressing the problems 
of inequality has considerable potential to moderate the problems of chronic poverty in Africa. 
Building the political economic environment and institutions necessary for mobilization of support 
for poverty alleviation are important to translate economic growth into sustainable poverty 
reduction. It is therefore vitally important for African countries to focus their effort to initiate and 
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Abstract 
Most analyses of the African Union (AU) focus on the politics of the state and presidents. 
There are very few analyses that focus on aspects such as youth development. This article 
departs from that tradition. It argues that although the youth were always part of important 
historical developments in Africa, they have remained on the periphery. In recent times, 
particularly since the transformation of the Organization of African Unity into the AU in 
the 2000s, the youth development agenda has begun to receive attention at the policy level. 
In 2015, the AU through Agenda 2063 went a step further by elevating youth matters to 
the mainstream continental policy framework. While these developments are all welcome, 
it emerges clear that in the arena of youth political participation, the continent remains 
hesitant. Where the AU and its member states adopt the language and grammar of youth 
inclusion, of which youth political participation is often limited, such is not met with fitting 
institutional and practical policy arrangements. This article finds that the African elite is in 
for a rude awakening, as we have witnessed since 2011, given the discovery by the African 
youth of new methods of political participation in post-colonial Africa. It advocates for the 
adoption of the African community outlook to a youth state policy, argues for linking youth 
to the project of economic freedom, and implores the African elite to embark upon the 
decolonial project to resolve the bearings of coloniality of being, power and knowledge. 
 
Introduction  
 Although the youth played an important role in the fight against colonialism in Africa, the 
liberating generation upon taking office did not see the need of placing youth development at the 
center of state policy in the liberated zones. The youth were to regard themselves as beneficiaries 
of an independent Africa which must be grateful to the fearless freedom fighters who freed the 
continent from colonial rule. 24 years after Namibia attained independence, former President of 
Namibia Hifikepunye Pohamba gave this warning to the youth of Namibia on 26 August 2014: 
“this [liberation struggle] was not easy as some of you want to believe. It was hard, long and bitter 
and we, the old freedom fighters, fought to the end and liberated the country and the people. Some 
of us lost our lives because of this right cause (Shivute, 2014).      
 In some extreme cases, the expectations of the youth to sing praises to liberating heroes led 
to dictatorships. In Malawi, President Kamuzu Banda ensured that everything in Malawi had been 
revolved around him. As Malawian academic Professor Wiseman Chijere Chirwa explains 
“throughout the 1960s, political songs reflected Banda's consolidation of power and his emerging 
dictatorship. Because of his heroic triumph, everything in the country belonged to him” (Chirwa 
2001, p. 8). African liberation leaders even created concepts and philosophies that were forced 
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down the throats of the citizens as national philosophies and concepts. South African political 
scientist Prince Mashele explains such an occurrence in Kenya:  
 
In Kenya, during the reign of Daniel Arap Moi… citizens were obliged to follow in the 
footsteps of Moi. To entrench his despotism, Moi introduced a philosophy called Nyayo 
(footstep) projecting himself as a pathfinder and the rest of society as followers. Political 
commentators who dared not to follow in Moi’s footsteps faced one of two hard realities: 
you disappear or flee to exile. So serious was Moi about his Nyayo philosophy that he 
could replace a vice-chancellor of any university with someone prepared to follow in the 
correct political footsteps.   (Mashele, 2011) 
 
The continent is, therefore, nourished with many examples illustrating how African 
liberation leaders perceived post-independent Africa as a personal trophy they obtained for 
liberating the continent through their heroic deeds. The citizens, particularly the youth, must at all 
time - it was made clear - be grateful and celebrate the freedom fighters and allow them to rule 
undisturbed. Fast forward to 2017, Africa still has the world’s oldest leaders. Below is an 
illustration of Africa’s top 20 oldest presidents for illustrative purposes;  
 
Table 1 
Rulers by country and age 
Name Country Age 
1. Robert Mugabe Zimbabwe 93 
2. Beji Caid Essebsi Tunisia 91 
3. Paul Biya Cameroon 84 
4. Abselaziz Bouteflika Algeria 80 
5. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf Liberia 79 
6. Alpha Conde Guinea 79 
7. Peter Mutharika Malawi 77 
8. Hage Geingob Namibia 76 
9. Teodoro Obiang Mbasogo Equatorial Guinea 75 
10. Jose Eduardo dos Santos Angola 75 
11. Alassane Ouattara Cote d’ivore 75 
12. Jacob Zuma South Africa 75 
13. Mohammadu Buhari Nigeria 74 
14. Denis Ngueso Congo 74 
15. Akufo Addo Ghana 73 
16. Yoweri Museveni Uganda 73 
17. Pakalitha Mosilili Lesotho 73 
18. Omar al-Bashir Sudan 73 
19. Ibrahim Boubacar Keita Mali 72 
20. Ismail Omar Guelleh Djibouti 71 
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To put Table 1 in fitting context and to understand how liberating leaders in Africa saw 
themselves as the only ones to govern Africa, it is necessary to juxtapose the above table to Table 
2 of Africa’s longest serving leaders. The table below shows that most of Africa’s oldest leaders 
are also the longest serving leaders. Although it may appear obvious that the oldest would be 
longest serving, it must be clarified, for example, that while Ghana’s Akufo Addo may be Africa’s 
15th oldest leader, he only has been in office a few months, having assumed office only in January 
2017. Namibia’s Hage Geingob is Africa’s 8th oldest leader but has only spent two years in office 
since his inauguration in March 2015.  
 
Table 2 
Leaders by country and years in office 
Name Country Years in office 
1. Paul Biya Cameroon 42 years 
2. Teodoro Obiang Mbasogo Equatoria Guinea 38 years 
3. Jose Eduardo dos Santos Angola 38 years 
4. Robert Mugabe Zimbabwe 37 years 
5. Yoweri Museveni Uganda 31 years 
6. Omar al-Bashir Sudan 28 years 
7. Idris Deby Chad 27 years 
8. Isaias Afwerki Eritrea 26 years 
9. Paul Kagame Rwanda 23 years 
10. Denis Sassou Nguesso Congo 20 years 
 
This state of African leadership has not only generated an interest by foreign scholars, such 
as Aguilar (1998), but from countries led by relatively younger leaders. African scholars and 
researchers have also taken keen interest in this debate. This debate is captured around the concept 
of gerontocracy. Nigerian academic, Omotade Adegbindin, explains that a gerontocracy “is a 
political system, a form of oligarchical rule, whereby a small group of elderly individuals are in 
control of power. Unpopular due to its peculiar nature, it is in short, a rule by old men” 
(Adegbindin, 2011, p. 454). Drawing from other scholars to locate this concept in Africa, 
Adegbindin (2011) captures Dei (1994) explaining that in African tradition a gerontocracy is seen 
as occurring where “respect for the authority of elderly persons for their wisdom, knowledge of 
community affairs, and ‘closeness’ to the ancestors… there is in Africa a general belief that ‘old 
age comes with wisdom and an understanding of the world’” (Adegbindin, 2011, p. 13). Kenyan 
academic Peter Onyango Onyoyo provides clarity in detail:  
 
Gerontocracy is the rule by elders or a type of government that associates leadership with 
elders. … Ipso facto in several African traditional societies in which customary law ruled 
the lives of people, the role of elders was substantial and critical for order and harmony. 
The elders are construed to be the custodians of customary law, its promulgators and 
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enforcers… In the post-independent Africa, gerontocracy in the political sense has become 
notorious as some elders cling on power to dominate and favour their next of kin. 
Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe is an example in which the leader sees his status as 
elder to be the reason to cling on power. The late Muammar Ghedafi did the same in Libya, 
President Paul Biye of Cameroon, and the late President Eyadema of Togo did the same. 
Elders in political leadership in Africa have been associated with hunger for power other 
than wisdom.   (Onyoyo 2017, pp. 2-3) 
  
It should, therefore, be no surprise that the entire structure of the OAU did not have a clear 
and specialized function dedicated to a continental youth development agenda. The Pan African 
Youth Movement (PYM) which later became the Pan African Youth Union (PYU) established in 
1962 (a year before the founding of the OAU in 1963) was recognized by the OUA but never 
integrated into its activities. Historically, the PYM consisted of the youth of African ruling political 
parties in general and youth of former liberation movements in particular. After achieving 
independence, the PYM lost currency in the eyes of the liberating leaders subsequently losing 
momentum (Nueys, 2012).  The African Union (AU), the successor of the OAU, established in 
1999, only became concerned with youth development seven years after its formation. This is 
confirmed by the AU 2011 State of the African Youth Report 2011 in no uncertain terms.   
 
Africa’s commitment to youth development and welfare was amply manifested in 2006 
with the adoption by African Heads of State and Government of the African Youth Charter. 
The charter provides a framework for developing and implementing more tangible youth 
policies and programmes. (AUC, 2012, p. VII)  
 
In a foreword to the same report, Professor Jean-Pierre Ezin, the then Commissioner for 
Human Resources, Science and Technology of the African Union Commission (AUC), 
summarized what to him was continental commitment to the continental youth development 
agenda.  
 
The African Union Commission has come a long way in its efforts to promote youth 
development and empowerment in Africa. It developed the African Youth Charter, which 
was approved by African Heads of State and Government in 2006 and which entered into 
force in a relatively short time. The Charter constitutes a continental legal framework that 
seeks to re-position the challenges, potential, contributions and rights of young people in 
the mainstream of Africa’s socio-economic growth and development. In 2009, the AU 
Executive Council declared the years 2009-2018 as the Decade for Youth Development 
and Empowerment in Africa. Subsequently, the AU Ministers in Charge of Youth Affairs 
approved the Decade Plan of Action (DPoA) – a roadmap for accelerating the 
implementation of the charter. By deciding to focus on the theme Accelerating Youth 
Empowerment for Sustainable Development for the 2011 Summit of African Union Heads 
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of State and Government, the AU demonstrates the importance it attaches to the role and 
contribution of the youth in the development process.  (AU 2012, p. VI)  
 
The mindset of the liberation leaders – of youth to be grateful to political freedom fighters 
– has extended to the technical staff of the AUC. How else does one explain AUC commissioner 
Ezin’s conclusion that something as flimsy as a theme can be regarded as demonstrating the 
importance that the AU attaches to the role and contribution of the youth in the development 
process? In 2011, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) released its 2011 
African Youth Report. Abdoulie Janneh, the then United Nations Under-Secretary-General and 
Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa, did not conceal the reality of the 
exclusion and nonparticipation of African youth in decision making.  
 
As argued in this report, young people need an enabling environment politically, 
economically and socially to thrive in our countries. They need to be empowered so that 
they can be represented and participate in decision-making processes that affect their lives. 
Though Africa has made progress in providing education and skills for more young people 
than ever before, youth unemployment and underemployment remain a major challenge. 
Innovative approaches and in-depth analysis of youth issues at both the design and 
implementation phases of policies and programmes are needed to ensure effective delivery 
and better outcomes towards a great future for the young women and men of Africa. 
(Economic Commission for Africa, 2011, p. VIII)  
 
To its credit, the AU distinguished itself from the OAU by creating a youth division within 
the structures of the AUC. According to the AU, the “youth division under the Department of 
Human Resources, Science & Technology (HRST) is the division responsible for Africa’s Youth 
Agenda in the African Union Commission (AUC)” (African Union Commission, 2017). Most 
importantly, the AU’s language and articulation of the importance of the youth division is the most 
telling in the subsequent sentences, “It [Youth Division] promotes youth participation such as 
organizing youth forums and celebrating Africa Youth Day. By harmonizing and coordinating 
member states as well as bringing together all relevant stakeholders, the youth division is mandated 
to, among other functions, use the outcomes and recommendations from all sectors through 
appropriate training frameworks to strengthen the African Youth” (African Union Commission, 
2017).  
What the above states is simply that the AU sees youth participation as represented by 
flimsy things such as celebrating Youth Day. This mindset is similar to that of Kamuzu Banda of 
Malawi, as discussed earlier, who saw the role of the youth and women as that of singing, clapping 
hands and celebrating him. The AU makes it clear that the mandate of the division is not to ensure 
that youth have input into decisions but merely to receive and accept outcomes and 
recommendations. From the 21st-25th of May 2016, the AU held what was called the Banjul+10 
Summit on the 10-year implementation of the African Youth Charter in The Gambia to review the 
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progress made in regard to the African Youth Charter since its adoption in 2006. It was found that 
most African states still did not ratify the Charter. In the outcome document, the AU set a target 
of ensuring that there would be a “hundred percent ratification by the end of 2016” (African Union, 
2016). Speaking on the future prospects for African youth, in Germany on 6 April 2017 at the 
Potsdam Dialogues, the AUC Commissioner for Human Resources, Science and Technology, 
Martial De-Paul Ikounga, disclosed that the wishful target of 100 percent ratification of the charter 
that was previously set in Banjul was not achieved (Ikounga, 2017).  
What emerges clearly from the above is that to both the OAU and its successor the AU, the 
youth and the youth agenda are either a non-issue or peripheral issue. In response, the youth did 
not sit idle. There have been a number of responses from the African youth. Although the PYU 
enjoyed cordial relations with both the OUA and AU, it faced several challenges, particularly 
financial challenges, given the somewhat ‘arm-chair’ approach of leadership of the continental 
body. The continental youth body was forced to change its headquarters three times: from 
Conakry, Guinea, to Algiers, Algeria in 1967; then from Algiers to Khartoum, Sudan, in 2008 
(NUEYS, 2012). Speaking at the African Youth Day on 1 November 2012, the former chairperson 
of the African Union Commission Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma admitted the serious challenges faced 
by the PYU thus promising the AUC’s commitment to embark upon the revitalization of the Pan 
African Youth Union (The Point, 2012). It does not require sophistication to note that revitalization 
can only take place when faced with decline and weakening.   
From the 1st to 4th of November 2013 in Tunisia, the AUC in collaboration with the New 
Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) coordinating Agency, the African Development 
Bank and the ECA organized a youth consultative meeting on the envisaged Agenda 2063. This 
meeting culminated in the establishment of the AU Youth Working Group (AUYWG). The 
AUYWG later transformed itself into the African Youth Commission (AYC) that held its first 
General Assembly and elected the founding leadership in January 2017 on the sidelines of the AU 
Summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The AYC, seeing itself as the youth version of the AUC, set its 
objective as an organization where “all inspiring and capable young African leaders and African 
Diaspora can organize themselves, take up their responsibilities, strengthen cooperation among the 
youth and youth structures as a platform, speak up and promote youth voices in the context of 
Africa’s development” (African Youth Commission, 2017). It further outlined its objectives as:  
 
to organize all young people in Africa and Diaspora for the promotion of African unity and 
development through linkage of youth and youth structures and mobilization of resources 
(human, technical, technology and finance) to support the work of African youth, youth 
structures, Pan African Youth Union and Youth Division of the African Union Commission 
in their quest to effective service delivery and advocacy activities on the African Youth 
Charter, other AU legal instruments and youth projects at national, regional and continental 
levels for the advancement of Africa (African Youth Commission, 2017, p. 4).  
 
International Journal of African Development v.5 n.1 Spring 2018 109 
 
As it did with the PYU, the AU took an “arm-chair” approach to the AYC although it 
played an indirect role in its creation. Towards the AYC General Assembly in January 2017, the 
African Union Youth Division released a statement that was regarded as an attempt to either 
sabotage or distance the continental body from the youth program. The statement, released on 13 
January 2017, merely a week before the youth General Assembly, read:  
 
With regards to the upcoming AYC Annual General Assembly on the 22-25 January 2017 
in Addis Ababa, we wish to categorically state that we have not been involved in the 
coordination of this event as has been erroneously reported across various 
media.  Unfortunately, this avoidable situation is a misrepresentation that has caused 
confusion, particularly among prospective participants, and simultaneously hampered the 
event’s credibility.  (African Union Youth Division, 2017) 
  
While making such damaging remarks, the division still went on to state that it would 
encourage “pro-active initiatives of African youth in forming organizations, networks or think 
tanks as a response to the prevailing challenges that affect them; whether it is at the national, 
regional or continental levels” (African Union Youth Division, 2017). Be that as it may, the AYC 
General Assembly went ahead and elected its leadership. This then meant that there were now two 
continental youth organizations: the PYU and the AYC. One of the arguments used by those at the 
forefront of AYC is that unlike PYU that is host to the National Youth Councils, the AYC 
membership is open to individual youth and civil society organizations that would not get an 
opportunity to engage in the continental youth development agenda under the PYU framework. 
The other argument used against the PYU is that it appears to be too political and aligned to ruling 
parties in Africa of which some are responsible for the suppression of the youth and 
underdevelopment. In other words, the PYU, through its national youth councils, stands complicit.  
There have been responses from African youth, responses to gerontocracies, 
authoritarianism, corruption and underdevelopment, outside the PYU and AYC structures. One of 
the well-known initiatives taken by the youth of Africa to ensure political participation is what has 
come to be known as the Arab Springs - the popular grassroots protests that took place in North 
Africa and toppled several African dictators. Ruge (2012) explains what underpinned the Arab 
Spring.   
 
At the heart of the Arab Spring was a disgruntled youth class seeking democratic 
representation and economic participation. Remember Mohamed Bouazizi, the Tunisian 
street vendor whose self-immolation launched the uprisings? He didn’t set himself ablaze 
because he had a smart phone. His self-immolation was his last desperate attempt to bring 
attention to his economic exclusion. His peers in the region sympathized and, almost 
overnight, Tunisia and the political landscape of most of Northern Africa changed. It was 
a signal that Africa’s ruling class was under siege. On one end, Mr. Bouazizi, aged 26, 
represented Africa’s emerging youth class, an impatient demographic eager to upend the 
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status quo (he was only five years younger than the median Tunisian). On the other, 
deposed dictator Ben Ali, age 76, stood as a breed of elder statesmen – disconnected from 
the needs of populations, and facing extinction. 
As dictators in North Africa were being toppled, their contemporaries in the rest of the 
continent worked hard to control the youth and avoid similar uprising. Ugandan President Yoweri 
Museveni is said to have deployed the military into the streets of Kampala to quell protests (Smith, 
2011). Despite these attempts, the youth in the zones with long serving and authoritarian leaders 
still managed to wage protests in one way or the other. Years later, in 2014, the long-serving despot 
Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso was forced to flee the country. Pictures of youth jubilantly 
jumping on top of seats in Burkina Faso Parliament went viral on social media (Berman, 2014). In 
stable democracies, where corruption and underdevelopment were rampant, particularly in 
Southern Africa, the youth formed radical social movements agitating for transformation, social 
justice and equality. Consider the case of Namibia as explained by Namibian academic Phanuel 
Kaapama (2016, p. 32):  
 
Namibia reached her Fanonian moment… a new generation has entered the country’s 
social and political scene and has forcefully asked penetrating new questions. So, 
Namibia’s ‘Fanonian moment’ has come in the form of the [Affirmative Repositioning] 
AR movement. Other issues that have come under the radar of AR’s fervent political eye 
include the perceived/allege widespread nepotism and corruption among the political and 
economic elite… The AR movement has ‘declared war’ on what it calls the “general 
zombie tendency” and its politics of hand-clapping and singing for the satisfaction of 
politicians, by working towards liberating the youth by converting them into active citizens 
and upright activists.  
 
In some parts of North Africa, the youth have taken serious risks such as attempting to 
cross rivers and oceans into Europe in search of economic opportunities and political stability. 
Consider the case that The Gambia reported, “for its size, Gambia is experiencing a 
disproportionate number of people leaving the country. Its population is just under 2 million, yet 
over the past two years, it has been ranked fourth and fifth in the International Organisation for 
Migration’s league of the six main nationalities identified attempting to cross the Mediterranean 
from Libya to Italy” (Hunt, 2015). In North, East and West Africa some youth resolved to join 
armed military groups such as Boko Haram and others (Onuoha, 2014). 
This account and survey of continental youth political participation and developmental 
agenda was necessary to buttress the point that the scope of analysis should not only concern itself 
with the center and the institutions within its reach but should also consider (a) the existence of a 
periphery, (b) an understanding of why the periphery exists, and (c) the interaction, if any, between 
the center and periphery. The fundamental question, therefore, remains - who is in? Who is 
included in the center-led conversation and who do they represent? Indeed, who is out and what 
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do they feel and what are they going to and willing to do about it? It is only when these questions 
are answered that it can be determine how youth political participation can be improved. 
 
Agenda 2063 - Who Is The “We”? 
 
The Essence of Agenda 2063  
 Agenda 2063 is a program of the AU adopted by African Heads of State and Government 
who assembled in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at the 24th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the 
Union in January 2015. In that session outcome, the African Heads of State and Governments 
romanticized Agenda 2063 as  
“[an] endogenous plan for transformation. It harnesses the continent’s comparative advantages 
such as its people, history and cultures; its natural resources; its position and repositioning in the 
world to effect equitable and people-centered social, economic and technological transformation 
and the eradication of poverty. It seeks to fulfil our obligation to our children as an inter-
generational compact, to develop Africa’s human capital; build social assets, infrastructure and 
public goods; empower women and youth; promote lasting peace and security; build effective 
developmental states and participatory and accountable institutions of governance; [articulate] 
Africa’s vision and roadmap for sequencing our sectoral and normative, national, regional and 
continental plans into a coherent whole; plus, be a call to action to all Africans and people of 
African descent, to take personal responsibility for the destiny of the continent and as the primary 
agents of change and transformation, and a commitment from citizens, leadership, governments 
and institutions at national, regional and continental levels to act, coordinate, and cooperate for the 
realization of this vision”  (AU, 2015, p. 13).  
And, as a policy framework that aims to provide a collective developmental path for 
Africa’s development, Agenda 2063 is anchored on 7 pillars: (1) a prosperous Africa based on 
inclusive growth and sustainable development; (2) an integrated continent, politically united and 
based on the ideals of Pan-Africanism and the vision of Africa’s Renaissance; (3) an Africa of 
good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law; (4) a peaceful 
and secure Africa;  (5) an Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, shared values 
and ethics; (6) an Africa whose development is people-driven, relying on the potential of African 
people, especially its women and youth, and caring for children; and (7) an Africa as a strong, 
united and influential global player and partner (AU, 2015).  
 
Youth Content in Agenda 2063  
 While there might not be a specific aspiration that speaks to youth political participation, 
it is important to note that aspiration 6 speaks of an Africa whose development is people driven 
and relies on the potential of the African people, especially its youth. What Agenda 2063 does, 
despite tokenism analysis, is to depart from a longstanding tradition of the OAU and AU of 
peripherising youth development. In fact, the OAU Charter, in both Article II (purposes) and 
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Article III (principles), makes no mention or inference to youth (Elias, 1965). The Constitutive 
Act of the AU also does not change this state of affairs. Its Article 3 (on the Objectives of the AU) 
and Article 4 (on the Principles of the AU) both fail to make mention of the youth (AU, 2000). 
While some might argue that the youth do not necessarily warrant mentioning in these legislative 
instruments, it must be noted that the AU Constitutive Act mentions in Article 4 the promotion of 
gender equality (often a twin to youth empowerment/inclusion) as one of the principles of the AU. 
Agenda 2063, therefore, departs from the AU tradition of placing youth at the periphery. The 
policy framework admits that “no society can reach its full potential, unless it empowers … youth” 
and sets an objective of having an engaged and empowered youth (AU, 2015). Furthermore, it 
articulates and makes the following daring declarations on youth as part of Aspiration 6:  
 The youth of Africa shall be socially, economically and politically empowered through the 
full implementation of the African Youth Charter.  
 All forms of systemic inequalities, exploitation, marginalization and discrimination of 
young people will be eliminated, and youth issues mainstreamed in all development 
agendas.  
 Youth unemployment will be eliminated, and Africa’s youth guaranteed full access to 
education, training, skills and technology, health services, jobs and economic 
opportunities, and recreational and cultural activities as well as financial means and all 
necessary resources to allow them to realize their full potential.  
 Young African men and women will be the path breakers of the African knowledge society 
and will contribute significantly to innovation and entrepreneurship. The creativity, energy 
and innovation of Africa’s youth shall be the driving force behind the continent’s political, 
social, cultural and economic transformation.  
 It is evident that Agenda 2063 has some content on the youth. As stated before, the decision 
to place youth in a central/mainstream AU document is a serious departure from the policy 
positions and approach of both the OUA and AU. In 2013, the AU started consulting the youth 
regarding Agenda 2063. The consultations will later bear fruit if the content of Agenda 2063 is 
taken into consideration. In November 2013 in Hamamet, Tunisia, the AU held consultation with 
the youth on Agenda 2063. It was at this gathering that the youth immaculately presented to the 
AU their desire to actively participate in the politics and governance of the AU, and its member 
states. The youth went further to indicate that the Africa they want is one wherein they are involved 
in the drafting of policies and take an active part in the implementation and monitoring process. 
At that conference, youth political participation was invoked. Resultantly, a working group called 
the African Union Youth Working Group (AUYWG) was established to ensure that the resolution 
of the youth that gathered there was included in the African developmental way forward in general 
and in Agenda 2063 in particular. Four years later, in 2017, the AUYWG transformed itself into 
an independent continental youth organization, the AYC, whose primary purpose would be to 
monitor the AUC and the AU and ensure that youth concerns would not be placed at the periphery 
(Dhlamini, 2017). This development alone indicates not only the input youth made into Agenda 
2063 but their determination to create their own independent spaces and ensure political 
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participation. The other aspects of youth consultation and input into Agenda 2063 took place at 
the state level. The AU policy organ, at its July 2014 meeting in Equatorial Guinea, had tasked 
member states to embark upon domestic consultations with various stakeholders (youth, academia, 
women, civil society and women) and submit the outcomes to the AUC by 31 October 2014. South 
Africa, for example, held such consultation with the youth on 11 July 2014 (DIRCO, 2015). 
 
‘It Is In But Not In’ 
 In November 2015, the biggest daily newspaper in Namibia, The Namibian, ran a story that 
President Hage Geingob had temporarily moved out of the State House to his mansion on the 
outskirts of the capital city, Windhoek, to allow for expensive renovations that were in line with 
his taste. The Presidential Affairs Minister, Frans Kapofi, was at pains in explaining as to whether 
the President had moved out of the State House. In response to journalists, who were asking for 
confirmation as to whether the president has indeed moved out, Kapofi flip-flopped stating the 
following, “He [president] is here but he is not here” (Immanuel & Mongudhi, 2015).  Kapofi’s 
explanation is a fitting importation to explain youth political participation in Agenda 2063 or, 
though slightly amended, to ‘it is in, but not in’. While there is considerable content and mention 
in Agenda 2063 of youth, it is not clear as to whether this constitutes political participation. The 
language and grammar of Agenda 2063 speaks to what the AU will do for youth and not what it 
can do together with youth. It sees youth as mere subjects to benefit from the generosity of their 
elders who have now mentioned them in their documents. It makes use of terms such as “support 
young people” and many ‘othering’ terms when discussing the youth. The main version, called the 
popular version of Agenda 2063, states the following as the actionable programs that speak to 
youth (AU, 2015):  
… support young people as drivers of Africa’s renaissance, through investment in their 
health, education and access to technology, opportunities and capital, and concerted 
strategies to combat youth unemployment and underemployment. Ensure faster movement 
on the harmonization of continental admissions, curricula, standards, programmes and 
qualifications and raising the standards of higher education to enhance the mobility of 
African youth and talent across the continent.  
 
 It is evident that what is an envisaged and actionable program of the Agenda 2063 does not 
include political participation. The language and grammar of Agenda 2063 make itself available 
to the interpretation that reform and youth inclusion are limited to health, education, technology, 
economic opportunities and education. Youth political participation is not conspicuously part of 
Agenda 2063. They are thus perceived as readily available beneficiaries of the political generosity 
of their elders who have now included their issues in key policy documents such as Agenda 2030. 
The youth are, therefore ‘In but not in’ in Agenda 2063. Agenda 2063 is often paraded, and its 
content so read, around the phrase of ‘The Africa We Want.’ Although it appears that youth are 
indeed part of the we, or they might perceive themselves as part of the we, it appears, on closer 
inspection, that the we is an exclusive imagery of the African Heads of State and Government. As 
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will be further elaborated in the proceeding pages, youth political participation remains a 
peripheral concern despite making an appearance in key policy documents of the AU.  
 
African Political Elite Orientation towards Youth Political Participation 
As has been explored and displayed earlier, youth matters have always been peripheral in 
the imagination and discourse of African political leaders. If the youth matters are themselves 
peripheral, one can only imagine how distant youth political participation would be in the minds 
of African political leaders. To understand what and how African leaders perceive youth, one only 
needs to study how the African governments conceptualize ministries dealing with youth affairs. 
A short illustration is thus necessary. 
 
Table 3 
Country and youth participation 
Country Name Name of Ministry 
Angola Youth and Sport 
Burkina Faso Youth, Professional Education and Employment  
Cameroon Youth Affairs and Civic Education  
DRC Youth and Sports 
Ethiopia Youth and Sports  
Gabon Youth and Sports 
Kenya Public Service, Youth and Gender Affairs 
Lesotho Gender and Youth, Sports and Recreation 
Liberia Youth and Sports 
Mali Youth and Citizenship Building  
Namibia Youth, Sports and National Service 
Nigeria Youth Development 
Rwanda Youth and ICT 
Senegal Youth, Employment and Promotion of Civic Values 
Sudan Youth and Sports 
The Gambia Youth and Sports 
Togo Basic Development, Crafts, Youth and Youth Employment 
Tunisia Youth, Sports, Women and Families 
Uganda Youth and Children Affairs 
Zimbabwe Youth, Indigenization and Economic Empowerment  
 
 Table 3 represents a random selection of 20 African countries and indicates the following: 
(a) most African leaders view the youth’s main objective and role as that of entertainment, chasing 
footballs and dancing/singing during national events. It is for this reason that in most African 
countries youth ministries are placed together with recreation, sports, national service or civic 
education.; but (b) Zimbabwe sees youth in relation to economic empowerment and indigenization, 
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Kenya links youth to planning, and Rwanda links youth to ICT which provides a new and fresh 
perspective that departs from the orthodox linkage of youth to entertainment and sports. With the 
exception of few cases, this illustrates that youth are perceived as peripheral issues. It is therefore 
understandable that youth play a very small, if any, role in continental agenda setting.  
 As such, it can be argued that despite its predecessor the OAU that started off as a people-
centered continental body that at one point assisted non-state actors fighting for national liberation, 
the AU remains engaged in elite politics. It is therefore no surprise that, although Agenda 2063 
speaks about fighting for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara, the AU recently 
resolved to admit Morocco to the African Union without a clear explanation and direction 
(Kazeem, 2017). What is clear is that once an elite pact is concluded, the aspiration of young men 
and women fighting with determination in Western Sahara does not matter (Akwei, 2017). The 
youth, including those of Western Sahara, are to remain beneficiaries of the ‘generous’ elders who 
have mentioned them in key documents such as Agenda 2063. When the African passport was 
launched at the 27th Summit of the AU in Kigali, Rwanda, the first recipients where not youth to 
symbolize a future-looking continent but the African elites, Rwandan President Paul Kagame and 
Chadian President Idris Deby Itno, who already enjoy diplomatic privileges until death. Giving 
these individuals African passports thus becomes irrelevant on close inspection (Adibe, 2016). 
These are amongst the many reasons that support the argument that the AU prioritizes elite interest 
dwarfing any elevation of matters such as youth political participation. 
In a 2011 Afrobarometer’s working paper titled The Political Participation of Africa’s 
Youth: Turnout, Partisanship and Protest, Danielle Resnick and Daniela Casale capture the 
orientation of African youth as it relates to political participation:  
 
Our findings suggest that Africa’s youth, particularly those residing in urban areas, operate 
in broadly similar ways to their counterparts in other regions of the world. In comparison 
with their older compatriots, the youth vote less and are more likely to demonstrate no 
partisanship or an attachment to opposition parties rather than any affinity to incumbent 
parties. Yet, the likelihood of their involvement in protests is not significantly different 
from that of their older counterparts.  Moreover, we find that the youth, unlike older voters, 
tend to vote less the longer an incumbent party has been in office. In addition, poor 
incumbent performance on job creation, compared with other socio-economic issues, 
increases the likelihood of the youth to express either no partisanship or an affinity to the 
opposition. In terms of protest activity, higher levels of education and economic 
deprivation, as well as a lack of satisfaction with democracy, increase the likelihood that 
the youth will protest while demonstrating a null impact on their older cohorts’ protest 
activities. (Resnick & Casale, 2011, p. 2) 
At the time Resnick and Casale (2011) published their paper, Africa had just experienced 
the youth-led uprising in North Africa that toppled long-serving dictators and authoritarian leaders. 
As stated in the introduction to this paper, a young Mohamed Bouazizi found himself in 
circumstances that were confirmed by the studies of Resnick and Casale, which led him to setting 
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himself alight and becoming a martyr of the youth-led revolution that spread fast and had as its 
casualty some long-serving African authoritarian leaders. The marginalization of the youth and the 
consequences thereto can be placed squarely at the doorstep of an unresponsive policy 
environment and the ‘periphering’ of the youth from mainstream political participation. Indeed, it 
is the failure of African states to engage the youth into activities that are aimed at influencing the 
selection, constituting and general decisions of the government bureaucracy. As previously stated, 
the marginalization of the youth from mainstream political participation and ‘periphering’ the 
youth did not leave the youth idling. They found alternative forms of political participation at their 
location - the periphery. To the surprise of many, as what happened with the Arab Spring and with 
popular urbanized protests in southern Africa, the periphery found its way to the mainstream 
forcing the political elite to either capitulate or engage those who were seen as ‘peripherised’ 
(Branch & Mampilly, 2015).  
 The AU in Agenda 2063 adopted a language and grammar that can be said to have 
diagnosed the danger of ‘peripherising’ the youth. In what can be seen as either appeasement or 
commitment to prevent the relapse of the popular protests, Agenda 2063 promised that “all forms 
of systemic inequalities, exploitation, marginalization and discrimination of young people will be 
eliminated, and youth issues mainstreamed in all development agendas” (AUC, 2015). Although 
the AU documents, such as Agenda 2063, appear to suggest that the AU and its member states are 
somewhat committed to bring about real political participation, its rhetoric does not seem to be 
supported by credible institutional arrangements. Consider the Youth Division of the AU that is 
responsible for Africa’s youth agenda at the AUC. The division explains that it promotes youth 
participation by “organizing forums and celebrating Africa Youth Day” (AU, 2017). It goes further 
to admit that its mandate is to use the outcomes and recommendations to strengthen the youth. 
This is a clear indication of two things: firstly, like is the case amongst AU member states, the AU 
understands the youth in the context of entertainment and celebration days like Africa Youth Day; 
secondly, it is an admission that the mandate of the division is not to influence decisions but to use 
the outcomes and recommendation (already made) to strengthen the youth. In other words, youth 
are to be beneficiaries and recipients of the “generosity” of the elders. Had the AUC, its youth 
division and member states been interested in genuine political participation, it would have 
endorsed campaigns such as Not Too Young to Run, supported and spearheaded by the UN 
Secretary-General’s Envoy on Youth, Ahmad Alhendawi. This campaign aims at doing away with 
restrictive practices, particularly in most African countries, where state policy prevents young 
people from running for public office (Srour, 2016) 
 
Conclusion – What Is To Be Done? 
 
Make the Circle Bigger  
 If there is any lesson to be learned from recent popular and far-reaching events spearheaded 
by the youth from the Arab Spring in North Africa to violent extremists in West and East Africa 
and popular urbanized protests in southern Africa, it is this: it is in the interest of the African elites 
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to engage the African youth and ensure that they facilitate political participation in mainstream 
national politics in a genuine, inclusive and constructive manner. The African youth have proven 
that they do not need permission and are capable of organizing their own independent forms of 
political participation that often lead to their desired outcomes - destructive as it may seem 
particularly to those profiting in an exclusive status quo. It is in the interest of peaceful coexistence 
for the African leaders to create an enabling environment for political participation of youth. The 
current leaders must, indeed, make the circle bigger.  
 
Linking Youth to Economic Freedom 
The underlying objective of the African liberation struggle against colonialism was not 
only to bring about self-determination but also to solve the then contractions of political power. 
The understanding and imagination of the liberating leaders, such as the likes of Kwame Nkrumah, 
were that political freedom will lead to economic freedom for the oppressed masses on the African 
continent. In fact, one of Nkrumah’s famous phrases has been one that states that you first seek 
the political kingdom and the rest shall be added unto you. The ‘rest’ that Nkrumah was referring 
to is seen as the economic kingdom. It is now a common understanding that Nkrumah’s dream was 
not fulfilled (Mashele & Qobo, 2014). This dismal failure has not left youth idling. The youth have 
understood the liberating generation as having failed economically thus necessitating the current 
need for economic freedom fighters to emerge and fight for economic freedom (Shivambu, 2014). 
Although the youth understands that their mission is to continue the incomplete struggle to solve 
the remaining contradictions of economic power, the struggle was started by the liberating 
generation, and it has become impossible to pursue this struggle without confronting the very same 
fighters and victors of political freedom because of their positionality (Seibeb, 2016). For as long 
as the AU member states continue to define youth from the perspective of entertainment, sports 
and agents of celebration during national festivals and events, conflicts between these states and 
the youth will continue to occur. As such, examples of Zimbabwe, Rwanda and Kenya who locate 
youth in the context of economic freedom – viewing youth as an agency of solving the remaining 
contradictions of economic power – must be emulated.  
 
Appropriate African Community Outlook to Youth State Policy  
Because of the conduct of the politics of the state, the liberation generation has often taken 
an opportunistic approach to the appropriation of African tradition and culture. The African 
political elites often resort to African tradition and practices such as respect of elders to 
opportunistically escape from accountability and evade serious questions related to their political 
conduct. There are several African practices and value systems that remain important and can assist 
in bringing about the youth’s political participation in the mainstream national discourse. One such 
African value system is the African outlook or conceptualization of a community. Africans have 
always understood the community as consisting of (a) the dead, (b) the living, and (c) those yet to 
be born (Kamalu, 2000). The dead are regarded as part of the community although may not be 
visible to everyone. They are in the ancestry watching over, supervising and protecting the living. 
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For their part, the living plays a dual role: firstly, they live their lives and lead society in adherence 
in regard and observation of the values and norms that were left by the departed who are in the 
ancestry and part of the community watching over them; secondly, the living leads their lives and 
society in such a way that they preserve a good community for those who have yet to arrive on 
earth. The community must be preserved in such a way that when the living takes their position in 
the ancestry, they will be watching over the new living (the present unborn) who will preside over 
a community that they left in good shape. The African elites opportunistically leave out this 
outlook that has ensured accountability and self-regulation in the African traditional society 
(Sesanti, 2011). An individual with this outlook would be hesitant of stealing the collective 
resources for personal use because he/she is cognizant of the ancestors who are watching his deeds, 
even those committed behind closed doors. He/She would be bothered by the thought of one-day 
sitting in the ancestry witnessing the living scavenging and suffering because he/she looted and 
squandered collective resources. Said differently and in the context of political participation, the 
African political elite should ensure political participation of the young, fearing an eye-sore when 
they are in the ancestry because they have left the unexposed and inexperienced to take over state 
power without the requisite experiences because they were not given an opportunity to learn and 
practice when they were young.  
 
Decoloniality – Reimagining Africa 
Related to the above discussion is the question of decoloniality, one of the many failures 
of the liberating generation. The common mistake that the African elite have made over the past 
decades of political freedom is to think that it is only them who are concerned about the African 
perspective and the fight against colonialism. They have concluded that the generation of youth 
born after independence has been influenced by western values. The African elites always see the 
demands by this generation of youth as sponsored from outside, and thus concluded that the 
growing dissent is the artwork of the underground of a ‘third force.’  The youth of southern Africa, 
through popular radical protests against inequality, poverty, underdevelopment and neoliberalism, 
have taken the African elites by surprise once it occurred that the discontentment is homegrown 
and, in some instances, has strong Pan Africa, Black Consciousness and African communalistic 
values (Mabhena, 2016). The demands on the state through radical protest actions for decent and 
dignified housing for all and the demands for free quality decolonized higher education are all 
prevalent in southern African as a case in point. The state and African elites must seriously 
consider taking the decolonial discourse serious, and this includes dealing with the questions of 
coloniality of power, coloniality of knowledge and coloniality of being. All these questions raised 
by the youth of Africa speak to the deficit of their political participation.  
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